

Husband: **JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM**
 Born: circa 1570 Haarlem, Holland, Netherlands
 Died: circa 1650¹ Al-Walīdiyya, Dokkala, Morocco
 Father: JAN GIJSBERTSEN VAN HAARLEM
 Mother:

Wife 1: **SOUTGEN CAVES**
 Born: circa 1575
 Died: after 1622
 Married: 1596 Holland, Netherlands
 Father:
 Mother:
 Issue: Born: Where:
 1) MARIKEN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM 1598
 2) LYSBETH JANSEN VAN HAARLEM circa 1600 Holland, Netherlands

Wife 2: **MORJANA BINT ABD AL-RAHMAN**
 Born: 1578
 Died: 1631 Fez, Ses region, Morocco
 Married: 12 August 1600 Cartagena, Murcia, Castile
 Father: ABDERAHMAN *al-Qartaganatiya (of Cartagena)*
 Mother: ALDARA BINT ZAYD IBN ABDEL-MALIK
 Issue: Born: Where:
 3) ABRAHAM JANSEN VAN SALÉ 1602 Cartagena, Murcia, Castile
 4) PHILIP JANSEN VAN SALÉ 1604 Cartagena, Murcia, Castile
 5) **ANTHONY JANSEN VAN SALÉ 1608 **Cartagena, Murcia, Castile****
 6) CORNELIS JANSEN VAN SALÉ 1609 Cartagena, Murcia, Castile

Wife 3: **ZAYNAB AL-KUBRA BINT SULTAN ZAIDAN EL-NASIR AS-SÂADI**
 Born:
 Died:
 Married: 1624 Marrakesh, Abda region, Morocco
 Father: ZAIDAN EL-NASIR AS-SÂADI
 Mother:
 Issue:
 7) [UNNAMED DAUGHTER] *died young*

JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM


THE BORING EARLY YEARS

The very name passed down to us over the centuries give us some clues about this ancestor.

- First: Toponymic surname – it can be surmised that he was from the town of Haarlem as “VAN” translates to “FROM” as in JAN JANSEN *FROM* HAARLEM. However just what “FROM HAARLEM” means is not certain. It does not say he was *born* in Haarlem, only that he was *from* that place. He may have been born in Haarlem or in a nearby place, which would be a sensible, if not proven, statement.
- Second: Patronymic surname – “JANSEN” literally translates to “JAN’S SON.” The development of surname usage followed a similar pattern in much of Europe in that a second name based on the father’s name was used in addition to the first; this is called patronymic naming. This helped to identify the *JAN who was JAN’S SON* from the *JAN who was DIRK’S SON* or “*JAN JANSEN*” from “*JAN DIRKSON*.” Both names were specific to one individual with the tradition of actually keeping the same surname through successive generations slowly catching on from the 15th to 17th centuries. While we can not be sure that the use of a specific second name versus a handed-down surname was the method of naming for this ancestor, the possible ancestry of JAN JANSEN found later indicates that the second name was specific until the mid-16th century. Absence evidence to the contrary, it is plausible to accept the premise that the use of second names continued to follow the established pattern through the rest of the 16th century and therefore the father of JAN JANSEN was named JAN. Additional evidence for accepting such a premise comes from the naming of JAN JANSEN’S granddaughters born in the 1630s and 1640s, the daughters of his son ANTHONY. The four girls were named ANNICA, SARAH, CORNELIA and EVA and the few contemporary records available often list a second name: ANTONISE, which means *ANTHONY’S DAUGHTER*. They also used JANSEN as their surname so we see when the change from using a patronymic name to a hereditary surname occurred in this branch.
- Third: the necessity of identifying oneself accurately comes with growing prominence in whatever community you find yourself in. JAN was a merchant and as he grew more successful, the need to accurately identify him grew as well.
- Fourth: we can assume that the application of the phrase “VAN HAARLEM” was used to prevent one JAN JANSEN from being mistaken for a different JAN JANSEN. Inherent with such a usage is the fact that to use this phrase while JAN JANSEN lived in Haarlem would have been pointless; every JAN JANSEN living in Haarlem was, by definition, JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM. So the *VAN HAARLEM* was added during the time JAN JANSEN, a merchant of some accord, was living somewhere other than Haarlem. Not only somewhere else, but somewhere where the qualifier VAN HAARLEM was understood, somewhere like Amsterdam.
- Fifth: it appears that VAN HAARLEM was used by JAN for many years, at least until he appears in the slave market in Algiers which possibly shows that use of his full name carried with it some cache that the abbreviated form did not.

Thirteen generations separates the author from the subject in this work.

BRIAN SMITH



JAN's descendants number in the thousands after thirteen generations. With such a huge population of cousins, there are bound to be a few stand-outs. Two U.S. Presidents named ROOSEVELT are related to us as is a former First Lady born with the surname BOUVIER, as in JACQUELINE (BOUVIER) KENNEDY ONASSIS – that could explain why I always thought Mom looked like JACKIE O. The VANDERBILT clan count themselves as our relatives – both the COMMODORE and the former fashion-maven GLORIA – as is the well-known news reporter, and one of our contemporary cousins, ANDERSON COOPER, son of “Little” GLORIA VANDERBILT. HUMPHREY BOGART is also named among JAN's descendants.

THE ANCESTRY OF JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM may be:²

JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM	born: 1570
JAN GIJSBERTSEN VAN HAARLEM*	~1540
GIJSBERT JANSEN VAN HAARLEM	~1508
+KORNELIS BOUCQUET (b ~1512)	
Dau of:	
BLASIUS BOUCQUET (b ~1480)	
JAN DIRKSEN VAN HAARLEM	~1476
+BARBARA JOSTENSEN (b ~1495)	
DIRK JACOBSEN VAN HAARLEM	~1444
JACOB EINGELBRECHTSEN VAN HAARLEM	~1414
EINGELBRECHT DIRKSEN VAN HAARLEM	~1384
DIRK VAN HAARLEM	born: ~1350

**This person is purely conjecture on my part but explains the name of our ancestor as "JAN, son of JAN" and the improbability that the 62-year-old GIJSBERT fathered JAN JANSEN in 1570.*

It should be stated that there are alternate parents given for JAN: HERMAN JANSEN and GEERTGEN BARENTS. The sources given have not been examined.³ Returning to JAN JANSEN, it seems at least plausible to say that he became a merchant, possibly in woolens and linens, while living in Haarlem and as that city's fortunes faltered and those of Amsterdam flourished, he made the logical decision to move to Amsterdam. Some historians state that JAN was in Dunkirk before that Protestant city in Flanders fell to the Spanish in 1583.⁴ Though lacking in supporting evidence, it would not be unusual for the time period to find a thirteen-year-old male working for his father or another merchant. At this point it is not possible to say when and where his first marriage occurred or even where they lived. Some maintain JAN and his first family made Haarlem their home, based on the use of the toponymic VAN HAARLEM. However, as suggested earlier, the use of VAN HAARLEM while actually living in Haarlem would be an exercise in futility as everyone living in Haarlem was VAN HAARLEM. A more logical assumption is that the family did not live in Haarlem but somewhere else where VAN HAARLEM would help identify exactly who you were.

That he was married and had a daughter while still in Holland is attested to by the actions of government officials in 1623. In an attempt to convince JAN to return to Holland and resume his responsibility as husband and father, they presented both wife and daughter within view from the deck of his ship as it was docked in the southern coastal port city of Veere for repairs. That this event transpired some 20 plus years after JAN last lived in Holland is surprising but the story is relayed in a journal kept by a member of the Dutch Embassy to Morocco in 1640 – 41. Writers have made suggestions that there was a second daughter, based on a probable misinterpretation of information found in that same journal which will be explained later. One writer names a son EDWARD or EDVARD but offered no indication where that information came from.

THE ANCESTRY OF ARJARIT AL-QUARTEGENA

Any research into this fascinating time is problematic on many levels. There is no consensus on what should be easy – such as the definition of the Barbary Coast. As RICKIE LETTE related in the Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Tasmania in September 2018, the Barbary Coast has been variously defined as the whole of the Southern Mediterranean coast from Tangiers to the Suez Canal; the same southern coast minus that of Egypt; either of the two previous definitions plus the Atlantic Coast of Morocco; and only the Atlantic Coast of Morocco. When the premise that a name would suffice to clearly and unequivocally identify a geographic location is not so easy to establish, imagine what happens when the name of the same person is given with a multitude of different spellings and differing numbers of add-ons – is *JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM* the same as *JAN JANSZ*? Is *MORATO REÏS* and *MURAD-RAÏS AL-SAGHIR* the same person? Add to this the fact that contemporary and recent sources suffer from ethnocentric and religious bias which invariably colors what is written. To add another confounding layer over everything, the dearth of contemporary records has led to over-reliance on those that do exist and, most problematic, certain sources are accorded an undeserved level of acceptance (no source is accepted at face value by dedicated researchers) and their rote repetition in any new endeavor is practically a given for any paper accepted for publication.⁵

Unfortunately, the published research falls short of qualifying as true research because it is due to *the reluctance of historians to focus on primary sources. On the whole they use little more than plagiarised copies of their predecessors' archival work as the pillars of their essays.*⁶ In addition, what scholarship that does exist often has done so in a self-imposed vacuum of sorts wherein the writer has stated as much in declaring that the indigenous sources cannot be trusted because they do not align with the particular European sources that author favors such as is found in H.D. GRAMMONT'S exhaustive but skewed book *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination Turque (1515 – 1830)* from 1887.⁷ Though sometimes there is a sign of enlightenment on this issue as when, for instance, LOUIS BRUNOT acknowledged at the beginning of his doctoral dissertation that the errors he encountered with the indigenous records were solely due to his own deficiencies:

*...it is a generally recognized fact that the Moroccan is sincere in the information he gives: he does not seek to mystify either out of interest or out of glory. By cross-checking the information taken, we realized that the errors came from ourselves, from poor hearing, from the haste to take notes, never from the informant.*⁸

KIDNAPPED ON THE HIGH SEAS?

A look at the known and supposed facts of his life show that if this kidnapping did occur, it must have been after 1594 and before 1620 and this span can be further limited to either 1594 – 1598 or 1609 – 1620. We now return to our *a priori* assumption that JAN was, in fact, owner, or at least the captain, of the vessel taken. The logical conclusion is that JAN was at least 25 years old to be married with a young family and a captain, which places the event after 1594. A Dutch fleet is known to have reduced the town of Las Palmas in the Canary Islands to rubble in 1599 during their long fight for independence from Spain so we can say without doubt that Dutch ships could, and did, sail to the Islands.⁹ It must also be accepted that *if* his ship was boarded and taken, it had to be a ship that was *worth* boarding and taking, that is to say, a merchant vessel. There is no evidence that shows JAN sailing merchant vessels anytime after 1605. Records have him bringing a captured vessel to Salé as early as 1609 which does not support a later date. His

use of the pseudonym MURĀD REĪS AL-SAGHIR (THE YOUNGER) during the same time that MURAD REĪS AL-AKBAR (THE GREAT) was based in Algiers supports the supposition that JAN sailed with his fleet. MURAD REĪS AL-AKBAR is credited with being the first corsair to sail away from the shoreline and out into the Atlantic. His raid on the Canary Islands in July 1586 was a response to the deprivations visited on the Barbary Coast by the Marquis de Lanzarote. Despite being aware of the renegade fleet amassed at Salé for an attack on the Canaries no later than the 23rd of June the raid was considered a success and ended with the removal of 200 prisoners to Algiers on the 26th of August. It was followed by another within two years.¹⁰ MURAD REĪS AL-AKBAR was made Admiral of Algiers in 1595, a position he held for at least a decade. Some records place MURAD REĪS AL-AKBAR in Algiers as late as 1609 but he may have been just using the port by that time as he was known to also be based out of Tunis from about 1603. He was allegedly appointed admiral or *beylerbey* of Tunis in 1607. At that time OTHMAN was the *dey* of Tunis and how a *bey* fit into the government at that time is unclear; within a few decades the *bey* supplanted the *dey* as the locus of power in Tunis.¹¹ In 1608, he was appointed *beylerbey* of the *sanjak* of Morea. Morea was the Peloponnese peninsula of Greece and, while under Ottoman rule, it was part of the *Eyalet of Rumelia* which encompassed most of the Balkans. That he may be the same person as MURAD REĪS IL GRECO and MURAD REĪS D'ALBANIA, each being found in records of the time, can not be dismissed. Some writers say MURAD REĪS AL-AKBAR died around 1609; others say he went to Constantinople to serve the Sultan; a first-hand witness related that *Murate a renegade of the Corsica nation, a person of great honor in Algiers*, died at the age of 104 in Vlore, Albania during 1638.¹²

Tunis fell under Ottoman control in 1574. The capital was served by the port of La Goulette while the other main ports were Sousse, Hammamet and Monastir for round ships, mainly polaccas and galleons; and Bizerte and Porto Farina for the galleys. The Englishman JOHN WARD (c1553-c1623; YÛSUF RA'ÏS or *WARDIYYA*) and the Flemish SIMON DANSER ('ALÎ RA'ÏS or SAMSÛN) were regular visitors as were YÛSUF DEY and MURĀD BEY with USTĀ MURĀD (*aka* MORATTO GENOVESE) being the *kapudan* in 1625.¹³

JAN converted to Islam before 1602 when he took **MARJARA**, an Amazigh woman as his second wife. As a Muslim, his vessel could not be seized by another Muslim and brought to Algiers as piracy committed against a co-religionist is explicitly banned in the Koran. It has been claimed that JAN, as CAPTAIN JOHN, negotiated a treaty with ELIZABETH I, QUEEN OF ENGLAND. Though doubtful, if this is so, it had to happen before 1603 when ELIZABETH died. The fragile peace that existed between the Dutch and the Spanish between 1609 and 1621 eliminated the Dutch as targets of the corsairs without causing diplomatic strains. Before this truce, enemies of Spain were a *de facto* ally of Algiers and, as such, the Dutch enjoyed a high degree of immunity from the depredations of the Barbary corsairs – it is unlikely that JAN was taken before 1609 *if* he was flying the Dutch flag. However, when looked at from the perspective of the *Prize Law* then in effect, Dutch ships were valid prizes before the truce, as determined by the Admiralty Court in Salé and by the States-General in La Hague, but not after. This assumes the corsairs were diligent in their observance of international laws, a strained assumption at best; even JAN was called to account for his capture of Dutch merchant shipping without any legal basis for such actions. Corsair and privateer are interchangeable though the former is more often used when referring to those sailing from ports along the southern coast of the Mediterranean and the Levant while the latter is used more for those sailing from western and northern Europe. Being a corsair was considered honorable but within that framework is the prejudice that those that sailed from ports in Islamic nations were, *a priori*, dishonorable and therefore could not be corsairs.¹⁴

There has been a retreat from this position as research has shown that, more often than not, corsairs from anywhere were basically pirates trying a new scam. Careful consideration of the facts and the possibilities lead this author to believe that JAN was in Algiers from 1597 or '98 until 1601 or '02. The "how, when and why" of his arrival is open for discussion – no record is known to exist that details his arrival in Algiers as a prize or otherwise (and these records are surprisingly detailed) – but he did arrive and maybe he did so quite voluntarily.

Allegedly JAN told of his life to someone who wrote it down, saying that JAN claimed he was kidnapped by corsairs from Algiers in 1618 and that he was forced to convert to Islam *at a very young age*. The actual written account has not yet been discovered but references to such a statement do exist, such as HENRI DE CASTRIES mention of a specific event in 1625 in his, with others, multivolume work Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc (SIHM). Upon inspection, those records are for interviews with three renegades returning to The Netherlands and the only mention of JAN is when the question is asked about the issuing of Commissions, specifically whether or not they are issued for every *corso*. Unfortunately, most writers cite DE CASTRIES as the source without noting that the information provided by DE CASTRIES is found in the footnotes and are his own additions. DE CASTRIES is not the only source quoted, just the most frequently encountered one.¹⁵ None of his references to this story cite the original consular records and the single reference he makes outside of the SIHM is to the 1625 event that does not, in fact, contain any such statements. It could be related to the 1625 mutiny on the Salétian corsair *Heart's Desire*; five captives, four English and one Dutch revolted and after a four hour fight, were masters of the ship. Sixty-five *Turks* were thrown overboard.¹⁶ Where DE CASTRIES got his information remains unknown and he certainly does not supply any credible reference for it. In 1630 JAN apparently made similar statements such as has been quoted to the English Ambassador JOHN HARRISON when he was attempting to secure the right to live in England but the original documents have yet to be located. Later writers assumed both events happened in 1618 but this is not what has been said to be the quote. In 1618 JAN was around 48 years old, not a *very young age* by any measure.

Here the timeline isn't quite so linear as one would like – the sequence of Lanzarote, Algiers, Cartagena, Salé, Algiers again, Salé again, a third visit to Algiers, Safi, and maybe a brief stay in Salé, and finally Walidia – isn't certain at all (though, for reasons that I hope will become apparent, this is probably the correct order). Whatever the sequence, we will start with the exciting story of being boarded by a pirate ship on the high seas near the Canary Islands.

Acts of privateering first received official support in large numbers toward the end of the 14th century when a perpetual state-of-war existed between the allied Emirate of Granada and Kingdom of Castile against the Kingdom of Aragon and the Sultanate of Morocco, then under the Merinids. This proved to be such a lucrative enterprise that all governments lost effective control of their privateering fleets in short order and thus we see the rise and fall of independent and semi-independent privateering republics all along the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.¹⁷ Those located to the north in Iberia, France, and in the Italian states retained, more-or-less, the sobriquet of privateers while their counterparts to the south were *corsairs*.

1598 – 1601: ALGIERS

Since 1587 Algeria was ruled by *bashaws*, pashas appointed by the Sultan in Constantinople (at a large cost to the appointee) to serve as regents for a three-year term over this westernmost province of the Ottoman Empire. (See end of file for *pasha*) The regents, whose only goal was to recover the cost of the appointment and then some, exercised a shadowy and limited authority as the Sultan was distant and offered no material assistance at all. The *bashaws* probably were:

1594 – 1596	KHIZR, Pasha, 2 nd time	1616 – 1617	SÜLEYMAN KATANYA
1596 – 1598	MUSTAFA, Pasha, 2 nd time	1617 – 1619	MUSTAPHA IV, Pasha
1598 – 1599	HASAN BU RISA	1619 – 1621	HASSAN KODJA or KOÇA
1599 – 1603	SÜLEYMAN, Pasha	1621 – 1623	KHIZR & KHÜSREV
1603 – 1605	KHIZR, Pasha, 3 rd time	1623	HUSSEIN or <i>vacant</i>
1605 – 1607	KÖSE MUHAMMAD II <i>the eunuch</i>	1624 – 1626	MURAD or KADER, Pasha
1607	MUSTAPHA III, Pasha	1627 – 1634	HUSSEIN KODJA & YUNUS
1607 – 1610	RIZVAN/REDWAN, Pasha	1634 – 1636	YUSUF II
1610 – 1614	KÖSE MUHAMMAD II, 2 nd time	1636 – 1638	ABU'L HASSAN ALI
1614 – 1616	ALI CADI or SHEIK HUSSEIN	1638 – 1640	SHEIK HUSSEIN

JAN's probable first time in Algiers was shortly after the bloody period in 1596 when the pasha had tried in vain to rein in the power of the janissaries and captains.¹⁸ That JAN personally knew, and most likely sailed with, the Algerian naval admiral MURAD REİS THE GREAT can be gleaned from his adoption of that same name while in Algiers. But in this, he was not novel or unique; in 1581, there were three captains based in Algiers with this name: MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR also known as MURAD REİS THE ALBANIAN; MURAD REİS THE SPANIARD; and MURAD REİS, AL-ASHGAR (THE YOUNGEST) also known as MURAD REİS THE GREEK. MURAD means *desire* or *wish* in Arabic. MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR was born to Albanian parents 11 miles from the southern coast of Ottoman Anatolia on the island of Rhodes in 1534 and served in the Ottoman navy for many years before becoming one of Admirals in the corsair fleet of SÜLEYMAN REİS. MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR does not appear in records of Algiers after 1609 but JAN's appearance in records as MURAD REİS, AL-SAGHIR apparently predates 1609. MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR is found as *beylerbey* and Admiral in Tunis after 1603 though he apparently remained active in Algiers. In 1603 he was instrumental in defusing a powderkeg threat developed between France and the Regency over the release of captives.¹⁹ He was the *beylerbey* of Morea, the southernmost part of the Peloponnese in Greece, from 1607. *Beylerbey* originally was used for the highest military rank, often in the navy, but had become an honorary court title in Constantinople by the 16th century. In Tunis the *bey* supplanted the *dey* as the locus of power around 1635. The MURAD REİS Mosque on Rhodes has been in continual use since being built in 1524. In all likelihood, the mosque was probably rebuilt by MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR in the early 1600s and has borne his name since then; his tomb is in the adjacent cemetery. Such an assumption speaks highly of the ability and respect afforded to JAN; he probably would have been killed had he not proven himself worthy to bear this illustrious *nom-du-guerre*. This has caused a great deal of confusion in the retelling of the exploits of JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM. One thing is for certain, to become this successful was probably due, in part, to JAN's religious conversion. It isn't clear how long JAN stayed in Algiers but it is believed that he took a second wife in the decade following his conversion to Islam. In addition to SÜLEYMAN and MURAD, other corsairs from Algiers included

MÂMI ARNAWÛT, MURÂD QÛRÇÛ, HASAN QALFÂT, ‘ALÎ BITSHNÎN, HÂJ HUSAYN MEZZOMORTO and ‘ALÎ CANARY. Despite the exotic sounding names *[m]ost of the captains of Algiers were renegade Christians who had knowledge in the science of navigation that the native captains did not. This explains the length of the voyages undertaken by the Algerian cruisers.*²⁰ The fleet fluctuated between 60 and 80 corsairing vessels each year from 1580 to 1640. Those raids were productive: 1607-1629 between 70 and 100 captured ships were brought to the port every year between 1607 and 1629 with 1620 being the peak year with 125 prizes.²¹

JAN was known in Europe as JAN JANSEN, JAN JANZON and JAN JANSZ, the abbreviated form of JANSEN and JANZON, as well as CAPTAIN JOHN. It is claimed that it was under this last name that he conducted negotiations with ELIZABETH I, QUEEN OF ENGLAND for a treaty on behalf of the REGENT OF ALGIERS, but this is doubtful as he was still quite young and inexperienced in the ways of politics and negotiating treaty terms. Unfortunately both the Queen and the Regent died in 1603 and negotiations stalled, much to England’s later regret. JAMES I ended the hostilities with Spain which decreased England’s reliance on Moroccan support while almost simultaneously the Ottoman’s no longer threatened Moroccan independence. In the absence of this threat, Morocco no longer had the need to have Spain as an ally to counter any Ottoman advance and the tenuous alliance, tenuous due to Spanish occupation of Moroccan ports, ceased to exist.²² Corsairs could henceforth number English and Spanish merchantmen among their targets. Between 1609 and 1616 four hundred sixty six British merchant ships were captured by Barbary corsairs or Moroccan pirates.

JAN adopted the Arabic name MORAT REÏS AL-SAGHIR (*the Younger*) possibly as early as 1602 when he converted to Islam. Conversion by pronouncing the *shahadâ* (declaration of faith), and usually circumcision if the convert was male, was often followed by taking a new name and marriage to a Muslim spouse.²³ Men usually adopted the *typical* dress of wide breeches and a narrow waistcoat over a white shirt and a red cap. We do know he did take a new name and a new wife in the early 1600s, a strong indication for conversion. MORAT and MUSTAFA were the two most common adopted names. He was called JOHN BARBER by JOHN HARRISON, the English Ambassador: JOHN for JAN and BARBER for Barbary. Others confuse him with LITTLE JOHN WARD who was in Salé in 1605 and Tunis in 1606. WARD was born around 1553 in Faversham, Kent. In 1608 WARD was described by the sailor HENRY PEPWELL to SIR HENRY WOTTON, the English ambassador to Venice, as being short, nearly bald with white hair and about 55 years old, much too old to be JAN.²⁴ Known as YUSUF REÏS, WARD died in 1622. JAN’S Arabic names, or the titles he was known by, were CAÏD MORATO and MORAT REÏS, AL-SAGHIR, meaning GOVERNOR MURAD and ADMIRAL MURAD THE YOUNGER, respectively. A correct alternate spelling of CAÏD is CA’ID and of REÏS is RA’IS. Many versions of the Arabic forms were recorded but these reflect the language of the recorder: MURAD and MOERAD REÏS (Dutch), MUTARE REÏS (Neapolitan and Catalan), MORATO REÏS (Castilian) and MURAT REÏS (French). MORATO ARRÁEZ is another version of the name that he is known to have used as there is a letter he signed using a form of that version in the Dutch archives. Two articles about MORATO ARRÁEZ written by M. HERRERO GARCÍA appeared in *Homenaje Menéndez Pidal* in 1925 and in *Revista de Filología Española* in 1926. Described as being popular in Spain in the first half of the 17th century, GARCÍA states that ARRÁEZ was *quoted* by GÓNGORA, LOPE DE VEGA, CERVANTES, ESPINEL, QUEVEDO and many other authors. Until that time it was accepted that this MORATO was a Spanish renegade from Murcia with the surname MALTRAPILLO. Working with documents held by the British Museum and the work of the Benedictine HAEDO, GARCÍA demonstrates that he was not MALTRAPILLO but an Albanian renegade, MORATO ARRÁEZ, EL GRANDE, who was most

known for his exploits during the last third of the 16th century. At the same time there was a MORATO ARRAEZ, EL PEQUENO, who was a Greek renegade. GARCÍA conflates JAN JANSEN/ MORAT REİS AL-SAGHIR with his mentor and namesake MURAD REİS, AL-AKBAR. Though GARCÍA is incorrect in his conclusions, these are significant additions to the body of literature for these are the first articles to connect JAN JANSEN to Murcia.²⁵



By the turn of the century Algiers had grown from an insignificant village into a thriving port. While population estimates vary from 15,000 to 150,000 in the first half of the 17th century, recent research based on population densities gives a more realistic figure of 50,000 for this period. Whether or not this figure includes the slave population of perhaps 15,000 is unclear; figures of 50,000, 75,000 and 125,000 give by Europeans at the time are not only a wild exaggeration, the city could not physically support such a number. Understanding that this was propaganda rather than statistics explains the outlandish numbers, without which, a lot of people would lose their jobs. Within the walls were about a hundred mosques and zawiyās. The population may have reached 125,000 by mid-century as a suburb grew outside the wall to the south.²⁶

1601 – 1609: CARTAGENA

Just as JAN'S arrival in Algiers is shrouded in mystery, so is his departure. In late 1601 a deputation of fifty Moriscos from Valencia met with ZAYDAN EN NASIR, the son of the Moroccan EMIR AHMAD AL-MANSUR, requesting aid for a Muslim *reconquesta*. ZAYDAN agreed to the venture and stipulated that the ships would sail with Dutch captains. Even though this reconquest never got started in a meaningful way, it may have been a factor in JAN'S decision to move to Cartagena in Murcia which was just south of Valencia. Control of Murcia had been lost by the Muslims in 1266, fell under the rule of Valencia for a time and changed hands between Castile and Aragon, being part of the former when the two crowns were united under one rule. And while the Muslim reconquest came to naught, a significant number of the 124,000 Moriscos expelled from Valencia moved to Salé. Another factor in his decision-making process to leave Algiers was that while he sailed with the Admirals from Algiers, most probably MURAD REÏS, AL-AKBAR, his career was not advancing as fast as he would have liked. The repressive measures against the Moriscos by the Spanish monarchy, while aimed at Spanish Muslims, had to be a strong deterrent for any Muslim – just how or why JAN decided to move to Cartagena must remain a mystery but we must bear in mind that he, by virtue of his birth in Haarlem, could always claim Dutch citizenship and along with that came the right to settle in any Spanish lands; how this right was affected by the war is uncertain. In any event, JAN would return to Algiers in the years to come. But for now, Algiers was left behind.



JAN allegedly sailed from La Rochelle, France in 1605, long a base of activity for the Dutch *Watergeuzen* or sea beggars. He could obtain letters-of-marque issued in the name of PHILLIP WILLIAM, PRINCE OF ORANGE from the Dutch consulate in that city to capture *Dunkirkers*, privateers for Spain who were based out of Nieuwpoort, Ostend and Dunkirk, who threatened Dutch trade routes.²⁷ A 1606 Resolution issued by the States General ordered all privateers of any nationality who sailed under Dutch-issued *lettres-du-marque* north of the Tropic of Cancer to return immediately to be held accountable for any excesses before the Admiralty Court. This exempted the Dutch East India Company and the Guinea companies as well as the State itself from liability as they operated south of the Tropic of Cancer. The purpose was to bolster Dutch-Moroccan relations however the opposite was the result. Dutch Admirals captured some vessels in Moroccan ports that were in violation of their commissions which was the goal, thus relieving the Sultan from being blamed for situations that may or may not be under his power to control. Instead, the seizures were viewed as a serious violation of the Kingdom's sovereignty which is an act of war.²⁸ Between 1606 and 1609 the Dutch Republic issued 130 such commissions.²⁹ Under such a Commission, JAN was bound to pay 20% of the value of any prize to the States-General and 10% to the person in whose name the Commission was issued. As part of the Dunkirk Fleet, the *Dunkirkers* were a part of the Spanish Monarchy's *Armada de Flandes* (Flemish fleet). One writer, without documentation, states that JAN was shipwrecked at, or near, La Rochelle and obtained the privateering commission only after acquiring a new vessel there. La Rochelle had been a hub of Protestant resistance to Roman Catholic Spain since 1568, receiving support from the HENRI III, King of Navarre and, incidentally, King of France as HENRI IV and leading members of the House of Coligny including GASPARD III DE COLIGNY, a Protestant General in the French Army. 20% of any prize went to La Rochelle to maintain their navy, harbor, and defenses.³⁰ A 1636 record state that 36 *livres* was spent by the *Compte de la*

marine de Ponant, controller of the Atlantic fleet of the royal French navy, for the return of *MORAT RAYS VAN SALÉ* to La Rochelle.³¹ This somewhat inexplicable entry is an enigma in that our ancestor was one of a very few people known as MORAT RAYS and he is the only one that lived in Salé; perhaps the *VAN SALÉ* is better translated as *from Salé* rather than being written as part of his name. As will be seen, JAN'S whereabouts are not certain for period from 1635 to 1639 and this is an intriguing find. The entry was footnoted by the author where he states that this was MORAT RAYS *from Genoa* but offers no reference for that statement.

Tradition has his second wife being Amazigh and bearing the name MORJANA BINT ABD AL-RAHMAN. This may be supported in the claim that her family now live in four villages in Southern Morocco. Her given name should become *MARGARITA* in Castilian but *MARGRIETJE* is encountered frequently. *MARJARITA DE CARTHAGÉNE* is used today by some descendants. She very well could have been a *mudejar* living in Cartagena when she first met and married JAN. The family ties to Southern Morocco may favor her being from the *Sanhaja* Amazigh tribe but this yet to be adequately researched and it is not known when the family first arrived there. This is by far the most likely scenario if for only one reason – a Muslim could not move into the realms of FELIPE III, only out of them. Logically, since a Muslim family from the Mahgreb could not move to Spanish lands but JAN could hide his Islamic conversion and, at the beginning of the century, the Muslim population was still quite sizeable. The fact of this second marriage gives us a time frame by which he converted to Islam; he must have converted before marrying (contradicting the 1618 or later conversion put forth by some authors with good reason, but faulty understanding, that information coming from JAN himself) for this marriage to be considered valid and legal within Islamic lands. However, it is in Dutch documents of twenty years later, combined with the teachings of the Koran, that we find the most supportive evidence of his conversion to Islam occurring around 1600. The verse of the Koran that has been interpreted by some to allow up to four wives does not do so without qualification. A man is only allowed to have more than one wife if he can be *equitable* to each wife. This has been taken to mean that the man must be able to provide for all his wives and the children he has by each wife. Such provision is, at a minimum, at a financial level. In 1600, JAN must have believed he would be able to satisfy this limitation thus allowing him to take a second wife. Dutch authorities acknowledge in the 1620s that JAN'S first wife and their children have always been amply provided for financially by JAN and that his first Dutch family have never wanted for anything nor have caused any expense for their care to fall to the state. Thus we have not only the Islamic permission to take a second wife; we also have the Christian Dutch confirming that the Islamic restrictions on multiple marriages have been met. Whether he converted to Islam while living in Algiers or after meeting MORJANA is not known. We can be quite certain that JAN did not marry a Muslim woman before converting to Islam; the penalty for doing so was execution of the man for certain and the woman depending on the circumstances. To do so violated the tenets that men were superior to women and Islam was superior to other religions of the Book. A Muslim woman could not take a position of inferiority relative to a Christian man without debasing Islam.³²

Most claim there were four sons born to JAN and MORJANA while at Cartagena: ABRAHAM JANSEN VAN SALÉ about 1602, PHILIP JANSEN VAN SALÉ about 1604, ANTHONY JANSEN VAN SALÉ in 1608 and CORNELIS JANSEN VAN SALÉ around 1609 but this is far from being a proven fact. Of these four only ANTHONY'S birth is close to being a certainty; the Consulate records that purport to place him in Morocco in 1622 and 1623 do not actually do so. There are several mentions of a presumably Dutch *ANTHONIS JANSZ.*, *captain of the Flessingue*, but none mention


any connection to JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, which is odd as the events occurred in Salé when JAN was approaching the upper limits of his power and authority there at the time.³³ If there were more children born to the couple, it is likely that all were born between the years 1605 and 1612. These sons put the claim that he married in Salé after 1618 merely to ingratiate himself in the corsair community there to rest.³⁴ Catholic registers for the area may record information on JAN'S marriage and the baptism of any children as required under the laws in effect at the time; there is no known Islamic equivalent as such proceedings were prohibited. Clandestine Muslim ceremonies certainly occurred but these were not recorded. Moriscos, Muslims living under Christian rule, converted in large numbers to Roman Catholicism but still maintained the ties to Islam using the principle of *tamqiyyah* which allowed for hypocrisy and dissimilitude in certain instances. This was further helped by a *fatwa* issued by the Grand Mufti of the city of Oran in Algeria, AHMAD IBN ABÛ JUMA'A, in 1504 which allowed Muslims to partake in forbidden things like eating pork and drinking alcohol if they were compelled to do so as long as they abhorred their actions 'in their heart'. They could deny the Prophet in words as long as they loved him 'in their hearts' at the time. Needless to say, not all Muslims agreed with this and, in fact, it was used against the Muslims that were expelled from Spain as they were all tarnished with the same accusations: they were sinners who did not adhere to the tenets of Islam, perhaps somewhat correctly. Often thought strictly in terms of religious persecution, the expulsions had a politically sound reason as well. A 33% increase in the Morisco population was documented in a 1602 census of the Kingdom of Valencia – how accurately this reflected the facts is not known – perhaps the census takers were more diligent, perhaps Moriscos had less fear of stating the number of children they had, perhaps it was strictly a device to persuade the government to expel the Moriscos – we'll never know. With numbers like this it was easy to believe that the Morisco population would soon be the majority, unfortunately the absolute numbers are not available and less reliable.³⁵

SALÉ, THE REPUBLIC OF SALÉ AND THE REPUBLIC OF BOU-REGREG

So much of this ancestor's movements were a function of the environment in and around the town of Salé and its neighbor to the south of Rabat, that the amount of information needed to be transmitted to the reader overpowers the amazing life of JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM. While it is not necessary to know its complete history dating back to the first millennium, some episodes from the very early years had an impact on JAN's daily life because what had occurred 800 years earlier was still being expressed in good ways, such as cohesiveness of the society, and bad ways, as in usually high intolerance for groups of people that the Salétians didn't actually know. This section will provide all the various aspects of the area – political, religious, geographic, the chronology of the building of each town, the famines and epidemics, and the wars – both civil and international – that helped to create Salé as the oddball it was. Salé has always been a noted religious center and has had over sixty mosques, many associated with Quranic schools, and forty saints.³⁶ The importance of Salé is illustrated by the old Córdoba dynasty, represented by Sîdî YA'QÛB ED-DEBBĀG, leaders in the tannery business decided to expand across the Straits, they chose Salé. Even a subsequent expansion to Fez in 1090 did not change their designation as *chorfā Slāwīyīne* (from Salé).³⁷ In the 13th century the King of Castile, ALFONSO X, capitalized on the wars between the incoming MERINID and outgoing ALMOHAD dynasties. In support of the former, he captured Salé from the Almohad governor around 1260 and destroyed much of the city. The city has had ties, occasionally amicable ties, with Spain since then, if not before.³⁸ In contrast, Rabat *was already nothing more than a village in ruins everywhere since the 13th century* while Salé *reached its apogee of glory* between the 14th and 17th centuries.³⁹


The Morocco of our ancestor should not be confused with the Morocco of today. While it is a single, unitary nation today, that was not the case in the 17th century. First, it was much larger than it is today, reaching its peak size under the SAÂDIAN EMIR AL-MANSUR. The area administered by the Emir through his deputies extended over the Songhay Empire in the 1580s and included distant cities such as Timbuktu and Gao. Officially, the SAÂDI lost their hold on Songhay by 1630 but their effective rule ended much earlier, but not before much of the stores of gold had been removed from that empire to the benefit of the SAÂDIAN palaces. However the oasis of Touat and of Gourara remained part of Morocco until 1903.

In what we understand to be Morocco today, there were 2, 3, or 4 separate kingdoms depending on the source. The 4-kingdom version included: *Fez* in the north; *Sous* in the south under the control of the *Zawiyā* of Iligh; *Marrakesh*, often called Morocco, in-between; and *Tafilalet* (Tafilalt, Tafilet) in the mountainous interior ruled by the Alaouite leader MOULAY MOHAMMED. AL-MANSUR managed to gain control of Fez and Marrakesh as well as the Songhay Empire. He was recognized by Sous as the most significant of the multiple Emirs; the area north from the Bou-Regreg was semi-autonomous; Tafilalet was less attached than Sous barely recognizing his rule. This system was so entrenched there was a name given to it – the *bled al-siba* was made up of all the areas that were not under the effective authority of the SAÂDIANS and the land taxes went to the local ruler, not the Emir. The official Morocco was those areas under SAÂDIAN control; they had a large Arab population; they paid land taxes to the Emir, and there was direct administration from the capital. This was the *bled al-makhzan*.⁴⁰ AL-MANSUR's sons and grandsons can be quite confusing so there is a



family tree appended to this work to assist the reader, and the writer, with the ‘who was who’ of this work. The 3-kingdom version from an early-17th century, Moroccan chronicle names fourteen provinces divided between three kingdoms:⁴¹

- *Kingdom of Marrakech* included the provinces of Haha, Doukkala, Essaouira, Tadla and Marrakech.
- *Kingdom of Sous* included the provinces of Jazûla, Dra and Sous.
- *Kingdom of Fez* included the provinces of Adrar, Habt, Rif, Gharb, Mont du Khaws (northeast of Fez), and Fez.




Under EMIR AL-MANSUR, the renegades succeeded to the most important military positions in the country: MOUSTAFA-BEY was in charge of palace security; MAHMOUD had command of the treasury; le caïd EL-OLOUDJ, headed the corps of renegades; DJOUDER, the conqueror of Songhai, was commander of the elite Andalusian corps; OMAR was the caïd of army of the Sous; and BAKHTIÂR was responsible for logistics and supply for the whole of the military. Their importance was reflected in their position on parade. It had two columns with the right, or superior, column comprised of freedmen. At the head of the right column was the elite Andalusian corps under DJOUDER followed by EL-OLOUDJ leading the corps of renegades while on the left OMAR led corps of Sous followed by with the army of the Cheragas, both considered to be slave forces owned by the Emir.⁴²

The *Zawiyâ* of Iligh was also called the *Zawiyâ* of Tazerwalt after its location in Iligh in the Tazaerwat region south of Agadir. It was a Sufi brotherhood founded by SÎDÎ AHMED OU MOUSSA AL JAZOULI AL SEMLALI (1460 – 1563), also found named simply as ABOU HASSOUN SEMLALI, of the Lakhsass tribe. He was a descendant of one of the *Seven Saints of Morocco*, MUHAMMAD AL-JAZULI (1404 – 1465), a prominent Amazigh, Sufi leader of the Jazula tribe in the mid-15th century. After extensive travels and studies he built a *zawiyâ* in Iligh and became a great friend of the early SAADIENS whose power base was in the nearby town of Mohammedia, later named Taroudant; their religious power grew with the rise of the SA'ADI. Taroudant was the first SAADIEN capital and the town prospered greatly in the 16th century, rivaling Fez in grandeur and status. With the move of the capital, Taroudant lost the place of pride it held as capital and the town was devastated by the plague epidemic which killed AL-MANSUR. With the death of AL-MANSUR in 1603 AHMED OU MOUSSA's grandson BU-DMIA transformed that religious power into political power, declaring himself the *Amir* of the *Emirate of Tazerwalt* with its capital at Iligh. Stability was greatly enhanced through the seizure of the port of Agadir and enriched through the favorable customs duties that were granted to English and French traders. Taroudant provided security for the beleaguered ZAYDAN three times before rebelling. It became the independent *Emirate of Hahis/Taroudant* in 1613 under SHEIKH ABU ZAKARIA YAHYA AL-HAHI, who died in 1626. The Emirate of Tazerwalt expanded to include the important trading centers of the Draa valley, Sijilmasa, Tuat, and Taghaza.⁴³ Tazerwalt coveted Taroudant, finally capturing the city in 1629.⁴⁴ The trans-Saharan caravans that carried gold from Gao through the emirate was a source of great profit too. By the time BU-DMIA died in 1659, much of the emirate had been lost to the Alaouiwites; his son MUHAMMAD became emir but within a year the emirate fell and Iligh was razed. It was replaced by the village of Ahmed Ou Moussa. This emirate is

sometimes counted as a 4th kingdom and at other times viewed as a semi-independent unit within the Kingdom of Sous.

Salé and Rabat, located in the Tamesna region, had developed partially at the request of the Emir and partially as a result of factors not in his control. Rabat, once envisioned as a resplendent new capital of Alcazava, had been heavily damaged during the fighting during the fall of the ALMOHAD'S in the 13th century. It remained mostly uninhabited, with a population of around 2,000 in 1507, at a time when the Sultan of Fez lived in Salé.⁴⁵ By the 1520s, there were only scattered neighborhoods populated by Arabs from the *Hilal* and *Achach/ Salaym* tribes that lived in the Chaouia area that was centered around Casablanca further south. The area was nominally a part of the *bled al-makhzan*, under the Sultan's authority. The small population that existed was further decimated by the plague epidemic that was rampant at the end of the 16th century.



In contrast, just across the river, Salé was part of the *bled al-siba*, that is to say, not under the Sultan's authority. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the arsenal at Salé was massive with facilities inside the city walls that were accessible to the river by canals that ran through two huge gates through which canals ran that connected the river to the arsenal within the walled city. With the collapse of the Almohad and Almoravid dynasties, the nation turned inward and port cities became less important, the harbors deteriorated, the harbor infrastructure collapsed, and they became like many other fishing

villages on the coast. These were taken over by the European powers, mainly Spain and Portugal, and all of the port facilities, if not the whole port city, were under foreign control. The revival of local control of the ports was augmented by the fall of Granada in 1492 and the subsequent removal to Algiers and Morocco of large numbers of experienced sailors. The Emir needed a port city under his direct control and that resurrection began with the SAÂDIAN conquest of Agadir in the Sous at the turn of the 15th century and more followed that dynasty's rise to power. The Emir repopulated the area with sailors by granting them generous trading concessions. He also wanted to expand the *bled al-makhzan* north of the Bou-Regreg and to this end he tried using similar concessions to those that would pledge their allegiance, live in Salé, and secure the port for the Emir. The *sharifian* or *cherifian* (meaning descent from the PROPHET) SAÂDIAN dynasty had an international view and Salé was well on the way to becoming a major Atlantic port by the middle of the 16th century with or without the SAÂDI. The Amazigh population was mainly from the Zenata and Masmuda confederations and they tended to look inward. There were many merchant/traders from al-Andalus who were made up the wealthiest segment of society; these were the religiously conservative *Old Moors*. Always nominally present, this population swelled during the 16th century and because of its geographic isolation from the rest of the country had to develop a semi-autonomous government since communicating its needs

and requests with the Emirate was a long and difficult path. They collected and held the taxes due the central government from which they deducted the expenses for services that would normally be paid by the government such as maintenance and growth of port facilities, a military regiment for protection, schools and roads, etc. Before the rise to power of the SAÂDI, Salé was already in charge of its own destiny. As the western European nations lined up against the Spanish Habsburgh dominion, the importance of the Moroccan ports whether in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, grew. This was a very fortunate happenstance for Morocco, because the sailors experienced with Mediterranean sailing were ill-equipped for sailing the Atlantic. Different ships with different skill sets were required. Banks of oars with their hundreds of rowers did little in the ocean. The progress of the port was severely hampered by this lack of skill and not having the right kind of ship; that is until the Dutch rose against Spain in the 1570s to fight for their freedom.

The Moriscos built the ports at Rabat and Salé and had them nominally running by 1580 while the Amazighs continued the way they had over the previous centuries, augmented by the need for an infrastructure to run a corsair enterprise. The increase in the influx of Dutch captains during the last two decades of the 16th-century corresponded with several factors directly linked to that population. They were the first group of significant size to employ ocean-going vessels; the communities from Iberia used the oar-powered galleys once they received a rudimentary education in sailing techniques, these could only hug the Atlantic coast and sail the Mediterranean. The ocean-going vessels brought larger prizes and a demand for workers. While preferring to crew their ships with co-nationalists, the Dutch who made up the largest block of captains, utilized the Moriscos for filling the less-skilled positions on vessels. The Dutch also brought their knowledge of harbors and managing freight and had the port overhauled to meet the demands of their trade which required, again, a specific skill-set not found in the other national or cultural groups, indigenous or not, in the area. Beyond the nuts-and-bolts knowledge and skills that only the Dutch possessed, they brought with them what was perhaps the most important skill of all – business acumen. The Dutch Empire rose on the backs of men like JAN JANSEN to become the world's first multinational corporation in the modern world. From an insignificant province of Spain to the largest international economy the world had known in barely a century reveals that though many took their skills to foreign lands, many more remained behind. These two populations would support opposing sides in the civil wars following the death of EMIR AL-MANSUR in 1603 but they did present a united front when it came to maintaining their self-government. Unfortunately the facts are often overlooked by writers even today with many accepting the unsustainable position that corsair activity out of Salé had consistently decreased from 1570 to the point of being non-existent until the arrival of the Hornachero population in 1611.⁴⁶

The difference between the *rive gauche* and *rive droite* of the Bou-Regreg is often overlooked or dismissed, providing a false history of both banks operating as a single unit. There was almost nothing in common – Arabs lived to the south, Amazighs to the north; Salé was religiously conservative, Rabat was not; Salé had been an educational and religious center for the nation for centuries while Rabat was a crumbling ruin for those same centuries; the diets were different; the language was different; even the embroidery patterns were different!⁴⁷

Another factor that is rarely acknowledged was that most of the Moriscos, most notably the Hornachos, came from the interior and had no experience as sailors. In Extremadura they had regularly rebuffed any attempt to be ruled over and they created a quasi-republic known for its

bandits, brigands, and counterfeiters.⁴⁸ This dual lack of knowledge – the Moriscos not knowing that Salé was not under SAÂDI control and the sultan being unaware that the Hornachos had no sailing skills whatsoever – had unforeseen effects. The Hornachos were not welcome in Salé and exiled again, they headed to Rabat which was in Andalusian hands already. The Rabatians were just about as welcoming as the Salétians had been and they were forced to live in the ruins of the Kasbah. Besides financial concessions, the Emir agreed to governmental concessions that allowed a great degree of self-government, and this was claimed by the new inhabitants of the Kasbah. Inadvertently, the desire to expand the *bled al-makhzan* north of the river resulted in the expansion of the *bled al-siba* south of the river.

The number of English, Spanish, and Dutch vessels captured by Salétian rovers steadily increased in these decades which should not be a surprise to anyone since the number of Dutch captains based in Salé increased over this same time frame. Salé was the logical choice for the Dutch renegades – there was no competition from the indigenous Amazighs, there were few Arabs, and it was not under SAÂDI authority.

It is hard to fathom how remote the towns of Rabat and Salé were before the 17th century. Today they are thriving twin cities; Rabat is the capital of Morocco; they have an international flair and metropolitan ambience yet retain a bit of their ancient charm in their older quarters. Salé was founded in the mid-11th century by the Banu Achara clan of the Banu Ifran who built their palace and mosque in what was known as the *Blida*; this is the raised area where the Great Mosque stands today. The first section of the old town to be populated was, and is, called the *Zenata quarter* to the northeast of the Banu Achara compound. It was made up of members of the same or related clans, all from the Banu Ifran. Four hundred years ago these towns were small commercial outposts only reachable by sea; there were almost no overland routes; they were completely isolated and insulated; the approach by sea was protected by a sand bar and plenty of cannon. But this does not equate with being small and insignificant. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, isolation Salé quickly became a thriving town of merchants long before the beginning of the 15th century. It was the Andalusian clan of Bani Khayroun that established the second quarter of the town which bore their name and was centered on Khyar Alley.⁴⁹ The Andalusians established the town as the merchant capital of the coast, if not the country. The leading families of the town were the Moroccan outpost of much larger and influential families living in al-Andalus.⁵⁰ The whole area was ruled as part of the taifas of Malaga, Granada, Algeciras, and Seville for much of the 11th century. This population constituted the population collectively known as the *Old Moors* and they were not very accommodating to any newcomers whether they were Amazigh, Arab, or Andalusian. The *Old Moors* were conservative in matters of religion and had little to no tolerance for the 17th century exiles from the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar. Or, at the least, this is the claim they put forward when they became the authority to exile the exiles, the alleged false-Muslims, to the south bank of the river. The fact that this removed possible future competition to their commercial interests had no bearing on their decision whatsoever – none at all. They allowed no infringement on their trade or their rights; they were the old money and, as elsewhere, they controlled every facet of life whether 17th-century exiles or 21st-century researchers understood this basic premise of life along the Bou-Regreg or not. By the early 1600s there existed 3 power centers in the immediate area – Salé on the north side of the river, the Kasbah des Oudaïa with its attendant neighborhood on a rocky elevation on the south bank of the Bou-Regreg, and the town of Rabat, also on the south side of the river. There was a healthy suspicion between all 3 centers which led to varying degrees of isolationism and distrust. This distrust had many roots – Salé was older, under

Amazigh authority, and assumed a preeminent stance; Rabat had been an abandoned ruin of a town until the early 1600s, in the civil wars each would back a different side. Rabat controlled the river access with its harbor upstream by virtue of the Oudaïa being on their side of the river. Salé was often forced to use the somewhat more exposed coastal landing, which is a misnomer. A very large lagoon, extending some 12 kilometers north, provided a sheltered harbor for Salé. For defense, Salé had its own fortifications protecting the coastal harbor and installed several cannon aimed at the river harbor which, when tensions were high, meant that neither faction was able to freely use the river harbor. Significantly, each side of the river turned to different religious leaders which reflected the Amazigh population north of the Regreg and the Arabs to the south. HENRI DE CASTRIES when adding commentary to the different national archives records he published states that Salé was where the Moors lived while Rabat was where the Andalusians lived. It's not clear what he was stating because, today, a Moor is a Muslim from Spain; it includes Andalusians as a subgroup. I believe the distinction meant was one of old versus new immigrants. *Moors* were people who moved between the Iberian lands and Morocco, and their descendants, while both were under Islamic rule prior to the 1492 *Reconquista* while *Andalusians* is used to mean the Moriscos from Andalusia that were forced to migrate around 1609. There are specific terms for Moriscos from some other areas, such as *Tagarino* for those from Aragon and *Granadinos* from Granada, but I have not been able to find such a word that means specifically a Morisco from Valencia. Moriscos from Valencia made up a small, but significant, percentage of the population of Salé whose arrival appears to predate that of the Andalusians exiled at this time and the later exiles from Extremadura. The word Morisco was selectively applied: a Morisco or Morisca spoke Arabic, had a style of dress called Andalusian but was North African, and kept Moorish cultural customs.⁵¹

After AL-MANSURS death, three sons fought for the throne and each was supported by renegades: ZAYDAN had the Portuguese caïd GUIRMAN in charge of Sous and the Corsican MOUSTAPHA plus a thousand English commanding 55 canons with him. EL-MAMOUN had three renegades: SELMA from Seville, HASSAN from Flanders, and AMMAR from Alméria, Spain. By far the greatest number of renegades supported ABOU-FARIS. In fact it was DJOUDER, the conqueror of Songhai, who arrived in Marakech with ABOU-FARIS soon after AL-MANSUR's death. Following his recommendation, Marrakech first declared for ABOU-FARIS as Sultan. ABOU-FARIS had in his service the most renegades, including SOLIMAN CORDOBÉS, ALI ZARCON MALLORQUIN, CAIRIN VIZCAINO, ALI PORTUGUÉS, CARDIN MURCIANO and AHMED BEN MANSÛR CORRITO. ZAYDAN was able to take Marrakech while ABOU FARIS escaped north where he was declared the Sultan at Fez. Slowly the realization the Abou Faris was not going to retake Marrakech set in and the renegade commanders AHMED BEN MANSÛR CORRITO and SOLIMAN CORDOBÉS defected to ZAYDAN. With the murder of DJOUDA in 1608, the renegades still loyal to ABOU FARIS defected to ZAYDAN forcing ABOU FARIS to capitulate.

The power and wealth of the renegades is illustrated with the murder of DJOUDA who was wearing clothes with hundreds of diamonds and rubies sewn in. He may have decided to give up Islam, which guaranteed a death sentence, and he was said to be holding a rosary of 103 pearls, crowned with a diamond. Another renegade named HAMETE BEN MENSOR had over 7,000 tons of wheat and barley, 16,500 gallons of cream and 13,208 gallons of oil stored at his palace. While this seems extravagant, he also had 320 women that needed to be fed every day so, in perspective, this may have been one weeks supply.⁵²

During the civil strife following the death of AL-MANSUR in 1603, his son ABÛ FARIS ABDALLAH adopted the title Sultan, thus transforming an emirate into a sultanate. This act was a defensive move of the Ottomans were keenly interested in extending their authority, however nominal it may be, west from Algiers to the Atlantic coast. Salé was not a significant port until the end of the 16th century, serving mostly as a forward base for Algerine raids on the Channel Islands, Madeira or the Azores, so its government was not a high priority. In the SAÂDIAN *bled al-makhzan*, everyone served at the request of the Sultan – not so in the *bled al-siba* which included Salé. There were separate and distinct military and civil governments; added to this was the governing of the port with all of its inherent functions – prize court, warehouses, brokers, maintenance, security, and so on. The SULTAN appointed what was called in Europe the *castellan* – the commander of the castle, or kasbah, and staffed the military regiments there; the commander was usually called the Caïd of Rabat. The civil government was handled quite differently. Geographically, the port town was located in the former Kingdom of Fez but it was actually easier to reach from the capital of Marrakesh by heading to Safi, the port serving the capital and sailing north to Salé. The civil official in Salé was the governor or Caïd who was appointed to this one-year post by the Caïd of Marrakesh. EMIR AL-MANSOUR tried to extend the Royal authority by removing the responsibility for the appointment from the Caïd of Marrakesh and reserving it for himself, probably in the 1590s. The port was supervised by a captain or *reïs*; due to the port's importance for the country's revenue stream, it is likely this was a post that was filled with the consent of the Emir or Sultan. This person is found as the Admiral or *Caïd* instead of *reïs*. There was no need for a civil Caïd in Rabat in 1600 but, when there was a need, the Sultan didn't have the authority to appoint one so that post sprung from the town itself. This autonomous area, often called the REPUBLIC OF SALÉ, had control at all levels of government including all money and slaves from prizes taken into their port. To keep the peace, they did acknowledge ZAYDAN as their SULTAN but his percentage of any booty, pegged at 20%, went to the *Diwân* which was used for the expense of maintaining the port, the Admiralty, etc. Likewise, all land taxes went to Salé, not Marrakech. Some say that without the support of Salé, ZAYDAN would not have been able to become Sultan.⁵³

The number of Dutch renegades who saw Salé as a great location to operate from in their fight for freedom from Spanish authority greatly increased in the 1580s; exact numbers are not known but Dutch renegades numbered over 7,000 in Algiers in the 1610s. They brought their experience with sailing on the Atlantic as well as their sailing ships and a healthy knowledge of how to run a successful business, just what the port needed. By 1590, it was well on the way to becoming a serious menace, mainly to Spain, but other nations suffered as well. To this was added an influx of British ex-Navy men once a truce had been signed between Britain and Spain in 1604.

Much of the history comes from documents found in various National Archives in The Netherlands, France and Spain where official reports and correspondence remain. What is contained in those records must be read with the idea that the writer was communicating a biased point-of-view. When an ambassador wanted to obtain some trading concessions he usually presented a written history of the interactions between the two countries. These records must be considered subjective, as the writers knowledge may be deficient and their opinions allow some facts to be ignored while suspicions may be recorded as fact. There are also problems with translations as is found when Caïd is someone's title. Translations include the governor of a city, the appointed vice-regent to a specific region for the Sultan, a military commander of a kasbah, and the captain of the port – deciding which is correct can be difficult because each of those

translations have correctly identified the person and position and we must keep in mind that anyone who is captain of a sailing vessel is also a caïd.

The SAÂDIAN, or SA'ADIAN, dynasty was the first Arab dynasty to rule Morocco. They claimed descent from MUHAMMED'S daughter FATIMAH and her husband ALI IBN ABI TALIB (601 – 661) through their eldest son HASAN IBN ALI (624 – 670) and his wife KAWLA BINT MANZUR. ALI was the PROPHET'S cousin [both being grandsons of ABD AL-MUTTALIB (497 -578)] and son-in-law, as well as the 4th Caliph. Descendants of the PROPHET are referred to as *Sharifian* or *Cherifian* and *Chorfa* in Darija (Mahgrebi Arabic). The SAÂDIAN dynasty shares the same lineage as two other Moroccan dynasties: the earlier IDRISID and the current ALAOUITE. The descent is from HASAN and KAWLA to his son HASAN and his wife FĀTIMA BT. AL-ḤUSAYN (671 – 735) to his son 'ABD ALLĀH BIN AL-ḤASAN and from there the lines diverge between their sons IDRIS (745 – 791) and MUHAMMAD IBN 'ABD ALLĀH (d. 762). It is interesting to note that on the website Ville de Salé, referenced earlier, the dynasty is named *ASSAADI* and it maintains that not much is known but they were ruled by an *ASSAADI* representative living in the Almohad Kasbah in Rabat. SĪDĪ ABDELLAH BEN AHMED KHALID (d.1604) aka *SHEIKH HASSOUN* moved to Salé as did his student AL-'AYĀCHI, who is called *MOHAMED LAYACHI MALIKI* on that site. Their brief history states the Andalusians with English assistance, expelled the population of the Kasbah. This led to AL-'AYĀCHI'S attack on Rabat and his assassination by the *Khalt* tribe working with the Andalusians and the Dila, or *Dellais*. MUHAMMAD AL-HAJJ AD-DILA'I, appointed his son ABDULLAH as Emir of the cities situated at the mouth of the river, he made of Kassbah his headquarters. In 1664 the people joined the *Ghaylan Brigade* under one of AL-'AYĀCHI'S commanders but this ended with the entry of the ALAOUITE SULTAN MOULAY RACHID into Salé in 1670.

The death of the SAÂDI EMIR AL-MANSUR in 1603 was followed by the proclamation of his son, and allegedly the heir-apparent, ABŪ FARIS ABDALLAH as SULTAN OF MOROCCO, meaning MARRAKECH, in the capital at Marrakech. This may not have been AL-MANSUR'S wishes though; ABŪ FARIS suffered from epilepsy and this may have caused his father to question his fitness to rule. With some foresight, and a startling lack of hindsight, AL-MANSUR hoped to stave off the internecine struggles that were a mainstay of royal successions by dividing Morocco into eight viceroys in 1585:

- Marrakesh including Haha, Doukkala and Demnet;
- Sous in the southwest;
- Tadla between Marrakech and Meknès; became part of Marrakech;
- Tamesna located south of the Bou Regreg and including Azaghar;
- Fez, including Habt, Rif, Gart and Khaws/Taza;
- Drâa, with the SAÂDI home of Tagmadert in south-central Morocco, became part of Sous;
- Tafilet (Sijilmasa) near the Algerian border in east central Morocco and
- Gourara which is north of Tafilet and is now Tuat in Algiers.

According to a work written during the reign of MOULAY ISMAIL IBN SHARIF (1672 – 1727), he gave rule of 4 regions to an equal number of sons; while his brother AHMAD BEN AL-HÜSSÎN ruled the Drâa Valley:

- MOHAMMED ES-SHEIKH *EL-MAMOUN*: Fez and its dependencies;

- ABÛ FARIS ABDALLAH received Sous and environs;
- ABÛ AL-HASAN 'ALI: Meknès and environs; and
- ZAYDAN AN-NASSER BIN AHMED was the *khalifa* or viceroy, of Tadla.⁵⁴

This may have been the settlement early on but as *EL-MAMOUN* was in prison for rebelling, it was not accurate in 1603. ZAYDAN was given command of Fez when AL-MANSOUR was there in early 1603.⁵⁵ An extended period of civil unrest waylaid those plans but using the Bou-Regreg as the border between two vice-royalties created separate rule for the north and south which continued and caused many problems for the rest of SAADIAN rule. ZAYDAN started building a kasbah at *az-Zaydanniya*, probably near Khénifra, in 1603 but was forced to abandon it after it was destroyed by ABÛ FARIS at the end of the year. This may have been the impetus to exchange Tadla for Meknès with his brother ABÛ AL-HASAN 'ALI, a move that put him closer to Fez and further from Marrakech. ZAYDAN had been appointed governor of Fez by his father and, accordingly, he was declared SULTAN in Fez while ABÛ FARIS, the appointed governor of Marrakesh, was declared SULTAN in Marrakesh.⁵⁶ ZAYDAN made several attempts at taking Marrakesh but all were repelled though ABÛ FARIS had to abandon the city for days or weeks at a time. ABÛ FARIS raised an army and with his brother EL-MAMOUN in command, descended on Fez and chased ZAYDAN and his supporters out of the area. This may be the conflict in which the Algerians played a pivotal role in ZAYDAN's defeat. ZAYDAN fled to Taroudant before leaving the country. ABÛ FARIS' goal of a reunited Kingdom of Morocco under his rule was thwarted when EL-MAMOUN was proclaimed SULTAN OF MARRAKECH.⁵⁷ He and his sons remained in control for over a decade. Meanwhile, ZAYDAN went into hiding, ending up in Dilâ-controlled Tafilet by 1606 where he secured enough gold from the local mines to outfit an army. But the Dilâ was not the problem; the Ottoman's were. Apparently ZAYDAN fled to Constantinople in 1604 and any association with the Ottoman's was a threat to both Morocco and to Spain. Spain supplied anyone with weapons as long as they fought ZAYDAN. The Moroccans had fought repeated attacks for decades against Ottoman incursions. It was an Ottoman-led plot that led to the assassination of the first SAÂDI Sultan. ZAYDAN returned to Taroudant in 1607, raised an army, and set off to reclaim his realm.

An alternate version, anonymously penned in early 1606 for the benefit of the English Secretary of State, SIR ROBERT CECIL, 1ST EARL OF SALISBURY, relates the following: *the old king* divided his realm between two younger sons, *MULLY BUFFAREZ* (ABÛ FARIS ABDALLAH) and *MULLY ZEDAN* (ZAYDAN AN-NASSER BIN AHMED). He disinherited the declared heir, *MULLY SHECKE* (MOHAMMED ES-SHEIKH *EL-MAMOUN*), the eldest son of JAOUHER EL- KHEIZOÛRÂN, for rebelling against him and committed him as a prisoner to *BUFFAREZ*. *ZEDAN* received Fez while *BUFFAREZ* received Marrakesh and Sous. *ZEDAN* was the son of a Queen, yet had received one kingdom while *BUFFAREZ*, the son of slave, received two. The aggrieved *ZEDAN* warred on his brother who released his imprisoned brother to lead his armies first in defense, then in offense, capturing Fez. *SHECKE* was consistent, rebelling against *BUFFAREZ* and had himself declared Sultan of Fez.⁵⁸ The rest of this version is similar to the first – brother fought brother, one fled to Constantinople, and the rest follows.

ABÛ FARIS remained SULTAN OF FEZ until he was assassinated by his nephew ABDALLAH II, one of EL-MAMOUN's sons, in 1608. But EL-MAMOUN did not take Fez; by some machinations, perhaps an agreement between brothers or nephew and uncle, or due to his newly purchased army, ZAYDAN succeeded ABÛ FARIS and was declared SULTAN OF FEZ for a second time. ZAYDAN then experienced the very same thing he had tormented his predecessor with – several

periods of expulsion from the capital due to threats from a brother, in this case, that brother was EL-MAMOUN. ZAYDAN tried to co-opt EL-MAMOUN from his adversarial position by *appointing* him *vice-regent* in Fez soon after coming to power (a ploy of his that we will see again).

In June 1609, the government at Marrakech named their Sultan MOHAMMED *EL-MAMOUN* to the position of SULTAN OF MOROCCO, believing ZAYDAN had been killed in battle. This act demonstrates that, though independent, Fez was considered subservient to the Marrakech government, at least in Marrakech if nowhere else. Despite ZAYDAN being very much alive, the south continued with the extension of the rule of their Sultan over both Fez and Marrakech. This position actually has some validity as ZAYDAN's claim to the throne was questionable and the Sultan of the *second city* of Marrakech would be the logical choice when the leader of the first city died. This provided the legal basis for ignoring ZAYDAN's son who could not be the heir-apparent since his father was a usurper.


ZAYDAN didn't fare much better in the land under his control. His economic policies wreaked havoc and created much opposition at all levels of government, including the military, as well as the civilian population in general. The policies resulted in soldiers being unpaid for months at a time, not having nearly enough food to survive and a lot of the food that was supplied was spoiled, weapons no longer worked, cannon carriages had broken and cannon barrels littered the grounds inside, there was insufficient ammunition, the fortifications were undermanned and decaying and ZAYDAN's meager forces were ousted by as few as 50 rebelling locals. The southern government kept MOHAMMED *EL-MAMOUN* who governed as the *Sultan of Marrakech*. His main goal was to replace ZAYDAN and become the SULTAN OF MOROCCO. MOHAMMED, like most influential Islamic leaders had many names which were often adopted at some significant point in life. MOHAMMED's most often recognized one is ABDUL ABDALLAH MOHAMMED III. ABÛ MAHALLI is mistaken by some to be *EL-MAMOUN* but this is wrong; in fact MAHALLI was ZAYDAN's stepfather for a brief period from 1613 until forces acting on behalf of ZAYDAN beheaded him in November 1614. Whether he was the stepfather of ZAYDAN's siblings is not known as their mothers are not known.

The 1609 *revolt* of Marrakech was first answered with a 3,000-strong army sent south in June from Fez; that army is said to have deserted *en masse* because they no longer accepted the condition of the military that ZAYDAN created. A second army of 2,000 left for Marrakech in August 1609; though claimed by some to be a success, Marrakech and its immediate environs, remained beyond ZAYDAN's control. As ZAYDAN made his way south in August, his powerbase in the north, including his capital of Fez, deposed him and elected SÎDÎ BRAHIM as the new SULTAN OF MOROCCO, at least on paper.⁵⁹ SÎDÎ BRAHIM was another source of conflict for ZAYDAN who never held the south and had just lost the north, but the election allowed for many other disgruntled factions of society to rise up in revolt. Central Morocco was never secure to any Sultan, as the local leaders saw the national government infringing on their right to govern. A serious power base was centered on the interior town of Dilâ. The first prince, SÎDÎ ABÛ BEKER, had provided a safe place for ZAYDAN's enemies since 1603. The DILAITES held whatever shreds of governmental power existed in Salé beginning in 1609. Since Salé was an independent city-state since the 1590s, the DILAITE power was minimal, but their unfavorable opinion of ZAYDAN, despite an early show of support, was shared by many residents.

In 1609 there was the revolt that cost ZAYDAN Fez, followed by the revolt of the south and the growing power of the princes of Dilâ in central Morocco, leaving an odd patchwork where ZAYDAN could rule. These provided the reasons for MOHAMMED to openly rebel against ZAYDAN

in 1610. On 20 November, he traded the Atlantic port city of al-‘Ara’ish (Larache) to Morocco’s sometime enemy, Spain which they nominally held until 1689. (Spain temporarily regained control of the city from 1911 to 1956). For their part, Spain officially recognized MOHAMMED as the SULTAN OF MOROCCO. He was succeeded in 1613 by his son, ABDALLAH II. Spain attacked and took a port farther south, al-Ma’mura, renaming it *La Mamara* (now Mehdyia) on 5 August 1614 with the corsairs escaping to safety in Salé.⁶⁰ This port had been a haven for English pirates under HENRY MAINWARING whose main target was Spanish shipping and its occupation by Spaniards ended not only the English threat, but could be used to check the corsairs from Salé just down the coast. MAINWARING received a pardon for his piracy in 1618. ZAYDAN’S Morocco did not include most of the country until 1626, and that reunion lasted about a year.

ZAYDAN could only maintain a token force of just 20 men garrisoned in the Oudaïa at Rabat which was totally ineffective in asserting any kind of authority and the garrison left, whether through desertion, ejection or recognition of the pointlessness of trying to fortify the area with just 20 men, or any other reason, is not known. The force was replaced by a military presence numbering 1,500 that was under local control. When it came to choosing a commander it would definitely have been another one of those points of contention between the two towns – Salé claiming the right as the older of the two and Rabat claiming it as a right of possession.



The first expulsion came in 1610 when he marched on Sijilmasa which had declared independence under ABOU L‘ABBAS AHMED BEN ‘ABD ALLAH or, depending on the source, AHMAD IBN ABD ALLÂH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN AL-QÂDÎ, known to most as ABÛ MAHALLI or IBN ABÎ MAHALLÎ from a family of *qāḍî-s* from Tafilet. He was born in Sijilmasa circa 1560 with a paternal ABBASID lineage and an IDRISSID one from his mother. At thirteen years old began his studies in Fez and received serious training as an ‘*ālim*, before abandoning the city in 1578 when the army of DON SEBASTIÃO I, king of Portugal, landed. He then went to the zāwiya of SÎDÎ MUHAMMAD IBN MUBÂRAK AL-TASTAWÎ AL-ZÂ‘IRÎ where he received a mystical education and experienced a *conversion* from ‘*ālim* to *sūfîsm*.⁶¹ He settled in Figuig where he learned from CADI IYÂD and ABD AL-QÂDIR B. ABÎ SAMHA, known as SÎDÎ SHAYKH, the latter he came to believe was a fraud and hypocrite. He later came to reside in the port city of Essaouira south of Marrakech.⁶² *Taṣṣort* or *Amegdul* were Amazigh names for the town before the Portuguese arrived in the 15th century and renamed it *Mogador*, after SÎDÎ MOGDOUL, an 11th-century saint whose shrine is in the city. *Es-saouira*, meaning the *walls* or the *ramparts*, is believed to be a corruption of *Amegdul* and has only gained acceptance since the 1960s.

His detractors describe him as a petty scholar from Safi who passed himself off as the *Mahdi* – a member of the *ahl al-bayt* or Prophet’s family who has returned to minister to all Muslims, in conjunction with *Jesus* who returned to do the same for all Christians. MAHALLI’s act was not a baseless one as the taxes levied by ZAYDAN were onerous and ZAYDAN apparently had a fondness for alcohol, itself an insult to Islam, which allegedly interfered with his judgment

though this was more of a justification for the seizure of power. The nonpayment of taxes to the sultan by Arab tribes added to the friction and financial problems for ZAYDAN. MAHALLI mounted his forces first in Sijilmasa using the taxes due ZAYDAN and found adherents in the Draa Valley as he advanced on the southern capital. He defeated ZAYDAN's army in the outskirts of Marrakech on 20 May 1612. MAHALLI followed the retreating forces, swallowing up everything they touched – they did not stop at the capital. ZAYDAN fled to Safi where he was said to be contemplating sailing to Spain, an unlikely choice considering the Morisco expulsions were not yet finished. It was in Safi that ZAYDAN chartered the ship *Notre-Dame-de-la-Garde* from JEAN-PHILIPPE CASTELANE the French consul in that town, for 3,000 ducats. He loaded his library, his wives and companions, and much of his personal wealth on a ship which was to sail to Agadir. The fact that ZAYDAN employed a French consul makes the story of an escape to Spain all the more untenable. At Agadir CASTELANE refused to unload the cargo without being paid first and, running low on supplies, he set sail for Marseilles where he planned to turn the ships contents over to CHARLES DE LORRAINE, 4th Duke of Guise who was Governor of Provence, and wash his hands of the matter. He did not get far; off the coast of Salé the *Notre-Dame-de-la-Garde* was overtaken, boarded and captured by Spanish ships and taken to Cadiz. There the court ruled that under Admiralty Law, the ship was a *fair prize*, somewhat of a foregone conclusion. ZAYDAN was so incensed that immediately after the ship left Agadir he sent the caïd AHMED EL-GUEZOULI as his ambassador to France, by way of Holland, to obtain the restitution of his goods. The Dutch ambassador to France could not obtain safe passage for EL-GUEZOULI or his party to Provence or Paris. ZAYDAN ordered EL-GUEZOULI to return in August 1613, bringing with him a gold chain and medal, worth 600 florins, as a gift from the States-General. On 1619 another Moroccan ambassador, SIDI FARÈS, had about the same success but he was held under house arrest for four months before being allowed to return to Morocco.⁶³ While this has been said to give us the extraordinary opportunity of being able to view what remains of the library, over 60% was lost due to fires and other disasters in the intervening years, at the Escorial, an equally tenable evaluation is that 40% of the Imperial Library was lost while in possession of the Spanish authorities. From Safi ZAYDAN sought safety for him and his family in Taroudant once again.

French and Flemish sources speak of MAHALLI as the new king called MOULAY AHMED BEN ABDALLAH EL FATIMI; he established good trading relationships with the English and the Dutch. MOÏSE PALLACHE, who will be encountered later, wrote disparagingly about MAHALLI, describing him as an imposter and a magician who made a pact with the devil. Once in possession of the capital, MAHALLI proceeded to marry ZAYDAN's mother, an occurrence that, rather oddly, does not appear in GARCÍA-ARENAL's account cited below; it was reported they consummated their marriage.⁶⁴ ZAYDAN recovered Fez after a four-year absence with '*foreign*,' i.e. southern, aid from beyond the Atlas Mountains in the person of the *faqih*, ABÛ ZAKARĪA YAHYA BEN ABDALLAH BEN SAÏD BEN ABDELMONAÏM ELHÂHI EDDAOUDI (or YAHYA IBN 'ABD ALLAH AL-HAHI) who beheaded MAHALLI, his fellow student at Fez.

In May 1612, one of the many forces that opposed ZAYDAN, threatened the southern capital of Marrakesh. He abandoned the capital and headed to the Atlantic coast port of Safi at first; it is probably while there that JOSEPH PALLACHE (PALACHE, PLIAJI) and his son MOÏSE, who we will encounter again, resurrects the idea of building a new port city north of Safi near Cape Meddouza in the Doukkala Province. MOÏSE PALLACHE was the grandson of ISAAC PALLACHE, a rabbi in Córdoba before being forced to flee to Fez in the 16th century. MOÏSE's father JOSEPH and his uncle SAMUEL PALLACHE served as envoys for the Sultan as MOÏSE will do for the last

four SAÂDIAN Sultans. SAMUEL and JOSEPH PALLACHE managed to obtain permission to export military equipment to Morocco from the States General. had previously negotiated on ZAYDAN'S behalf during his second Moroccan embassy to Holland to purchase eight ships to be crewed by Moriscos, a contingent of whom had accompanied him to Holland, and two thousand harquebusiers which the coast of Malaga would be regularly attacked with a quarter of the booty going to ZAYDAN. ZAYDAN'S mother objected and the deal was scrapped. In April 1613 Samuel was involved with another attempt by Moriscos to secure Zaydan's assistance. This time they promised him sixty thousand troops if he would cross the Straits of Gibraltar on ships they provided to commence the reconquista of al-Andalus.⁶⁵ AHMAD ABÛ MAHALLI has himself proclaimed SULTAN at Marrakesh on 20 May 1612 and it is around this time he married ZAYDAN'S mother. ZAYDAN, with assistance from a rival *marabout*, YAHYA BIN 'ABDULLA AL-HAHI from Mount Duran in the High Atlas manages to recover his throne from the usurper who is killed in the confrontation on 30 November 1613. It is an alliance that ZAYDAN will come to regret.

SIDI YAHYA settled perhaps too comfortably in the palace at Marrakech after taking it in October 1613. In 1614 he handed the throne to ZAYDAN, possibly under the threat of military action. YAHYA extracted a commitment from ZAYDAN to reform his tyrannical government, to abstain from alcohol, to remove Jews from all positions of power, and from acting on the same-sex desires of his bisexuality. ZAYDAN allowed MAHALLI'S head to swing from the ramparts until it disintegrated, a process that some claim lasted for 12 years. YAHYA, emboldened with success, returned to the south and claimed Taroudant and the surrounding countryside as his domain. The self-declared *Emir of Taroudant* continued to rule the south until his death in 1626. In September 1614 ZAYDAN, who had refused to honor any commitment made while his throne was in jeopardy, was again expelled from his capital by YAHYA; rather puzzling some sources place this scene in Fez while others place it in Marrakech.⁶⁶ This time ZAYDAN fled to Khénifra, center of the Dilâ now under SÎDÎ MOHAMMED BEN ABÛ BEKR since the death of his father ABÛ BEKR in 1613. With their assistance he regained his throne but this choice spelled the ruin of the SAÂDI dynasty. ZAYDAN lost more prestige, and more territory, with each upheaval. During his reign he lost the Sous, first to ALI BEN MOHAMMED, the son of ABOULABBAS SÎDÎ AHMED BEN MOUSSA ESSOUSSI ESSEMLALI, and then to his former ally, YAHYA IBN 'ABD ALLAH AL-HAHI. Similarly he lost the Drâa and Sidjilmassa first to ALI BEN MOHAMMED (who may have been the same person as his brother *EL-MAMOUN*) and then to his nephew MOHAMMED BEN ECHEIKH *al-ZEGHOUDA* (son of MOHAMMED ES-SHEIKH *EL-MAMOUN*, the pretended sultan of Marrakech after 1608). By 1627 his enemies had increased their holdings to the point that ZAYDAN held the capital city and the port of Safi and a strip of land connecting the two.⁶⁷ By a stroke of luck for ZAYDAN, he and the Dilâ had a rapprochement which brought all of central Morocco back under his control, except the Republic of Bou-Regreg, just months before he died. This rapprochement lasted a few years with these lands escaping from SAÂDI control within a decade, never to be regained. The Emir of Igh, ABU HASSOUN SEMMALI (undoubtedly related to the ESSEMLALI who held Sous), captured Taroudant in 1629 with this southern independent entity outlasting the SAÂDI dynasty.⁶⁸

The Dilâ from the High Atlas Mountains held power in and north of Salé by 1609 which effectively isolated Fez in the north from Marrakech and Sous in the south. The three major power players were the Dilâ, the Igh, and the Alaouite – though vying for power, they managed to hold the majority of Morocco for nearly forty years. In addition to these factions, the powerful NAQIS family held sway over the city-state of Tétouan.⁶⁹

The *Republic* owes more to its Dutch minority than has hitherto been accorded.⁷⁰ The Dutch not only brought with them their highly organized skills of republican government but also the know-how to build the high-masted sailing ships required to master the ocean, and the skill set needed to sail them. Corsair galleys were slave-powered oar-driven ships that required a vast number of rowers that were not available for anything else. Their design made them unsuitable for the ocean voyages due to their shallow draft and also due to the amount of space that would be needed for the food and water requirements on a long voyage. The square-rigged sailing ship, first introduced in Algiers around 1605, changed everything – no more gangs of slave rowers meant more room for booty and captives plus enough storage for long trips. I propose that it was the Dutch that set the nascent *Republic* on firm-footing that allowed it to not-only survive, but thrive; Dutch captains were using Salé as a base by the 1590s but the early ones were there sporadically and didn't have any plans to stay so there was little, if any, transfer of information about ship design. Well before and up to the expulsions began on the Iberian Peninsula, Salé was the center of maritime activity. It had started on the path to becoming the commercial center of the nation due to its strategic location connecting the land routes to Fez and Marrakech and sea routes connecting it to all of Europe. Commerce had been established there under the ALMOHAD rule during the 12th century, expanded by the MARINIDS in the 14th century, and under SAADIAN rule by the late 16th century it had been granted a semi-autonomous status by AL-MANSUR.⁷¹ By the 1610s the expertise of the Dutch had caused the rovers to expand the area of their activities to a 500 to 600 mile radius from Salé which placed Canary and Azore Island groups well within their grasp. Summer campaigns went much farther because of the longer period of good weather; the fishing fleet off Newfoundland and the Great Banks were routinely targeted.⁷² ANDRÉS SÁNCHEZ PÉREZ makes several statements in his 1964 article “*Los moriscos de Hornachos, corsarios de Salé*” that are wholly at odds with the known facts from the documents that were readily available when he wrote his work of fiction.⁷³ He fares poorly when recounting facts: his claim that JAN JANSEN proved his loyalty by marrying a woman in Salé is utterly false. He deliberately misconstrues others works as when he discusses JAN being appointed Admiral of Salé. He wrote that DE CASTRIES stated *that some called him the Admiral of Salé* when, in fact, DE CASTRIES clearly stated that SULTAN ZAYDAN appointed JAN JANSEN as the Admiral of Salé in 1624. The article is a propaganda piece creating a falsified history of the Hornachos. There is no internal agreement between his statements and the quotes he uses: at one point he writes that Salé was insignificant compared to Rabat in the decades before 1610 and then quotes CAILLÉ in saying that it was after 1610 that Rabat was pulled out of *three centuries of darkness!* He does not cite his source correctly; it was JACQUES CAILLÉ who wrote *La Petite histoire de Rabat*. There were five works in two series dating to the 1940s and 1950s and which PÉREZ found this statement, if indeed he did, is uncertain. That PÉREZ's article was actually published in a supposedly reputable journal only serves to call into question the veracity and accuracy of all other articles published in *Revista de Estudios Extremeños* as it is established that what is published is not necessarily factual. Unfortunately, PÉREZ is not the only person to have published what can only be described, at best, a questionable article much to the detriment of the scholarship of this place at this time. Another usually valuable academic in this same subject area that has published valuable and inciteful works has the unfortunate claim as author of “*Salé au XVIIe siècle, terre d’asile morisque sur le littoral Atlantique marocain,*” that was published in the journal *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* in 2009.⁷⁴ This work contains such a plethora of inaccuracies as to both facts and their interpretations that an English translation of that article

had to be abandoned after the first few pages as the corrections and commentary exceeded the length of the sections being analyzed.

As far as sailing was concerned, a Moroccan naval fleet was non-existent in the early and mid-16th century. It's heyday as a naval power had ebbed; in 1270 thirty-six warships were launched to lay waste to *the Verdes Islands off the coast of Andalusia*. Despite being the site of the armory which had canals dug from the river through great ports in and out of the city where ships were built and armed in the 13th century, this had faded from memory over three centuries. While pirates like the SIMON DANSER from Flanders and many English privateers shared their knowledge of ocean-going ship building at Algiers and Tunis, PIERRE DAN imperfectly credits MORAT-RAÏS AL-SAGHIR with introducing this knowledge to Morocco. DAN was wrong in saying that it was the *GREEK MAMI RAYS* who brought this knowledge in 1618; nonetheless, JAN did bring the much-needed knowledge on building the round ships with sail required for sailing the ocean as well as the skills required to sail these ships. He honed his skills while sailing under MORAT-RAÏS AL-ELDER in Algiers. His knowledge of the coastlines he sailed was indispensable as well. While JAN was instrumental in developing the ocean-going corsair fleet, he was undoubtedly not the first foreigner to use Salé as a base. On the other hand, it was only after he had moved to Salé that a ship-building program was instituted.⁷⁵

My assertion of Dutch origins for the REPUBLIC is not meant to belittle the contributions of the more numerous Moriscos or to deny the fact that the Andalusian expatriate population came to be the military class of the REPUBLIC for most of its existence; it is only made to explain the predominance of the Dutch in its early life and its success as a business for which the Dutch are renowned. In this, I am not alone; the most recent scholarship indicates that, while the Andalusian refugees accounted for a large percentage of the crew, the organizers and leaders of the corsairs were, in fact, Dutch and English. The impact of the mass deportations in Spain had much less of an impact on the rovers than has previously been published.⁷⁶ The growth of the pirate enclave actually began at least two decades before the expulsions, as it had all along the Barbary Coast. In 1609, ZAYDAN was in control of only a small part of Morocco and the Bou-Regreg area was not one of them. In an effort to regain control he mimicked his father and offered financial incentives, such as free housing, to groups of refugees if they agreed to settle there. The refugees had been duped; ZAYDAN promised something he didn't control. Not only did this alienate a new group of people, it caused the last remnants of support for the Sultan to crumble. For the foreseeable future ZAYDAN would not have control.

Early on Salé was mainly used as a forward base for raids on the Canary Islands, Madeira and the Azores; there was no developed market there to handle booty or captives and those went back to the lead captain's home port. A fleet was sent from Murcia to take Salé in 1236 during the confusion that reigned in Morocco as the Almohad caliph AR-RACHID consolidated his rise to power. Though this force was sent by IBN-HAUD, the Emir of Murcia, and though it failed, it was noted that upon arrival, the Murcian force was met there by *supporters who cheered his arrival*. While this certainly not definitive it does indicate a presence of Murcians in Salé that predates 1236. As the Murcian forces included soldiers of many faiths, it can be inferred through logic that among the supporters in Salé there were probably some Christians, some Jews, and some Muslims.⁷⁷ A more definite Spanish presence has been there uninterrupted from 1260. In that year ALFONSO X EL SABIO, King of Castille (1221 – 1284) attacked and conquered the city, holding it for a short time which had a lasting impact as the demographics of the town had been changed.⁷⁸ When the type of ship changed from the galley to sails, their range increased greatly

– the Atlantic coasts of Portugal and Spain were the first to enjoy the new attention, but they went much further on occasion, to France, into the English and Bristol Channels, to Ireland and Scotland, and even Iceland, but their main target was always Spanish shipping. Their location was ideal for interrupting the trade routes from Spain to South America as all ships sailed between the two via the Channel Islands which lay some miles off the Moroccan coast. Spain was the main target as it was that government that had robbed their own Muslim citizens of everything – their land, their language, their culture, their personal property, their money, and even their children.

Morocco had cultivated Spain and Portugal as allies against the Ottoman threat but the relationship had always been a strained one. As previously mentioned, in 1601, ZAYDAN is said to have offered aid to the Moriscos of Valencia which alienated the Habsburg monarch, FELIPE III (r. 1598 – 1621). Thenceforth, Spain became an ally of anyone who opposed ZAYDAN but their support always came at a high price. ZAYDAN *appointed* his brother MOHAMMED ES-SHEIKH *EL-MAMOUN* [sometimes written ES-CHEICK] to be his vice-regent for Marrakech in 1608; this was a ploy as MOHAMMED was in full control of the southern sultanate. There was some sort of military confrontation called the *Battle of Bou-Regreg* on 5 March 1609 between ZAYDAN and an unidentified rival at Rabat and Salé. ZAYDAN's rival is not known, but the ones named in written sources are wrong. That all writers have continued to report the erroneous combatants is possibly attributable to the information being characterized as originating shortly after the *Battle* and coming from the Consular records of at least two major European powers. In fact, the errors are in the publisher's footnotes to these works and were written in the early 20th century. The opposition forces are claimed to be the combined armies of two mysterious brothers who are named nowhere else, ABDALLAH and ABÛ FARES. This becomes problematic when it is recalled that a real brother named ABÛ FARES ABDALLAH was the son and designated heir of AL-MANSUR who became SULTAN OF MARRAKESH in 1603 until his death in 1608. It seems the *two* brothers were, in fact, *one* – and that one died several months before the *Battle*. It very well could be that, with the death of ABÛ FARES in 1608, some faction living at Salé began exerting more authority at ZAYDAN's expense, with the formalization of the process that was begun two decades earlier – the creation of the Republic of Salé. The *Republic of Salé* came into existence around 1608 but had existed informally since the 1590s. The burgeoning Republic was coaxed along by two external circumstances. First was ZAYDAN's loss of Marrakech and the second was the arrival of a sizeable number of exiles from the coastal region of Spain, exiles with sailing experience.⁷⁹ The *Republic of Rabat* was founded by the Andalusians of that city around 1614, followed by the Hornacheros in the Kasbah forming a republic a few years later under the leadership of IBRAHIM VARGAS.⁸⁰ All three were subsumed into the *Republic of Bou-Regreg* around 1620 with Salé as the dominant partner. Between 1609 and 1616 the Salé Rovers captured 466 English merchant ships, and England was far from being at the top of the list of nations when listed by their financial losses due to the rovers.

JAN's move to Morocco may have come about as early as 1609; once again, clear records do not exist. There are multiple records concerning a complicated legal dispute involving a ship sailing under a Dutch flag, a Portugal-based company that owned the cargo whose value was placed at 10,000 *livres*, a pirate crew and the Sultan in November 1609. The named members of the pirate party are JAN JANSZ, CAREL DE JONGE, and SYMON WILLEMSZ NOOMS and the records have them bringing a prize to Salé to stake their claim and sell the cargo and take title to the vessel.⁸¹ What is fascinating about this case, besides possibly placing our ancestor in Salé no later than October 1609, is the import of the 1609 truce between Spain and The Netherlands. An ongoing official

state of war existed between Morocco and Spain during this time which meant, under accepted prize law, any ships flying the flag of the enemy were subject to capture as a legal prize. Due to the truce, The Netherlands was no longer considered to be a Spanish holding. Since the pirates were not carrying a *Lettre-du-mark* the only ships they could claim as prizes were those flying the flag of an enemy and the Dutch flag no longer was included in that category. However, the cargo owner was based in Portugal, which, because it was Spanish at the time, was considered to be a declared enemy, allowing the possibility that the cargo could be seized, but not the ship. This was the crux of the matter in the lawsuits involving the States-General – a Dutch ship wasn't liable for seizure but the Admiralty Court at Salé ruled that it was a legal prize and awarded ownership to the pirates; the Court may not yet have been aware that a truce had even gone into effect. The Dutch, understandably, ruled otherwise, and demanded return of both the vessel and cargo with no monetary award. The Sultan got involved and based his claim on the fact that the cargo was war materiel and, as such, the law gave him ownership of any war-related materials in the cargo which placed him at odds with both the States-General and the Admiralty Court. What actually happened to the vessel and the cargo is not known because we only know the extent of the legal proceedings in The Hague and those rulings remained at odds with the finding of the Admiralty Court in Salé. The pirate JAN JANSZ, which is the abbreviated form of JANSZEN, could be our ancestor as the year, the location and the career are all correct; what does not make sense was the absence of his moniker of MORAT REÏS which he adopted several years earlier, which may only reflect a European ignorance of the moniker or just tell us that JAN was not yet well known. The Dutch signed a treaty with ZAYDAN in 1610 that, in theory, put an end to the taking of Dutch vessels as prizes and the holding of any Dutch citizen captive. The treaty was honored on the whole, but there are many instances of violations, including several by JAN but this behavior had changed by 1620; sometimes he would take the cargo from a Dutch vessel but he didn't take any vessels or captives and he used his influence to gain the release of any Dutch sailors that had been captured and brought to Salé.

Concurrent with the loss of power was the rise in conservative religious leaders that came to be called *the Maraboutic Crises*. There were three main centers of Maraboutic power that posed a serious threat to the unity of the country; they were the AL-SAMLALI in Sus, the DILAITE or AL-DILA' IYA in the Middle Atlas, and AL-'AYÂCHI in the Gharb region (discussed next). A marabout or *murābit*, claimed to be imbued with *baraka*, a spiritual power he inherited from the Prophet. This came from the esoteric branch of Islam known as *Sufism*. Their schools, called *zawiyā*, were a growing, decentralizing power in the state which the Emir countered through the construction of *madarsas* which, under the direction of the '*ulamā*', the guardians of knowledge, promoted orthodox Islam which was conservative and supported the government who created it. The spiritual *Sufism* gave rise to the political *Sharifism*, a powerful combination of sheik and a descendant of the Prophet with *baraka*. The local sheiks supported the *zawiyā* by building a complete educational institution including hospitals and lodgings for their chosen marabout which increased their own power for three centuries until the time of *the Maraboutic Crises* which saw the triumph of the marabout of Dilâ over the SAÂDI dynasty, *de facto* from 1641 and *de jure* from 1659, followed by the overlooked 30-year reign of an Amazigh marabout as Sultan. Two marabouts that stand out in power and prestige are *al-Jilani* under the Qadiri sheiks of Fez and *al-Jazuli* a *sharif* or *shérif* of the Sous; the latter was especially venerated at Salé.⁸²

Between 1616 and 1627 ZAYDAN jumped from one crisis to the next. The Maraboutic Crises worsened to the point that ZAYDAN could not maintain his position on the throne without the continued help from the marabout YAHYA BIN 'ABDULLA. This dependency, while keeping ZAYDAN

on the throne, severely weakened his power. After years of propping up ZAYDAN, YAHYA BIN 'ABDULLA made two attempts to take Marrakesh for himself. In 1618 he succeeded in routing ZAYDAN from Marrakesh but this was not the disaster it sounds like. ZAYDAN set up his camp on the Mégrous plain between Safi and Mazagan in the Doukkala province from where he continued to rule.⁸³ YAHYA died during his second attempt in March 1626.

Hoping to thwart the growing power of the several marabouts, SULTAN ZAYDAN turned to a marabout living south of Rabat in the Doukkala province. MOHAMMED BEN AHMED ELMÂLEKI EZZEYYÂNI (1563 – 1641; also found as ABU 'ABD ALLAH MUHAMMAD B. ABU AL-'ABBÂS AHMAD AL-MÂLAKÎ AL-ZAYYÂNÎ, ABOU ABDALLAH SÎDÎ MOHAMMED BEN AHMED ELAYYÂCHI and SÎDÎ MOHAMMED EL-MALIKI EZ-ZEYANI AL-'AYÂCHI) belonged to the Awlâd Zayyân clan of the Banû Mâlik, one of the Hilâlî Arab tribes. Known simply as AL-'AYÂCHI, he had come to Salé in the latter part of the 16th century to study under SÎDÎ ABDALLAH BEN HASSÛN ESSELÂSI (1515 – 1604; his mausoleum/shrine remains a place of pilgrimage to this day and is the focus of Salé's famous *Procession des Cierges* which began under AHMED EL-MANSUR around 1575 after witnessing a procession of candles in Constantinople on *Mawlid*, the birth of the Prophet Mohammed several years earlier).⁸⁴ In early 1604, HASSÛN sent him to the Awlâd Bû 'Azîz, an Arabian tribe in Doukkala. AL-'AYÂCHI settled in the region of Azemmour and took part in the ongoing fight to recapture Mazagan. French historians claimed, in the early 20th century, that he was appointed by ZAYDAN to the post of governor of Azemmour, just north of Spanish-held Mazagan; this is not supported by any European documents or Moroccan histories. The *caïd of fah 'ç* ruled the area around Azemmour and when he died in 1611, ZAYDAN appointed AL-'AYÂCHI as his successor, placing him in opposition to the *caïd* of Azemmour. ZAYDAN was facing down the revolt of MAHALLI for Marrakesh since 1610 and he did not want another area in revolt. Once he had recovered his capital, he could always oust his appointee. AL-'AYÂCHI preached, not without reason, a conservative doctrine with strict adherence to the tenets of Islam. There was a sheikh named ABOU SALIM who was better known under the pseudonym of "*VOYAGEUR EL-'AYYACHI*," associated with the *Ait 'Ayyach zawiyâ*; it is not certain if this was the same person or not.⁸⁵ It has been said that AL-'AYÂCHI's most radical belief was that every Muslim in Morocco was beyond redemption and had to be killed but this is a fanciful lie. Often portrayed as a fanatic, AL-'AYÂCHI did have some valid points – the Iberian Muslims did not adhere to all of the tenets of Islam, not always through a willful rejection of the tenets but possibly from an ignorance of them. Though not knowing about the ban on alcohol consumption does stretch the credulity of these Muslims and with an annual wine production of 200 tons in the 1630s, it does seem they did pick and chose what tenets they would follow (a characteristic not uncommon in most religions).⁸⁶ La Mamora was occupied by the Spaniards on 6 August 1614 and set their eyes on Salé. AL-'AYYÂCHÎ was sent to Salé by ZAYDAN to bolster the defenses against a possible attack from La Mamora. By 1616 he was building an army in Tamesna, south of Salé, to take Azemmour. When his forces arrived outside of that town on 20 August 1617, he was joined by several local Arab tribes and a significant portion of the city's population, all with the tacit approval of ZAYDAN. His military force became too powerful to easily dislodge as ZAYDAN had hoped to do and AL-'AYYÂCHÎ ruled a large swath of land north and east of the city; despite his strength, his repeated attacks on Spanish-held Mazagan were unsuccessful. In 1618 ZAYDAN was supposedly convinced by insinuations emanating from Spanish agents, that the security of his throne was being jeopardized by AL-'AYYÂCHÎ's ever-increasing power. He sent a force of 400 under command of his *caïd* or captain, MOHAMMED ESSENOUS to capture and kill

AL-AYÂCHÎ but he, and his army, escaped to the north and found refuge in Salé where he consolidated his power.⁸⁷ Soon after arriving in Salé, AL-AYÂCHÎ became involved in one of the stranger episodes of his life. He along with the *caïd* and supporters of the Kasbah in Rabat, the majority being exiles from Hornacho, is said to have entered into negotiations with the Spanish crown to turn over the fortress in exchange for allowing the exiles to return to Extremadura. Presented to the Spanish Court on the 8th of June, twenty days was allotted to draw up proposals. The envoy sent to negotiate, SĪDĪ 'ĪSĀ BEN AL-TĀLIB, offers an incentive – he knows where an important, ancient treasure is to be found and he will present it to the king for a 10% cut! This “treasure” is revealed to be a cache of gold ingots and 629 gold jewelry, each with a ruby or diamond that his father stole from ZAYDAN’S camel caravan! Extant documents prove that negotiations were held so the story cannot be completely discounted. AL-AYÂCHÎ’S involvement is puzzling as he was not on good terms with those in the Kasbah and was living in Salé and building fortifications with cannons aimed at the Kasbah! A clue is found in a letter addressed to PHILLIP III, dated 19 June 1619, in which the fifty-five year old AL-AYÂCHÎ is described as being destitute and sapped of strength. The letter continues with him saying he would overthrow the sultan of Marrakech if he had the men and the means to do so.⁸⁸ This was not the first time in 1619 that Spain had been offered a Moroccan port – in April Mogador and *Sante Croce* had been offered to PHILLIP III by the *caïd* of the latter place; nothing came of this. The turnover of the Kasbah progressed quite far with keys to the Kasbah being given to the King, SĪDĪ 'ĪSĀ making additional requests – a mule and a pearl necklace, costing no more than 300 doubloons, for his wife, a string of Spanish Crowns as his fee, 100 doubloons for the expenses for travels plus some spending money and, lastly, the cargo carried by the ship that will take him back to Morocco should include foods, tobacco, brandy, fabrics, etc should be given to him – and the ship too! An agreement is reached 22 July with another clause – SĪDĪ 'ĪSĀ is to be declared King of Marrakech & Fez! The matter is still being deliberated in Council and details worked out through October. It will not be until 30 April 1620 that we find notice in the Councils records that the project had been abandoned completely. Since 1618 Spain and the Netherlands had been at war with the Regency of Algiers and a couple of planned naval attacks required the building of warships which took precedence no doubt. Further scrutiny reveals that the whole attempt was never real – it was a scheme cooked up by SĪDĪ 'ĪSĀ to gain control and hopefully overthrow the SAĀDIAN dynasty! So just was SĪDĪ 'ĪSĀ? A charlatan or conman? This character disappears from the records just as quickly as he appeared but LOUIS MOUGIN posits that he was most likely a relative of ZAYDAN’S former ally and current enemy SIDI YAHYA.⁸⁹

A reinvigorated AL-AYÂCHÎ would soon emerge and continue his radical course. Since the end of the 19th century, much misinformation has been published, mainly by French researchers, on this enigmatic person; these errors have been repeated and spread world wide by later researchers who have failed to catch them and can be found in print today.

The Special Ambassador to Morocco, ALBERT RUYL, described ZAYDAN’S weak position in a letter dated 23 February 1623, in which he repeats remarks made *by some Andalous* that the inhabitants of Salé simply ignore ZAYDAN. The Dutchman Jacon Gool (Golius) was known to have anchored in Salé in the early part of June 1623; he was accompanied by Albert Ruyl for several months. Unfortunately no mention of Jan has been found in any of Gool’s letters or in his journal.⁹⁰ The two banks of the river are said to be in *permanent war against each other*, in part, because the Oudaïa on the south side of the river, controls all river navigation, which forced Salé to anchor their ships in a riskier location closer to the Atlantic, being subject to weather and attacks. The discord is not limited to either side of the river. Neither side trusts *the state*

(meaning the Sultanate of Morocco), the Moors of Salé back the SULTAN OF FEZ, MOHAMMED *EL-MAMOUN*, over ZAYDAN. This exacerbated the cross-river animosity as the Andalusians of Rabat held MOHAMMED as an enemy as they supported ZAYDAN to some degree though they challenged his authority over Rabat. What little population not accounted for included the small Arab community in Rabat and peasants in both places oppose ZAYDAN, because of his *unfair taxation* – these were the only groups in the area that paid any taxes to the Sultan and they were also required to pay the local taxes described below.⁹¹ RUYL describes the fortifications of the Oudaïa, holding a force of 1500 Andalusians, starting with the entrance and ramp being *blocked against entry* and armed with 6 small *metal* cannons from Portugal and 70 *iron ones all with bad carriages*. He says *the town is protected by 3 levels of artillery*, which is assumed to mean Rabat as the 3 levels would be hard to apply to Salé. He describes a system of taxation wherein *all contribute to the cost according to their means*, from less than 10 ducats to 100 or more, and all *participate in the profit sharing of the spoils*.

Between 1618 and 1626, it has been estimated that the Salé Rovers brought goods worth £15 million *at that time* into port. This figure does not include the value of the estimated 6,000 slaves that were captured during these raids and sold in town. The Salé Rovers raided the Faroe Islands in 1615 and 1616, and again in 1629, with additional ships from corsairs from Algiers.⁹²

French ADMIRAL ISAAC DE RAZILLY (1587 – 1635) was put in charge of a French embassy in 1624 charged with resolving the affair of ZAYDAN's library being stolen by the French Consul. RAZILLY had been sent previously by the French King, landing at Safi on 10 January 1619. He may have been sent to find out what he could about the rumored development of a new port at Aïer.⁹³ This time they fared no better than the 1619 visit as RAZILLY was imprisoned and put in chains before agreeing to unspecified items, the violation of which would imperil the lives of the captives he had to leave behind as security. The ADMIRAL retaliated by shelling the harbor without regard to those captives he left behind as security against just such action; they remained in prison for years because of RAZILLY.⁹⁴ In 1626 he suggested the French mount an expedition to capture the port of Mogador to keep the Sultan and the Salétians in check. The French made overtures again in 1629, possibly veiled as an offer of assistance to the Sultan and/or AL-‘AYÂCHI to take the Oudaïa.

In 1627 AL-‘AYÂCHI returns to our attention as his forces, numbering some 5,000 men, were settled at Chellah, just outside the walls of Rabat. Some believe he had been invited by the Andalusians of Rabat, whose military numbered 1,500, as protection from ZAYDAN but this does not accord with AL-‘AYÂCHI's proclaimed *jihad* against all foreign-born Muslims. If it was by invitation of the Andalusians, it did not help; they were slaughtered, almost to a man, in that year, not by ZAYDAN but by the Hornacheros from Rabat. From this base he tried to settle the score with Spain, mounting an attack on the Spanish-held port of al-Ma'mura, now Mehdyia (*La Mamara* while under Spanish control); whether or not he had help from the English remains a debated point. The captain of the citadel at Salé, ostensibly ZAYDAN's but really there as an agent of the Dilâ princes, was the caïd EZZAAROUR. He sent some Andalusians to AL-‘AYÂCHI, possibly to spy on him, possibly to warn him against an impending attack from ZAYDAN, and maybe both. The Andalusians turned on EZZAAROUR, reported him as a traitor to ZAYDAN, executed him, and looted his house. ZAYDAN sent the *Mamluk* (warrior) ADJIB to be his governor at Salé but the Andalusians refused to suffer this encroachment on their authority and ADJIB was dead in a few days. Thereafter a short period of anarchy came to an end when AL-‘AYÂCHI was asked to take charge of the city. He subsequently defeated ZAYDAN's army and commanded by

his son ABOUL ABBAS AHMED that was sent against Fez.⁹⁵ He effectively governed not only Salé but the land between Salé and Safi to the south called the *Tamesna* and between Salé and Larache to the north called the *Gharb*. Extending 300+ miles (500 km) north-to-south and up to 70 miles (110 km) inland, this was a significant amount of territory. His power was such that he sent envoys to the court of CHARLES I: MOHAMMED BEN-SAID (LOPEZ DE ZAPAR) and AHMED NARAVAEZ in 1627 and MOHAMMED CLAFISHOU in 1629.⁹⁶

1627 was a memorable year: a massive earthquake hit at daybreak on 9 April; this was followed by a monstrous hailstorm on 21 April with hailstones the size of chicken eggs! They lasted on the ground for 3 days!⁹⁷ And then SULTAN ZAYDAN died in September 1627, and events similar to those that followed his father's death in 1603 repeated themselves. ZAYDAN's youngest son, ABÛ MARWAN ABD AL-MALIK II, was proclaimed SULTAN OF MOROCCO. Almost immediately, another son, ABOUL ABBAS AHMED, had himself proclaimed SULTAN OF FEZ, once again splitting the country that had only reunited a year earlier. This was followed by civil unrest during which time any power and authority ZAYDAN had managed to win back in the *Gharb* (the Atlantic littoral area that included the Republic) was quickly lost and the resultant vacuum paved the way for religious leaders to wreak havoc. Also much disorder was caused by the Hornachos slaughtering the Andalusian community in 1627.

The power, wealth and status of the *Republic of Bou-Regreg* continued to grow. Its power was such that in 1626 a specific exception to the trade embargo imposed *by both countries* was granted to the *Moriscos of Salé*.⁹⁸ The *Republic of Bou-Regreg* signed its first international treaty on 10 May 1627 with the English Ambassador to Morocco, JOHN HARRISON. HARRISON remains known today mainly for writing and publishing The Tragicall Life and Death of Mulay Abdallah Melek in 1633. The treaty secured the *Republic's* help in releasing English captives in exchange for provisions and arms, the terms of which, with alterations, were renewed annually for the next decade. The English soon violated the terms of the treaty with the capture of a Moroccan vessel.⁹⁹ Many authors alter this treaty from ignorance or to suit their own goals: many write that it was between England and the *Hornachero Republic*. There never existed such an entity, even the exiles from Hornacho never referred to it as such. That population is credited with assuming *a predominant role in the agitation of internal quarrels*.¹⁰⁰ They moved into the derelict buildings around Oudaïa after being chased out of Salé by the residents and refused accommodation in Andalusian Rabat. They may have assumed a majority role in the *Republic of Rabat* in the late 1610s but forfeited that role when it was combined with the much older, wealthier and more powerful *Republic of Salé* around 1620. In the 1991 book Ships, Money and Politics, author KENNETH ANDREWS gets just about everything wrong from who lived where and when, who was in charge, who were friends and who were enemies and this treaty as well. He describes the fantastical *Hornachero Republic* as wealthy and powerful who grudgingly paid the Sultan a percentage of each prize until they rose up and, in conjunction with the thousands of fighters under the impressive SÎDÎ AL-'AYÂCHI, expelled the Sultan's government, establishing their Republic as an independent state. Where to start? There never was a *Hornachero Republic*; the Hornacho population, holed up in the Kasbah, had tried to model their *Republic* on the one they had tried to create in Extremadura for their bandits, brigands, and counterfeiters, but it certainly was not powerful or wealthy; the exiles from Hornacho were made an offer upon their arrival - *if* they moved to Salé, they would not pay taxes to the Sultan – which they unwisely accepted – the connen had been conned. Upon arrival, they found that the *Republic of Salé* was not under the Sultan's control, nor had it been for over 20 years; residents and businesses paid taxes into their own treasury, not to the Sultan's. The Sultan promised something that was not his to give away –

they'd been had. Salé granted the Sultan an annual tribute in lieu of taxes, when they felt the urge to do so. The exiles arrival in Salé was met with suspicion, distrust and worse by both the Amazigh and the old-time Moorish families that had been living there for many generations already, some since the 13th century. What did they bring to the town? Nothing of any value to the town; they had no sailing skills at all – they lived in the interior, far from any ocean or sea. They couldn't even talk with the exiles from Valencia and Andalusia already living in town as they used an incomprehensible Arab dialect. The inhabitants made it clear that they were welcome to stay in the area, just not in Salé; perhaps Rabat, where the Andalusian population lived in relative comfort and ease in the southeast section of the town and the Arabs from the south lived in a virtual ghetto in the northern part. The *Sultan's government* that was present amounted to a 20-man garrison in the Oudaïa and they walked out as they had not been paid in months. They had to take on odd jobs to buy food since the promised government rations were as available as the promised government salary. SÎDÎ AL-'AYÂCHI was there too; after 1614 he and his 5,000 soldiers lived in tents just outside the walls of Rabat, near Chellah, after fleeing ZAYDAN's forces in the south. Even newer works such as that of ALAN JAMIESON, *Lords of the Sea* from 2012, gets virtually all of the historical information about Salé and Rabat completely wrong. Authors who are only familiar with the latest published works continue to rehash or worse, expand, on the distorted history that had been previously published by authors who may have only wanted to highlight the presence of a specific group but whose work has been interpreted as documentation for false claims for that group being the single most dominant one and/or the *raison d'être* for the existence of all corsairing activities from the Salé area. Books for public consumption are one thing but when a 2017 doctoral dissertation, submitted at the Sorbonne in Paris, among others, is filled with these same distortions and errors, it sets the stage for continuing the fanciful history that is gaining more misguided accolades as time passes.¹⁰¹ But there are some writers like SAFAA MONQID who is much more accurate and has the following (translated from French) to say:

Between the end of the ALMOHADS and the beginning of the sixteenth century, the importance of the city of Rabat diminished considerably in favor of the city of Salé. Under the MERINIDS, a dynasty of nomadic Berber zenets of eastern Morocco who reigned in the Maghreb between 1258 and 1465, the city of Salé had a maritime arsenal protected by a wall on the river side, especially after the destructive raid by the Castilians in 1260. Salé played an important role in trade with Europe and it became, at the beginning of the 15th century, the most important trading post on the Atlantic coast and a prosperous city. As in all the big cities of their empire, the Merinides built madrasas in Salé like the Madrasa 'Inâniyya, as well as an aqueduct. The city took on a religious character and became the home of Sufism with holy hermits like SÎDÎ BEN ACHIR (Spanish Muslim mystic of the fourteenth century), marabouts like SÎDÎ ABDALLAH BEN HASSÛN (learned man of the sixteenth century from a village north of Fez) and many others.

MONQID also states that Salé was independent of the Sultan's rule before the arrival of the exiles from Hornacho in 1613 but then falters in saying these refugees gave birth to the Andalusian city of Rabat and that they were accomplished corsairs on the Atlantic Coast.¹⁰² In 1988 MAURICE PERRAIS wrote in the French bimonthly *Gavroche*:

Salé, at the mouth of Bou Regreg, opposite Rabat, an important commercial port in the Middle Ages, became in the 17th century, a small independent republic of corsairs ...

On the other hand he misidentifies JAN in the retelling of his two most notorious raids without realizing he is writing about the same person – in the first he is the German *CARA MORAT* and in the very next paragraph he is the Flemish *MORAT RAYS*!¹⁰³ ROGER COINDREAU, considered by some as an authority, summed it up nicely in 1948: they arrived *les poches pleines de ducats*, their pockets full of money, with their principal value to the *corso* being *armateurs*, ship owners. They also scouted for experienced foreigners to fit out their ships with weapons and, on occasion, would buy a fully fitted-out ship built elsewhere. As ship owners, they had to supply all ammunition, provisions, and equipment necessary to go on *corso*. However, it was the sizeable Jewish community who supplied the necessary funds, not the exiles. The Jews maintained and expanded their networks in Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Through these last mentioned, the Dutch were introduced and integrated into the *corso* at Salé. Without the Dutch sailing ability and ship-building skills, the *corso* would have stagnated. COINDREAU continues with the statement that captains from Salé were *always* independent, only recognizing the authority of the ship's owner. As the captains and owners organized into a republic, the Diwan of Salé attempted to exert authority by requiring all vessels to have their commission before setting sail but this soon devolved into little more than a money-making venture with rubber-stamped commissions being handed out. As the income generated by the *corso* made up a significant proportion of the income for the Diwan, there was little they could, or would, do in opposition to this important cadre; many ships sailed without a commission.¹⁰⁴

Upon the death of the sultan, his designated heir, ABÛ MARWAN ABD AL-MALIK II ascended the shaky throne. ZAYDAN had a questionable right to the throne and his nephews also vied for the throne, making the rule of AL-MALIK II an uneasy one. The princes of Dilâ controlled that part of Morocco from the Bou-Regreg north to the Kingdom of Fez and east into the mountains; they had been supporters of the rival line of MOHAMMED in Fez but that line reconciled with ZAYDAN in 1626, bringing Fez and Marrakesh under a single sovereign for a year. ZAYDAN's death in 1627 revived the split when one of his sons had himself declared *Sultan of Fez*, in opposition to the *Sultan of Morocco*. So uncertain was the political sphere that when JOHN HARRISON returned from England in March 1630, ostensibly to renegotiate the treaty. He made no attempt to see the sultan, instead heading to Salé to treat with the Republic. One of his main goals was to find out where an opportunity might arise for the English to gain control of a port and, to this end, the English offered military assistance in the ongoing internal battles to any side if it looked like they would be able to dislodge all sides and grab a fortified port for themselves. Rabat was the port and the Oudaïa was the fortification that offered the most promise. HARRISON's communications with his King in 1630 refers to JAN JANSEN as *the former president and grand admiral of the Republic of Salé*.¹⁰⁵

ZAYDAN was proclaimed SULTAN OF MOROCCO upon the death of his nephew ABD AL-MALIK IBN ABDALLAH, the Sultan of Fez, in 1626. This reconciliation returned Salé to the status it had before the 22-year period of opposition rule. That was as an independent *Republic* where the Sultan's authority was minimal. ZAYDAN died 20 September 1627 and he was followed by the brief reigns of his sons ABUL ABBAS AHMED (1627 – 1628) and ABD EL-MALEK (1628 – 1631). In 1631, a *Sultan of Morocco* came to the throne with the support of both kingdoms and the Dilâ princes when they granted recognition to EL-WALID as the one rightful ruler of all Morocco. This certainly should have been a surprise to the new Sultan as he, and his brother MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH ES SEGHIR, were imprisoned by ABD EL-MALEK for fomenting a rebellion against him in 1628. But imprisonment could not stop planning and the assassination at the hands of some Arabs had been orchestrated by EL-WALID. It is safe to say they would never name a city

Philadelphia or *madinat alhabī al'ukhawī* (نة الحب الأخويدي) as there was no sign of *brotherly love* for miles.

In the Republic the ongoing discord between the Andalusians, whose numbers rebounded from the 1627 slaughter and augmented by migration of Andalusian tribes to Rabat, and the Hornachos under ABDALLAH BEN ALI EL-KASRI in the Oudaïa was only tempered by their mutual and growing antipathy towards AL-'AYÂCHI. When tensions escalated between these two groups in 1630, mediation by the AMBASSADOR JOHN HARRISON failed. HARRISON returned in 1631 but he was not welcome in Salé because the English had repeatedly breached the terms of the 1630 treaty. Heading to Marrakech, HARRISON was greeted with the demand of the sultan that the English must stop their deprivations on his subjects as part of any treaty. A journal kept by SIR GEORGE CARTERET of Jersey, is said to differ significantly in details from those given by HARRISON, as it should.¹⁰⁶ CARTERET'S journal covers his voyage to Salé in 1638 and there is no indication that he was involved in the 1630 or 1631 expeditions to the region though he served as Vice-Admiral for the 1637 one. AL-'AYÂCHI had gone to Mecca but without knowing when the Islamic month of *Zul-Hijjah* fell or when he was in Tunis on his way back to the Bou-Regreg, it is not possible to state the trip was a *Hajj*. As fate would have it, JAN was sailing on a corso and decided to stop in Tunis probably to offload any booty he had and to take on supplies. Being well-aware of the fact that a civil war was about to break out, he surmised that this war be more likely if AL-'AYÂCHI was absent and offered him and his companions a fast voyage to Salé. He agreed and when JAN dropped anchor and the *SAINT OF SALÉ*, one of AL-'AYÂCHI'S nicknames, disembarked, negotiations began with a renewed sense of urgency.¹⁰⁷ JAN was right in his assumption and a military confrontation was avoided for the moment but the peace would not hold for long. The Moors of Salé realized the damage this was doing to the *Republic* and tried to end it in 1631 when, against their better judgment, they called on the assistance of AL-'AYÂCHI. He had grown paranoid and delusional by this point, blaming the Arabs for every failure of his and fearful that rule would fall to the Amazigh! Thus he added the Arabs and the Amazigh to the growing list of his imagined enemies of Islam – not only Europeans, or those of European descent even if the family had been in Morocco for centuries, but also the Arabs and the indigenous Amazigh were all now acting in a concerted effort to undermine the Islamic faith and destroy the vision of the Prophet. Doing the simple math, what he wanted to do was eliminate every human in Morocco and yet he failed to see how much of a lunatic he had become.

He may have provided some assistance to the Salétians but given his tenuous grasp on reality, it's hardly likely. One or two fortifications built outside the city walls on the river bank may date to this time, but both the time and the builder remain uncertain and they have been removed within the last few decades as has the system of tunnels connecting these batteries with a residence within the walls – the claims it was AL-'AYÂCHI'S house are suspect as the Salétians did not want him in their town but they could have used his forces against their neighbors on the south bank. The house later became the site of the French *École de fils des Notables* and, after that, the *École de Mekki Alaoui*. The batteries had 5 cannons; 4 aimed at the Oudaïa and the 5th at the sandbar; this not only provided protection from a water-based attack but henceforth all commerce was reserved again to Salé. The financial ruin of the Andalusians and the Hornachos was quick at hand. The Oudaïa was besieged until October 1632 by the Salétians who were able to relax once AL-'AYÂCHI left to attack Spanish held al-Mam'ura. The Salétians were right to be concerned about the erosion of strength caused by this never-ending feud and the continued existence of the *Republic of Bou-Regreg* was probably never more in question than in 1632. In that year, *Salé* was captured by the combined forces of the English navy and the army of SULTAN


EL-WALID. Rabat must have been taken as the English were only interested in liberating any of their conational captives held in the prisons of the Oudaïa. Once done, the English turned tail and fled, leaving EL-WALID without the support they had promised. They duped the Sultan into providing enough of a diversion by throwing his army against a difficult obstacle, eating up his soldiers while the English fought from their ships with cannon shot until they secured the way to release the English prisoners through the liberal use of bribery. Abandoned, EL-WALID had to evacuate his forces before they were massacred once his fair-wind allies fled.

The *Republic* had operational troubles to deal with as well. The mouth of the Bou Regreg needed constant dredging. The massive sand bar lying just off the harbor was a blessing and a curse. Its shallow waters allowed for the shallow-draft corsair vessels to skim over the bar to the safety of the harbor while effectively blocking the deeper-draft European warships from gaining entry. As the years passed the vessels of both sides increased in size and what once allowed safe passage now blocked that escape route to safety as the corsair vessels no longer just skimmed the surface. The sand bar also slowed the outflow of the River and it was this very slowing that caused the silt carried in the river to sink to the bottom of the harbor. This silting up of the harbor interfered little in the years of the shallow-draft vessels but strained the treasury with the heavy dredging fees required to keep the harbor viable in later years. By 1634 the harbor was so silted up that the pirate fleet had been reduced to just 30 shallow-draft, yet very fast, *caravels*. A later description of the harbor captures the decay nicely (and calls into question the accuracy of the 1634 observation made by a Roman Catholic priest): *By 1780 all that remained were 15 frigates, a 'few' xebecs and 30+ galleys – all rotting from lack of use while the harbor was useless due to sandbar and silting from mainland.*¹⁰⁸

As late as 1635 SULTAN EL-WALID was still trying to subdue the *Republic* rather than work with them as his father and grandfather had done. He even sent an embassy to CHARLES I, KING OF ENGLAND requesting military assistance. The English participation was noted by the Venetian Ambassador to England, as detailed later. On 21 February 1636 SULTAN EL-WALID was murdered in Marrakech, with several plausible versions including that the deed was done by the same group people that EL-WALID used to kill his predecessor. Another version calls this one into question; EL-WALID was known to have a real passion for music; he had musicians at his beck and call night and day. He suffered from *the same vice as his father and was intoxicated until the day he died assassinated by the renegades*. The renegades in his presence had grown impatient with his drunken lapses and demanded their unpaid salary and the customary presents that had not been forthcoming. They demanded *Give us something to eat!* His reply does not translate well as it sounds innocuous, coming from someone inebriated, rather than being the reason he was murdered. EL-WALID allegedly said *Eh! Well, eat orange peels in the Meserra*; this could have been derogatory if, say, it was common for dogs to eat orange peels. Whatever the meaning, it was provocation enough for four renegades who ambushed the Sultan on 21 February 1636.¹⁰⁹ He was succeeded by another of ZAYDAN's sons, MOHAMMED ESH-SHEIKH ES-SEGHIR who ruled as MOHAMMED IV. He ventured from Marrakech later that same year, heading towards Tâdla when the caravan was attacked by the forces of the Dila marabout MOHAMMED BEN ABÛ BEKR under command of his son MUHAMMAD AL-HAJJ. The Sultan fled to the safety of Marrakech and never again ventured beyond the walled city.¹¹⁰ English correspondence of this period relays that the southern Kingdom as Sous had not been under the control of the SAÂDI sultans for many years, stating that *the marabout CIDDY ALLY (ABÛ HASSÛN) had in fact governed much of that region ruled since the time of his grandfather, AHMAD ABÛ MAHALLI...*¹¹¹ The same

MAHALLI who briefly captured Marrakech in 1612, married ZAYDAN'S mother, and was beheaded in 1613.

The ongoing presence of two strong antagonistic factions competing for power on the south side of the Bou-Regreg compromised the running of the *Republic*. Several versions of the events that transpired are readily available and, while the logic and/or chronology is wrong in most of them, there are some threads of truth in them as well. What makes the events so confusing is the intervention of the English, which I believe, no one expected yet everyone claimed as an ally after-the-fact per the inclination of later story writers and tellers (which is still going on with today's latest offerings that present a gloss of fact but are pure fiction). While most place events wholly in 1637, more detailed accounts date the beginning to September 1636. In that month the Andalusians seized the Oudaïa and exiled the Hornachos to Tunis and Algiers – which is quite an accomplishment as they numbered over 10,000 by this time. Once in control of the Oudaïa, the Andalusians exerted control of the harbor; they turned their sights on the much more powerful Moors across the river. They built a pontoon bridge across the river and moved artillery, infantry and cavalry in early 1637 and launched an attack against Salé. Again, quite a lot to accomplish without provoking any kind of response, especially considering the presence of the Salétian fortifications on the north bank and the control of the river and harbor they afforded, which proved helpful in 1632. The Salétians repelled the attacks, once again with or without the help of AL-'AYÂCHI'S forces, depending on your source.



Coming as a surprise to the local belligerents, but, perhaps, not the Sultan, was the arrival of an English squadron of three ships, none too spectacular or effective, in March, possibly the 24th, or April 1637. In 1636, the Bristol merchant GILES PENN submitted a plan to liberate the imprisoned subjects of CHARLES I to the Admiralty; he had hoped to be appointed commander of the expedition if the plan was approved. PENN, the grandfather of WILLIAM PENN of Pennsylvania fame, described the political situation in

Salé but nowhere does he indicate he advocated any cooperation with any local party which renders any supposition that he did rather suspect. The Admiralty approved, but chose, once again, WILLIAM RAINSBOROUGH (or RAINBOROW) Vice-admiral in the English Royal Navy, to lead from his flagship, the *Leopard*. The ship was one of two third-rate ships of the line under his command, both surviving relics of the Tudor navy launched in 1546: the galleass *Antelope*, updated in 1618 to 450-tons and 34 guns, and the slightly larger 500-ton *Leopard* with 34 guns, along with the 400-ton merchantman *Mary*, completed the squadron. In the several versions of the retelling of these events, the English are made out to be the ally of whoever the writer chooses as their protagonist – the Andalusians, the Hornacheros, SULTAN MOHAMMED IV, the Salétians or AL-‘AYÂCHI; what seems to be the case is that the English followed plans laid down and approved the year before; they acted in their own self-interest. That hostilities were underway upon their arrival was a mere happenstance that they soon took advantage of.¹¹² RAINSBOROUGH, who was, at times, the English Ambassador to Morocco, stationed his three ships outside the harbor at Salé and unsuccessfully blockaded the harbor; the arrival of the *Hercules* a month later did not help. The partial blockade allowed corsairs to come and go anytime with over 100 shots being fired at one corsair without a single hit being made. This porosity was finally lessened when two English *pinnaces* arrived in June: the *Providence* and the *Exposition*. They did manage to plunder the *Neptune* of Amsterdam, making off with their cargo of gunpowder. Some say RAINSBOROUGH attacked points held by the Hornacho faction at the request of the Andalusians but this is at odds with the expulsion of the Hornachos to Tunis and Algiers in September 1636. An alternate version have the Salétian-allied English destroying the pontoon bridge, causing the Andalusian’s to retreat into the hilltop Oudaïa, which was then bombarded. In any event, the English took control of the prison and, just as in 1632, liberated the English prisoners and, leaving all other nationalities captive, sailed away, arriving in England sometime over the summer, June and August are mentioned, with 230 or 300, or more, liberated prisoners. English accounts of the event are exaggerated in its success with claims of liberating over 400 captives of all nationalities whether Protestant or Catholic and sinking a dozen ships, which is not supported in other records. They were only interested in liberating English Protestants but were coerced into taking some Scots and a few Irish, as they had been instructed to do.


ENGLAND 1637 During this expedition, RAINSBOROUGH, who must have been appointed Ambassador to the Sultan, signed some sort of *Convention* which was dated 10 May 1637 but that date is unlikely as the blockade of Salé had not yet ended; such a signing could only be accomplished by an Ambassador or a Consul. RAINSBOROUGH did sail to Safi, the one port under the Sultan’s full control which served as the gateway to Marrakesh, where he disembarked and headed to the capital for over a month. The *Convention* was unusual and ineffective as it *allowed*

for armaments to be shipped to the SULTAN, but in no way guaranteed such shipments would actually happen – which made the financial costs, whether MOHAMMED IV received the weapons or not, his responsibility. Some of this is related in the papers of ANZOLO CORRER, the Venetian Ambassador to the Court of Saint James in which, on the 6th of November, he relates to the Doge that the Moroccan Ambassador, GAUDAR BEN ABDALA, has arrived at Court *since the sending of the slaves, to return thanks for the help in recovering Salée and to establish solid relations of State. He brings four very fine horses as a present to his Majesty, and half a dozen exquisite falcons, a gift that pleases him more than anything could, birds and horses for hunting being for him ministers for his chief pleasures. They say preparations are being made to receive this envoy with great honour, the merchants in particular being most eager to surround him with stateliness and render him every kind of courtesy.*¹¹³ This statement hints at an agreement between the two Courts to affect the recovery of Salé. Depending on the source consulted, these prisoners were released by the Andalusians, by AL-‘AYÂCHI, or due to the English subduing the enemy. What is most likely is that the English were allied with no one, the goal of their plan always being liberation of their captive countrymen. This they did rather effectively and rapidly. It is unclear if it was this attack, or the 1632 one, which saw the sinking of 3 corsair vessels; likewise, the ownership of the vessels – Andalusian or Salétian – is uncertain. Where JAN was during the blockade and what, if any, role he played is not known. Perhaps he was an observer and remained ensconced in his new *castle* in Walidia.

The Andalusian bid for power ended with their defeat at the hands of the combined forces of AL-‘AYÂCHI and the Salétian Moors; whether this occurred on the 10th of May or some later date is disputable. The exiled Hornachos were allowed to return under a much more determined *Republic of Bou-Regreg* who severely restricted the remnants of both groups from meaningful participation in the affairs of the *Republic* for several years. The internal discord of 1637 was followed by an attempt to subdue the area by MOHAMMED IV, and, just as in 1632, failed.¹¹⁴

ENGLAND 1638 CARTERET set sail once again for Salé on the 21st of May 1638 with the Sultan’s *Embassador* to CHARLES II, *ALCAYDE JAURAR BEN ABDELLA*, aboard his ship, the *Convertive*. Four merchant ships, one holding a coach and seven horses as a gift from CHARLES II to *MAHOMMED III, King of Moroco* were being escorted by His Majesties Ships *Convertive* and *Expedecon*, a pinnace, to Morocco. Rabat was in revolt again with the Hornacheros taking the town but failing to take the Kasbah. CARTERET recorded that on 23 August 1638 he learned that AL CAYD MORATTA French renegade from Safi at the head of the Sultan’s force of 450 in the Oudaïa was contemplating turning the Kasbah over to the King of Spain. CARTERET claims to have dissuaded him of this, in part, by placing Charles II of England as the safer power to relinquish the Kasbah to.¹¹⁵ ROBERT BLAKE also supported this idea before the Star Chamber but the idea did not win the day. CARTERET’s *Journal* was first published in 1929 and contains a foreword that is thought to have been written by BOIES PENROSE, the owner of the *Journal* just prior to publication. While it is tempting to associate this AL CAYD MORATTA from Safi with MORAT-RAÏS, AL-SEGHIR who was admiral of the port at Safi, given that JAN was approaching 70 years old, it does not seem likely. The *Journal* provides a good accounting of the expedition which lasted until September 1638.

The elimination of the irritating Hornacho and Andalusian factions from all positions of authority did not end the internal strife of the *Republic*. The Andalusians grew evermore fearful of the growing power of AL-‘AYÂCHI. As already mentioned, everyone was



responsible for polluting the faith – Christians, European Muslims, Arabs, Amazighs – and only he saw that only by killing everyone would the faith be cleansed (and the mosques empty). When he started getting support from radical jurists, all foreigners from Europe and the Middle East no matter what religion they practiced and the Amazigh saw this fanaticism for what it was.

After four years of internecine fighting, Salè recognized the marabout of Dilâ as their leader in 1631. The *Dila'yya* tribe was a Sufi brotherhood from the Aït-Mejjat tribe of the Sanhajian federation from the Middle Atlas who exercised rule over Salé and the Gharb for much of the middle part of the 17th century. Contrary to what JAMIESON states, the Dilâ were not some “*new power within Morocco*”. The Dilâ were Amazigh that settled in the western foothills of the Atlas Mountains at the start of the 15th century. By the mid-16th century, the head of the family was SÎDÎ ABUBAKR IBN MUHAMMAD, who had become a religious leader of note, established a school – the *Zawiyâ* of the Dilâ. The second head of the Dilâ was MOHAMMED BEN ABÛ BEKR under whom the idea of a resurgent Amazigh sultanate gained traction. As the *zawiyâ* grew, so did its influence which necessitated a more active role in government with the *zawiyâ* combining religious teachings with a political vision. After ABÛ BEKR died in 1637, he was followed by his son MOHAMMED nicknamed *ELHADJ* or MUHAMMAD AL-HAJJ. They would form a virtually



independent state with their capital at Ait Ishaq. MOHAMMED ECH-CHEIKH planned to destroy the in the fall of 1638 but spys had relayed this information to the Dila. AL-HAJJ forces swept out of the mountains and destroyed the Sultan's army on 26 October 1638.¹¹⁶

By recognizing Dilâ suzerainty, Salè extricated itself from the failing Republic of the Bou-Regreg.¹¹⁷ The rump Republic of Bou-Regreg limped along confined to the southern bank of the river for about a decade with 1641 being the year usually given for the collapse of the once profitable *Republic*, though it

would periodically reappear at will. AL-AYÂCHI had not only lost his power base in Salè but he learned of secret negotiations by the Andalusians of Rabat to secure the assistance of the Dilâ. AL-AYÂCHI attacked the Dilâ, achieving a modicum of success initially. But his extremism had no place in multicultural Morocco and a Dilâ counterattack overwhelmed the fanatic and his dwindling army. The religious zealot was ultimately killed on 30 April 1641.¹¹⁸ His severed head was buried in Salé where it remained for almost 3 centuries. The French found in the early 20th century but what became of it is not clear.

The Sultan sanctioned the *de facto* rule of the Dilâ MOHAMMED EL-HAJJ to the south bank of the Bou-Regreg just as his father had done many years earlier. Undoubtedly cognizant of the threat the ruling Dilâ on the north bank of the river posed to the south bank, the Sultan granted to the Dilâ the right to govern, *i.e.* collect the taxes on, the Andalusians of Rabat.

The *Zawiyâ al Dilâ* produced many scholars including the renowned writers ABÛ ABDALLAH MOHAMMED ELMORABITH BEN MOHAMMED BEN ABÛ BEKR and ABÛ ABDALLAH SÎDÎ MOHAMMED BEN ELMASNÂOUÏ a son and a brother of MOHAMMED BEN ABÛ BEKR respectively and many warriors. The family dynasty rose to power as that of the SAÂDI declined and before its successor, the ALAOUITE dynasty had fully consolidated its hold on Morocco. They consistently increased their territory during the SAÂDIAN rule of the 17th century. From Salé in 1631 they

captured Meknès by 1637 and Rabat in 1641. They already collected the taxes from Rabat for the Sultan; the Andalusians decided to recognize the rule of the Dilâ Prince SÎDÎ MOHAMMED EL-HADJ in 1641. This was in opposition to the rule of ZAYDAN'S son MOHAMMED ESH-SHEIKH ES-SEGHIR, ruling as MOHAMMED IV, SULTAN OF MOROCCO from 1636 to 1655 though in name only in much of the country from 1641.¹¹⁹ When Fez and then Marrakech fell to the Dilâ, a DILAITE Sultanate was established and it became the dominant power in the country for twenty to thirty years, lasting until 1665 at least. Michael Brett was understating when he said *By the middle of that century Muhammad al-Hajj, marabout of the zâwiya of Dilâ' in the Middle Atlas, possessed an army, and ruled in central and northern Morocco. Taking advantage of the collapse of the Sa'did dynasty, he had become in effect a sultan, a man of power, who might have established a new Moroccan dynasty.*¹²⁰ During this time there were four rulers – all Sultans of Morocco, Marrakech, or Fez, that coexisted in uneasy alliances on occasion but more frequently at war with each other for dominance. The end of the SAÂDI dynasty was heralded when they were expelled from Fez in the same year that AL-'AYÂCHI was beheaded, 1641.¹²¹ This is also the last year that JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM is known to be alive and there has been speculation that the fall of the SAÂDIAN dynasty and the disappearance of JAN from the record may not be coincidental.

Though SAÂDI rule was greatly diminished after 1641, MOHAMMED IV was followed on the throne by AHMAD AL-ABBAS who may have been MOHAMMED IV's brother or son; in any event, he ruled as a figurehead until 1659. The power and influence of the Dilâ started to wane towards the end of the 1650s and they suffered a severe setback in 1660 when they were defeated by the northern warlord, AL-KHADIR GHAILAN. They maintained power in certain areas until 1670.¹²²

Through all these years of turmoil, the Republic of Salé maintained some semblance of independence which is attested to by the several treaties signed between European powers and the Salétians; notably not with the Bou-Regreg or Rabat. The Pays-Bas, or Low Countries, signed a treaty with Salé on 9 February 1651 which was ratified at La Hague on 8 July 1651. Three years later, consular records of the United Provinces reflect that *SULTAN ABDALLAH* objected to the validity of this treaty based on his assertion of sovereignty over the area but his arguments were rejected by both parties.¹²³ Just who this *ABDALLAH* person was is not known as the Sultan was AHMAD AL-ABBAS, but *ABDALLAH* could be another of the many names attributed to one person. The last known appearance of the *Republic* was in the early 19th century when a ship was captured by a pirate crew claiming to be from the *Republic of Salé*.

The ALAOUIE tribe ruled the Tifilalt, the Sahara, and the Drâa River Valley by 1666. They were a *sharifian* house, related to the SAÂDI, from the Sijilmasa. Their leader ALI was captured by the Sous in 1638 and remained prisoner until his son MOHAMMED BEN ECCHERIF, who assumed power, ransomed him many years later. In 1664 MOHAMMED BEN ECCHERIF was killed at the opening of the battle against his brother MAULAY ERRECHID BEN ECCHERIF (MULAI AL-RASHID) when he was shot in the throat.¹²⁴ In 1666 they seized Fez from GHAILAN, though it would be two more years before he was eliminated, and it is from that year the ALAOUIE's say they became rulers of MOROCCO. The proclamation of MULAY AL-RASHID as SULTAN OF MOROCCO occurred on 6 June 1668 and was a political statement that did not reflect reality. Their official history would have us believe that all their rivals were subdued with the last falling in July 1670. The new ruling family began with SULTAN MULAI AL-RASHID and the 22nd ALAOUIE KING, MUHAMMAD VI (the title was changed in the 1950s) has been on the throne since 1999.


In contrast to the history currently promoted by the sharifian dynasty in power today, as given in the last paragraph, an examination of contemporary works provides us with a different non-Arabic, non-sharifian history. The last period of Amazigh rule as both the *de facto* Sultan of Morocco and the *declared* Sultan of Morocco is one that has been actively suppressed. The main reason for this suppression is believed to be the desire to maintain the hegemony of the Arabic people over the Amazigh with one way to achieve this goal being to downplay, ignore, and push back the time when the Amazigh were the ascendant power in the area. Little known and rarely discussed is the rule of the *Dala'iyya* which began in the 1630s and early 1640s. They removed the last of the SAÂDI rulers from Fez and the north in 1641 yet maintained them on the throne of Marrakech as the Sultans of Morocco for almost two decades.

The marabout MOHAMMAD AL-HAJJ IBN ABÛ BAKR AL-DILAI, son of ABÛ BEKR ECCHEBÂNI ELHARÎRI, *caïd* of the great tribe of the Chebâna, was acclaimed Sultan of Fez in 1641 and Sultan of Morocco in 1659. Also found named as ABDELKERÎM BEN ABÛ BEKR ECCHEBÂNI ELHARZI this leader hailed from the Chebâna tribe, dedicated allies of the Dilâ, and of the same tribe that murdered the last of the SAÂDI rulers, AHMAD AL-ABBAS in 1659. Nicknamed *KEROUM ELHADJ* or *MOHAMMAD AL-HAJJ*, he and his son ABÛ BEKR reigned long past the date the current dynasty claims to have taken the throne. While the ALAOUITE tribe did make progress in conquering the northern areas in the 1660s, the 1668 declaration of AL-RASHID as Sultan was, to be kind, premature. The current *official* version of history has MOHAMMAD AL-HAJJ being utterly defeated, and some claim killed, in 1668 with the *zawiyâ* of the Dilâ in Khénifra being so completely destroyed as to not leave a trace of its existence to this day. AL-HAJJ, in the versions where he wasn't killed, and his immediate family, were forced to live in Fez before being exiled to Tlemçen where he died and the rest disappear from the record. In the earliest of records, the ALAOUITES claim to have recovered all the lands of the Sudan and even beyond the Niger River, a claim soon discarded as their suzerainty over the *Pashalik of Timbuktu* is questionable at best.¹²⁵

The location of the Dilâ *zawiyâ* was known as late as 1944. The ruins of the mosque and the tomb of *Sîdî MOH'AMMED B. 'ABD ER-RAHMAN*, the *AUTRE MASUSOLÉE* at the upper left, are identified in the schematic at right.¹²⁶

There was a military leader named MUHAMMAD IBN 'ABD AL-RAHMAN, who was appointed as the commander of the SAADI forces that attacked the Portuguese fortress of Founti (Agadir) in 1511; it is unclear if this is the same person or not.¹²⁷ The history as promoted today are more of a wish than a reality as early records show the third sheikh of the Dilâ ruled as SULTAN MUHAMMAD AL-HAJJ until 1671. He was followed by his son ABÛ BEKR until 1678 and after his rule

his own son, the grandson of AL-HAJJ, named AHMED BEN ABDELLAH AD-DILA'I as the fifth sheikh and third Dilâ Sultan of Morocco. He was at the head of a large Sanhaja army that visited defeat on the ALAOUITE armies in three large battles. Sources state that the ALAOUITES did not enjoy unified authority until the murder of the ALAOUITE rebel ABOULABBÂS MULAY AHMED BEN MAHREZ BEN ECCHERIF in October 1685. It was a unity of limited duration as Morocco split into two kingdoms in 1727, each ruled by an ALAOUITE faction. When the ALAOUITE dynasty first gained the throne, one of their first acts was to disinter the corpse of MUHAMMAD AL-HAJJ



and burn it.¹²⁸ This period of Dilâ rule lasted for half a century and represents the last time a native Amazigh tribe was the official, and unofficial, rulers of Morocco. The MARINID and WATTASID dynasties are only rarely discussed as being Amazigh though both are of the Zenata tribe. Meanwhile the triumph of the sharifian SAÂDI over the Wattasids the mid-15th century is glorified though, in truth, that event represents the oddity and not the norm. Today it is not uncommon to read that the last great period of Amazigh rule was that of the 13th century ALMOHADS. The key word in this statement is *great*. It is subjective to say the least and when the opponents of the Amazighs are the subjects that employ that descriptive it must be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. The last period of Amazigh rule was not the 13th century ALMOHADS but the 17th century DILÂITES.


Against this turbulent backdrop we can now return to the life of JAN JANSEN.

1609 – 1615: THE REPUBLIC OF SALÉ

JAN lived for at least 24 years in Morocco and was at Salé for three separate periods of 6, 8 and 3 years, for a total of 17 years. He was probably based at Salé by late 1609, and could have functioned as an agent of ZAYDAN to keep an eye on the various geopolitical forces operating in the area, specifically the 1st and 2nd PRINCES OF DILÂ, SÎDÎ ABÛ BEKER and his son SÎDÎ MOHAMMED. SÎDÎ ABÛ BEKER died in 1612 and his son became the 2nd prince; JAN was a strong supporter of MOHAMMED.¹²⁹

No later than early 1609, JAN probably came to the attention of the SAÂDIAN SULTAN OF MOROCCO, ZAYDAN EN NASIR, whose weak legal claim to the throne was strengthened with the death of his rival, and brother, ABÛ FARIS. Some sort of entanglement between JAN and ZAYDAN likely began in 1609 but the nature of that relationship remains speculative. One possibility concerned the access to the country through its Atlantic ports. Safi was the only Atlantic port controlled by the SULTAN OF MOROCCO and it provided access to the capital of Marrakesh. Safi and Agadir were the main ports for the Saadian dynasty when they held Marrakech and Sous.¹³⁰ The Sultan, whether it was ABÛ FARIS or ZAYDAN, knew that another southern port was required for reasons of security and access. A new port could be built or an existing port could be captured and improved. All of the other Atlantic ports were either under the control of Portugal or Spain or they were, *de facto*, independent city-states. JAN may have had a role in the analysis

of possible solutions as well as putting a solution into effect. A Dutch concern was in the small fishing village of Aïer around 1609 making an assessment of the possibility of building a new port city. JAN ultimately had a rudimentary understanding about the requirements for a successful port, but it is not known how much of that knowledge came from his time in Cartagena and Algiers, where he undoubtedly learned a lot. Because of the authority that was entrusted to him by more than one entity to manage large ports, he may have had a part in the early decision-making process about Aïer. The Dutch declined to invest in the development of a new port and the French would soon step in. When a new port did open there 25 years later, JAN was the head honcho! Unfortunately the endeavor would prove to be of limited benefit as will be told later.




Flags used by Salé corsairs in 17th century

The above three designs have been identified as being specific to Salé in the 17th and 18th centuries.¹³¹ It is not certain if Jan used one or more of these, though there are some suppositions as mentioned later.

Recall again, the records concerning a complicated legal dispute involving a ship sailing under a Dutch flag, a Portugal-based company that owned the cargo whose value was placed at 10,000 *livres*, a pirate crew and the Sultan in November 1609. The named members of the pirate party are JAN JANSZ, CAREL DE JONGE, and SYMON WILLEMSZ NOOMS and it is difficult to dismiss this out-of-hand as someone else because that name is so very common. A Dutch pirate in Salé named JAN JANSZ by the end of 1609 – that's hard to ignore! Raids were led from Salé on the Faroe Islands, at the time a part of the Kingdom of Norway in 1615 and 1616.¹³² The archipelago lies in the North Atlantic about two hundred miles northwest of Scotland.

JAN is said to be the first Governor of the REPUBLIC OF SALÉ for a one year term, but it is not known when this happened and if he was appointed by ZAYDAN or elected by the *Diwân* or some

combination of both. In Morocco the first *Dîwân*, called the *Majlis al-Malâ*, had been formed during the reign of AL-MANSUR. Of Persian origin, the word *Dîwân* as used in Morocco meant the council responsible for the administration of the tax assessment and collection.¹³³ The record that does exist is for his appointment by SULTAN



A SALLI ROVER IN PURSUIT
(From the Dutch edition of Dan, 1684)

ZAYDAN in 1624 as the town's Governor; there is no mention of a Republic. This same year is when JAN took, as his third wife, ZAYNAB AL-KUBRA BINT ZAIDAN EL-NASIR AS SÂADI. Just how much of this is a proper name versus a descriptive phrase is not certain. The "BINT ZAIDAN EL-NASIR AS SÂADI" translates as "daughter of ZAYDAN of the SÂADIAN family" and, given the structure, appears to be only a descriptive. If it was part of her name it would usually be written as ZAYNAB BINT ZAIDAN AL-KUBRA or possibly ZAYNAB BINT ZAIDAN EL-NASIR AL-KUBRA with or without the addition of *AS SÂADI*. Given the convoluted history of the place, the non-standardization of titles and their translation, the lack of a documented first year for the Republic, it is doubtful that the real story will be discovered

That JAN lived in Fez finds support in the records of New Amsterdam. In those records, on multiple occasions, JAN's son is found as ANTHONY JANSEN VAN VAES (FEZ) and it can be assumed that the source of the VAN VAES was ANTHONY himself. Why the alternating between VAN VAES and VAN SALÉ exists is difficult to explain but it is safe to say that no one would say they were *from Fez* unless they had actually lived in Fez for a period of time. Just when this was has not been discovered.

How JAN fit into this picture isn't clear – the close-knit Andalusians would not elect a Dutch expatriot Mozarab (Christian convert to Islam) to be their governor. The Hornachos had no knowledge about running a port, or sailing, so their involvement in affairs of the corsairs was minimal, at best, for the first decade. The fact of his election supports the more recent position that Dutch and English renegades were the real power behind the formation of the *Republic*. JAN's intelligence and courage is given as the reason for the stunning business growth in the *Republic's* finances. He may even have been forced upon the *Republic* by ZAYDAN who could muster a military force that could defeat his rebellious subjects after his political troubles lessened around 1614. But ZAYDAN also saw the advantages in being able to claim, on a diplomatic level, the Salé Rovers weren't his subjects.

1616 – 1620: ALGIERS

Once again we are confronted with a hazy move to Algiers – this “move” may have been, in fact, an extended raiding voyage done in concert with the Algerian corsairs. Two stories about our ancestor have come down over the centuries and each has some truth to it. The most often repeated story is that JAN was captured by corsairs from Algiers in 1618; while not entirely accurate, it is close to what happened. The second story is that he sailed as a pilot with IVAN DIRKIE VAN VEENBOER, aka SULĚYMAN REİS in 1618 and this is what places him in Algiers at this point in time.


In 1617, WIJNANT DE KEYSER, the first Dutch consul to the Regency, as well as Tunis, arrived and got off to a good start but soon ran into trouble when allegations of corrupt practices, financial irregularities and a remarkable lack of initiative in obtaining freedom for Dutch captives soon surfaced. Freedom of Dutch prisoners had been granted under the *Capitulaltions to the United Provinces* promulgated by SULTAN AHMED I in June 1612. The viceroy or *bashaw* of the Regency of Algiers in 1617 was the pasha SÜLEYMAN KATANYA and no captives had been released yet. He was commanded to attend a conference to be held in Constantinople in May 1617 along with the commander of the Janissary Corps in Algiers. While both signed the *Declaration* issued at the end of the conference on the 26th of May, no captives were released. SÜLEYMAN’S stated the Dutch continued to confiscate vessels and imprison citizens of the regency. The Dutch prisoners would gain their freedom when all captives from Algiers had been restored to the regency and the losses of the ship owners were reimbursed.¹³⁴ These charges probably had some merit as it was impossible for the States General to police every vessel that sailed under a Dutch flag and it would directly lead to war. DE KEYSER was also hamstrung by his own government who, through ignorance, refused to countenance paying ransom for any Dutchman. DE KEYSER thus had the unenviable task of enforcing the terms of the treaty and to

demand the immediate release of all Dutchmen held in captivity and, where possible, obtaining financial remuneration for the individual but mostly for the losses to the State. The distance from Tunis made him an ineffective consul there. Despite being officially removed from this position by the end of 1617, he is found serving in the same post in 1627.¹³⁵ His consular records mention JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM several times but this is only because those notations are mentioned by others; DE KEYSER's journals have not been located. Perhaps JAN had some role in the attempts to gain freedom for the Dutch prisoners.

SULĚYMAN had over fifty ships, divided in squadrons, in his fleet. SULĚYMAN REİS had trained a decade earlier under the famous Dutch renegade, SIMON DE DANSER, DIABLO REİS to the Algerines, whose we will encounter again with his son SIMON, JUNIOR. SULĚYMAN had become ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF ALGIERS in 1617, specifically on 8 September according to diplomatic correspondence.¹³⁶ Sailing under SULĚYMAN, JAN managed to work himself up from boatswain, a junior officer grade position into the senior-grade positions of sailing master and quartermaster; the latter combines the duties of the former with those of second-in-command functioning as helmsman and captain as the situation demanded. JAN may have participated in the 1618 Fuerteventura and Lanzarote attack as it sailed from Salé. If so, he probably commanded his own ship if not fleet. He was not one of the 900 captives taken, representing between a quarter and a third of the total population, as he later claimed.¹³⁷

SULĚYMAN was replaced in 1618 as ADMIRAL by MUSTAPHA REİS, possibly the same person as MUSTAPHA IV PASHA who took over as regent in 1616. Circumstances developed by which virtually all the Dutch renegades were temporarily restricted to land. The oft-told story of JAN assuming

command of the retiring SULĚYMAN's fleet just doesn't ring true for two reasons: the timing is off and SULĚYMAN never retired, he took a short break and was soon cruising the Mediterranean for prizes. On 20 November 1618 WYNANT DE KEYSER, the Dutch Consul to Algiers and Tunis gave his opinion that SULĚYMAN would no longer sail and would *promote his steersman to captain*; the assumption that this meant JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM seems well-founded.¹³⁸ It is possible that JAN did sail back to Salé in possession of one of SULĚYMAN ships; if so, it would have been one of the tall ships that had sails, probably a *polacca*. SULĚYMAN REİS met his end on 10 October 1620 in the harbor at Cartagena when a cannonball took off both legs.




The States-General of the United Provinces orders included employing *voetspoelingen* or “foot-washing” – the throwing overboard and drowning of any Algerian or Tunisian pirate in early 1618 as a prelude to formal hostilities. They issued a declaration of war against the Regency of Algiers just before their third fleet sailed to join their Spanish allies in May 1618. One of the earliest actions of the war is mischaracterized as a raid on the Canary Islands. By the 1st of May 1618 a fleet of 60 ships had been amassed at Salé and with 5,000 men, they launched an attack on Spain. Fuerteventura and Lanzarote were targeted with 900 to 1,000 Canarians captured, though 200 were later taken off a captured corsair before it reached Algiers. So successful was the attack that the Chérif began using the title King of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote.¹³⁹ There was a simultaneous action taken against the Regency of Tunis but what transpired there has not been investigated. The decision to declare war was based in large part on the communications from directly from SULĚYMAN to the States General and JOHAN VAN OLDENBARNEVELT, one of the

leading Dutch politicians of the day, and indirectly through DE KEYSER.¹⁴⁰ In July twelve Algerian ships were captured at Gibraltar and all prisoners were subjected to *voetspoelingen*.

The state of war completely changed the situation for JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, from sailing with the ADMIRAL for the Regency to being an enemy of the state of the Regency. Technically he could be considered a citizen of the United Provinces and not just any ordinary citizen either. He was sailing with the Regency's ADMIRAL, another Dutchman, and was known to be an accomplished privateer –

in-other-words he posed a possible threat to the Regency. This fact alone was grounds for detention under the accepted rules of war – grounds that appear to have been used. The Dutch former ADMIRAL SULĚYMAN stops sailing at this time and it can be surmised he suffered a similar detention. The detainment was more akin to a house-arrest situation; they were prevented from sailing but not prevented from living in luxury and free movement about town.¹⁴¹ This house-detention was a comfortable one – all the captains had extremely well-appointed palaces in the western part of the city along the sea.¹⁴² The Republic sent negotiators which resulted in the cessation of hostilities in January 1619. JAN's ship was impounded, his crew detained possibly until late summer 1619. JAN and SULĚYMAN were definitely not imprisoned; such a move could rouse the ire of the corsairs which, as the navy for the Regency, they could not afford to alienate. Undoubtedly there were appeals forthcoming from the *diwān* of the REPUBLIC OF SALÉ protesting the detaining of their head-of-state as well as SULTAN ZAYDAN calling for JAN's release invoking the Qur'an's prohibition against enslaving a fellow Muslim. The Regency may have even received some terse letters from the central Ottoman government, the Sublime Porte – their little war was putting a lot of their income in jeopardy. JAN was detained for only a short period as on 21 September 1619, WYNANT DE KEYSER, the Dutch Consul to Algiers and Tunis informed the States-General that CAPTAIN JAN had taken a *Hollander whom he had deprived of his guns, victuals, sails and hawsers*. Moreover *he tortured a member of the crew to death in order to get money and he was planning to sell in Salé all valuables on which he could lay his hands*.¹⁴³ Both are back in records in 1619 and this was most likely the time SULĚYMAN gave JAN a ship, probably a *polacca* that he used to sail back to Salé the following year. The state of war between Algiers on one side and the Dutch and Spanish on the other continued to exist for several years. The 'armistice' of 1619 proved ephemeral – on both sides; the Dutch captured at least two corsairing vessels later the same year and the following while the Regencies seized a dozen Dutch merchants in 1619 and another 76 the following year! The English made a misguided and failed attempt to attack the Algerian corsair fleet in harbor in 1620 and 1621; their only success, for England, was to capture a French merchantman! However their presence did spur the Regencies to enter negotiation with the Dutch to actually end the hostilities.

Between 17 March and 13 November 1620, Dutch records show that Algerian corsairs captured 174 vessels: 76 Dutch but only, perhaps, 5 Spanish (the two powers officially at war with Algiers); 15 were French, 10 were English and the rest sailed under unknown flags.¹⁴⁴



The 1622 treaties that ended the hostilities were not what the Republic hoped to achieve. Algiers and Tunis denied the right of Dutch vessels to transport goods belonging to an enemy of either Regency or to claim the return of captured ships, men, and goods. They also mandated the Dutch punish any merchant sailing with the cargo of an enemy of either Regency. The treaty with Tunis did not mention the release of captives while that with Algiers denied the free liberation of captives.¹⁴⁵ One effect of the war was the reduction in the number of Dutch captains in the corsair fleet of Algiers; prior to the war, about a quarter of the fleet had Dutch captains, eight of thirty-five in 1613; while after the war that had decreased to less than a fifth, eight of fifty in 1625.¹⁴⁶

To recap: JAN, a Dutch linen-merchant/ship's captain is captured by pirates, or by some other manner, ends up in Algiers by the end of the 1590s where he stayed 3 or 4 years; going to Cartagena around 1601, he meets MORJANA, a Muslim of Amazigh descent and decides to marry, which required him to convert to Islam. In 1609 they move to the REPUBLIC OF SALÉ. He may have had a second residence on Fuerteventura or Lanzarote, the two Canary Islands closest to the coast, between 1609 and 1618 where he passed himself off as a Catholic which is discussed later. With the SULTAN'S consent, JAN gains control of the port city of Salé as the Admiral of the port; there is a governor of Salé appointed by ZAYDAN who has little real authority. Around 1616 JAN headed to Algiers where he sailed as a helmsman under SULĚYMAN REİS; he may have briefly been in charge of this fleet in 1618. His family probably stayed in Salé during this time. While in Algiers, open warfare breaks out between the Regency and the United Provinces and JAN, being Dutch, is detained by authorities until mid-1619. He befriended a ship's carpenter, also from Haarlem, who had been in Algiers for six months, and JAN was alleged to extol the benefits of converting to Islam quite regularly.¹⁴⁷ Upon his release he sailed back to the REPUBLIC in one of SULĚYMAN'S ships, not in possession of the entirety of SULĚYMAN'S fleet as many writers suggest.

1620 – 1629: REPUBLIC OF BOU-REGREG

It was fortuitous for JAN that he was able to leave Algiers when he did. In early 1621 several Muslim captives were turned over to ALOF DE WIGNANCOURT, the French Grandmaster of the KNIGHTS OF SAINT JOHN on Malta, by CORNELIUS PAUW, the Dutch Consul at Aleppo. Upon this news reaching Algiers, the *diwán* acting under pressure from some of the wives of the prisoners on Malta, immediately ordered the detention of all Dutch citizens in the town. They would be held until the Muslim prisoners had been released and returned. By the time the Dutch returned in 1622, represented by GUILIELMUS WIJNTGES who was appointed as agent for the *Extraordinary Ambassador* to Algiers CORNELIS PIJNACKER, a couple of significant changes had transpired. The Twelve-Year-Truce ended and hostilities resumed between Spain and the Republic. And the Portuguese LUÍS MENDES DE VASCONCELLOS was almost through his brief six months as Grandmaster; Portugal at this time was united to the Spanish crown. He tried to pry a ransom of an estimated 6500 *zichynen* (an unidentified term) from the Republic for the liberation of the prisoners. Unsuccessful, he relented upon receiving a guarantee from that two Maltese captives in Algiers would be freed and returned at no cost to the KNIGHTS. CONSUL KEYSER and AMBASSADOR PIJNACKER must have been greatly relieved to see the captives returned to Algiers in early 1623; both had to offer themselves to the HUSSEIN, pasha of Algiers as collateral against the return of the captives. The 150 or so free Dutch in Algiers were granted the freedom of movement after 18 months and the release of more than a dozen Dutch captives was completed in February 1623.¹⁴⁸

But JAN did return to Salé, a much-changed Salé. In the 4 years JAN was gone the REPUBLIC OF SALÉ had grown to be the REPUBLIC OF BOU-REGREG; the balance of power had shifted with certain segments quicker to embrace violence to achieve their goals and, worryingly, more respect was being given to more extreme religious zealots preaching a jihad against all Muslims that did not adhere to their particular idea regarding Islam. JAN resumed a prominent position in

the REPUBLIC'S *diwán*. Undoubtedly involved in fencing his, and possibly others goods, before his brief sojourn in Algiers, upon his return he became more active in fencing booty of the prizes brought into the port of Salé. A formidable force was already well-established in this lucrative business in Salé – SIMON DE DANSER. Not the famed Dutch privateer who, as DIABLO REÏS, trained SULĚYMAN REÏS (who JAN sailed with and shared their enforced captivity) but his son of the same name. SENIOR used Salé as his base for corsair operations in the 1610s and undoubtedly knew JAN from that time. SENIOR also started dealing in buying and selling cargo and was the dominant dealer by 1620. JUNIOR took over this business in the early 1620s and JAN'S first forays were limited to the overflow that JUNIOR couldn't handle, a not insignificant amount. Several factors caused JAN'S business to expand at the expense of JUNIOR'S: greed, hot-headedness and an overinflated sense of his own importance come to mind.

In 1620, there appears one of the more puzzling records pertaining to JAN. Moriscos – those who had specifically converted to Roman Catholicism in this case – were quite numerous in the Canary Islands. On 19 October, PASTOR GABRIEL MARTINEZ, Prosecutor for the *Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición* (S.O., Spanish Inquisition) in the Canary Islands filed an action against JAN JANSZ *who lives in Lanzarote as a Catholic as is well known*. In this filing he states that JAN was captured in 1618 and *upon reaching Algiers, became a renegade*. The Inquisitors granted his petition to examine the witness AUGUSTINE PAGI so as *to provide details*; they also ordered the arrest of the accused and the seizure of his property *wherever he is*. The testimony of the witness has not been found and the order does not enumerate what property was involved, only that they ordered its confiscation. The *slave* PEDRO DE BRITO testified that JANS JANSZEN, with others, negotiated the ransom for the release of captives at Salé.¹⁴⁹ The specifics of why this case was filed are not clear, nor what the desired outcome was. Nowhere is found mention of the dates that JAN is supposed to have lived *as a Catholic* in Lanzarote. We can surmise that it was after 1609 when the Dutch-Spanish Treaty went into effect and Spanish lands were no longer barred to the Dutch enemy, and before 1618. We also know that JAN participated in the 1618 attack as a pilot for SULĚYMAN REÏS; the story of his capture is false but may be one the JAN promoted when it was in his interest to appear as an involuntary corsair in Algiers and later Salé at that late date. It is also safe to say that he was never a Catholic and some have a different translation of this section, saying that he lived in Lanzarote *as a Christian*. JAN did lead a raid, or possibly an attack depending on the date the war on Algiers formally ended, on the Canary Islands sometime before 1622; perhaps the legal action was in response to that.

ORTIZ DE FUNÉT upon assuming the office of Inquisitor for the Canary Islands in 1568 ordered that all Moriscos had to live in a quarter in every town that was separate from *catholics*. The *Triana Quarter* is what resulted from that order in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. Located south of the *Vegueta*, or old quarter, the area is described today as *being one of the most pristine areas of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Triana is also one of its oldest. This, along with Vegueta, is the historic centre of the city*.¹⁵⁰ *Calle Dos Moriscos* in the Armarios Quarter in Santa Cruz de Tenerife may mark the Morisco Quarter in that town. An imperfect Morisco census of 1594 showed just 865 Moriscos living on six of the seven islands, there being none on El Hierro. Of the other islands we find slaves accounted for almost all 200 on Tenerife, half of the 300 on Fuerteventura, 12 all living on *calles del Terrero et Moriscos* of the 77 on La Palma, and none of the 90 on Lanzarote. The number of slaves of the 142 Moriscos on Grande Canarie and the 52 on La Gomera is not stated. Including unofficial figures such as the 1,500 for Fuerteventura and Lanzarote combined. Without more specific information, the most likely location of JAN'S property, according to RICARD, would be the island closest to the continent, Fuerteventura,

whose population was almost entirely Moriscos and their children. The 13 Morisco villages were grouped on Tilovento on the east while the others lived at Barlovento on the west. Grande Canarie and Lanzarote are also options if only because of the size of the free Morisco population in 1594. The Moriscos of the Canaries were exempt from PHILLIPE III's mass expulsions of 1609 to 1614 as they were seen as hailing from the Atlas Mountains and having no relation to the Moriscos of the Iberian Peninsula.¹⁵¹

Between 1618 and 1626, it has been estimated that the *Salé Rovers* brought goods worth £15 million *at that time* into port. This figure does not include the value of the estimated 6,000 slaves that were captured during these raids and sold in town. Among these prizes was a small *shallop* seized in the English Channel in late 1625 or early 1626; it had sailed with another larger vessel from Plymouth Colony, home to our ancestors JOHN ADAMS and ELLEN NEWTON, laden with cod-fish and beaver pelts. Being small it had been secured to the larger by tow-lines which were cut as their destination approached. It was set upon by the corsairs and taken to Salé.¹⁵² A letter from the Mayor of Plymouth to the Lords Council, dated 18 April 1625, alerts them to the presence of ships of *Turkes, Moores and Dutchmen of Sally in Barbary* lying in wait off the coast and that *two fisher-boates were verie lately found flotinge on the seas havinge neither man nor any tackle in them*. He relates the contents of a letter written on 1 March by an English captive in Salé named *PETHERICKE HONICOMBE* in which he states there were *thirtie shipps of saile att Sally now preparinge to come for the coastes of Englande in the begynninge of the summer...* William Knight deposed on 18 April that on the 12th a French-built *barke* from Salé of about 35-tons sailing with a pinnace was off the coast, crewed by nine Dutchmen, six *Turkes*, and three Moors, captured two fishing boats, took twelve captives, set the boats adrift, and headed back to Salé.¹⁵³

JAN often sailed with CALAFATE AÇAN, (probably not the CALAFAT that captured Lanzarote in 1569) an Algerian corsair with a reputation for being fearless. In June 1621 CALAFATE AÇAN sailed to Salé to resupply after a *corso* along the coast of Portugal and the Berlengas Islands. His had only captured his ship, the *Capodun*, in May. It was quite large with a crew of 250 and armed with 52 cannon; it had been named the *Saint Nicolas* when he captured it. The *Capodum* was too large to make it over the sandbar and had to drop anchor in the open ocean. A storm arose and the vessel ended up being beached. Unable to refloat the vessel, CALAFATE ordered it burned to prevent looting by the Arabs. JAN persuaded CALAFATE to buy a vessel and sail with him; they first sailed Cape San Vicente, on the southwest tip of Portugal, where, on 13 September, they took the French vessel *La Jorna* and her crew of 13. They then captured a Dutch vessel, relieving it of its cargo of cod but letting the ship and crew sail home. CALAFATE then joined up with the corsair fleet sailing under TABACO REÏS which had 17 ships and *pinnaces*, each with 30 to 40 cannon, heading to Granada. Given that JAN was with CALAFATE in September and again just a few months later, he was most likely one of the 17 vessels of the fleet. They captured 19 English vessels before encountering the Portuguese ship the *Nossa Senhora da Conceição*, a ship from India loaded with cargo, on 9 October. An 11 hour bombardment failed to take the ship and CALAFATE'S ship was severely damaged and taking on water. Ramming the front of the *Conceição*, he and his crew boarded the forecastle of the beleaguered ship but suffered heavy losses from musket fire. Attempts to bring the sails down failed and after 3 attacks by the Portuguese crew, the remnants of CALAFATE'S crew jumped overboard and were rescued; only one of the crew was captured; what became of his ship isn't mentioned. The Algerian fleet returned on the 11th and the battle, well in sight of the village of Ericeira, resumed. Once again, a corsair got entangled with the *Conceição* but this time, as that ship was being consumed by fire, its crew escaped the inferno by surrendering and boarding the



corsair before it burned to the water line, sending its valuable cargo to the sea floor.¹⁵⁴ By early 1622 JAN and CALAFATE were in the Channel Islands. JAN's ship had a crew of 65: 42 Moors, including 18 Hispanic Moriscos; 8 renegades, 2 from the Canary Islands; and the rest, 15, were Dutch Christians. Of the 40 crew on CALAFATE's ship, 32 were Muslims including 2 Hispanic Moriscos, and 8 were Dutch Christians. There were also six Spanish renegades among the crew, 3 from Madrid, 1 from Toledo and 2 others. They captured two *caravels* and, while anchored to take on water and supplies, one of the crew, JUAN ROLDEGAS, or RODELGAS, managed to escape. It is from his testimony given before the *Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición*, or S.O. (Spanish Inquisition) that we know this story. It seems this JUAN ROLDEGAS, had


been a soldier of the company of CAPTAIN ALONSO DE MOLINA and while sailing from Cartagena to Naples in 1617, had been captured, along with 455 others, by SÜLEYMAN REİS. He joined the crew of one of CALAFATE AÇAN's 7 ships in May 1621. This was part of a fleet of 25 from Salé sailing under MAMI TAGARINO, aka MAMI REİS, a Spanish renegade who was probably from Aragon as that name was used to describe any Morisco from Aragon. They were searching for French ships loaded with cod. Passing near to Tetouan, the ship ROLDEGAS was on ran aground after being attacked by two Christian ships. Though escaping capture, he took ill and recuperated in Salé under the care of JAN, who also provided him with ample cash. It was there he joined CALAFATE again and took part in the Channel Islands raids. One of the captured *caravels* was retaken by a Channel Islands vessel and several of the 13 captives were rescued.¹⁵⁵ One of JAN's crew members, the Morisco ANDRÉS, a native of Lucena, was able to escape from the captured *caravel* and made it to the Santa Catalina district of Las Palmas, near the port. From there he planned to escape to *Barbary* but was apprehended *with another black slave* and charged for attempting to flee. On 24 November 1622 he was sentenced to 200 lashes and 6 years in the galleys.¹⁵⁶ ROLDEGAS was treated leniently by the court and returned to Spain in 1623.¹⁵⁷ The Barbary Coast was hit by a particularly virulent outbreak of the plague in 1622, with Algiers being hit the hardest. This caused an uptick in corsair activity in the Atlantic in general and from Salé specifically as the outbreak was contained to the Mediterranean.

In 1620, JAN met a Dutch man-of-war in the area of Malaga, a Mediterranean port city in Spain. When the ship noticed the corsairs it immediately altered course and sailed directly after them while raising the red flag (this means that no quarter will be given). Upon seeing this, JAN turned and fled from the advancing ship. According to the Dutch consul in Algiers, the ship was not a man-of-war, but a courageous merchant that bluffed his way out of the meeting. Not long after this, in June and July of 1620, JAN was again capturing ships.¹⁵⁸ There is a Dutch record dated 26

July that partially details one of his prizes: *MORATO REYS, alias JAN JANSZ VAN HAARLEM*, sailing the *Cara Mostaffa*, captured the *Oosterling*, captained by HANS PLAGGE from Hamburg. He went first to Salé to sell the cargo and then sailed the *Cara Mostaffa*, the captain and crew of the *Oosterling* and the captured vessel sailed to Algiers, entering that port on 26 July. The Dutch knew of this incident because the *Oosterling*, a Hanseatic vessel, sailed with a German captain and crew arrived in The Netherlands with a Dutch captain and crew. A Dutch ship carrying sugar was captured by JAN and, wanting to free the Dutch, he captured the *Oosterling* and made the German crew captive and released the Dutch to sail home. The German crew ended up on the slave market in Algiers while HANS PLAGGE was sold in Salé.¹⁵⁹

The Dutch Special Ambassador to Morocco, ALBERT RUYL, arrived in Salé on 1 December 1622 with two missions: first, to liberate all Dutch captives but he was not able to make any progress in the matter. That is, until he met JAN on the harbor in the evening of 14 December 1622. JAN had only just returned with a small vessel he had taken under the Torre de Catalán in Lepe on the Bay of Cadiz near the border with Portugal. In his Journal, RUYL refers to JAN as the CA'ID OF SALÉ and states that *all the renegades of Salé are under his command*. On the following day, JAN came aboard RUYL'S vessel and brought with him those of the captured crew who wanted to return, 13 men and 2 boys, mostly Dutch with a couple English. Several of these men praised JAN for his good treatment of his Dutch captives. 32 additional captives were released within the week and within six months there were no more Dutch captives in Salé.¹⁶⁰ JAN discussed the finances for the port and RUYL reported that JAN and his secretary, MOÏSE ST. JAGO, receive a fifth of all the prizes coming into port which is spent on the upkeep of the Oudaïa and pay for the Andalusian soldiers in the hire; they also receive a tax of 5% on all goods sold and on everything produced or earned *by the Moors*. This liberal structure is granted to them by *the KING OF MOROCCO, who does not draw a penny*. RUYL continues with the bright prospects for the endeavor which already has thirteen vessels *on the Salé channel* which has sufficient depth yet is protected by a sand bar which is almost dry at low tide.¹⁶¹ Every Dutch official to Morocco in the 1620s through the 1640s knew that before anything was done, one had to befriend the Dutchman MORAT REÏS first.¹⁶²

RUYL'S second mission was to survey Aïer as the possible site for a new harbor which is detailed later in the section on Walidia. In 1623, when an answer to the question of where to locate a new port city was being investigated, a Dutch renegade known as *MORATO* put forth a plan to locate it 60 miles north at Azemmour, where, with the construction of a dike or mole, Azemmour could be a good port. Just who this person was is not certain; however VERMEULEN and COINDREAU clearly identify *MORATO* as JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM.¹⁶³ Zaydan was intrigued and sent his favorite SAINT-MANDRIER to check it out. This worried the Spanish and PHILIPPE IV approached the French king who agreed to pardon SAINT-MANDRIER for the murder he committed and return the properties that had been forfeited to the crown when he fled France some fifteen years earlier. SAINT-MANDRIER is a fascinating character; from Provence, he fled France to avoid a prison sentence for murder. He first went to Savoy, serving the Duke in several capacities before being



sent as an ambassador to the autonomous corsair community at La Mamora in 1613 with an over of protection from the deprivations suffered at the hands of the Spanish, Dutch, and even the Sultan. On the 14th of August 1614, the Spanish attacked La Mamora and most of the corsairs fled to Salé, as did SAINT-MANDRIER. He was introduced to SULTAN ZİDÂN and made a favorable impression as he became a favorite for the next 12 years. He was, at times, a soldier, sailor, privateer, ambassador, engineer, technical advisor and financier. *MORATO* was furious and accused the Frenchman of being a Spanish spy, which he was; SAINT-MANDRIER was beheaded on 14 April 1626.¹⁶⁴

Now we arrive at one of the more interesting occurrences on the domestic front, sort of. During November 1623 JAN was sailing with two ships that were damaged by the turbulent seas and severe storms of the North Atlantic. He entered the Schelde estuary, sailing down the *Oosterschelde* to reach the port of Veere where he requested permission to dock to complete the necessary repairs pursuant to the clause in the 1610 Treaty of Friendship between the Sultan and the States General that guaranteed the use of Dutch ports by Muslim corsairs. Veere lies on the northern point of Walcheren island in the province of Zeeland in the southern Netherlands. The eleven-year truce between the Spanish Empire and the United Provinces had expired the previous year and the authorities granted his request as Morocco and his *Republic* had been on friendly terms with the Netherlands since the previous year. He did not offload any cargo but he did release some Dutch and English *Christian slaves*. The presence of this ship in Veere touched off a firestorm of protest by France, who had been a recent target of corsair fleets. Diplomatic protests were countered by the position of the States-General that to hinder JAN in any way do so would violate the terms of the treaty then in effect between Algiers and the States-General. It was while in Veere that Dutch authorities are said to have brought his wife SOUTGEN and his daughter LYSBETH, and any more children they had (some claim a son EDWARD), to the dock to try to convince him to return home; this was probably in late 1623. They pleaded to no avail. It is often repeated that JAN, despite his second marriage and family, never shirked his financial responsibility to his first wife and family, regularly sending large sums of money so they had want of nothing. Instead, a number of Dutch seamen join JAN's crew against the wishes of the Dutch government.¹⁶⁵ Repairs to the ship were done in Vlissingen (Flushing), perhaps to hide it from French officials. Vlissingen is on the southern part of the island on the *Westerschelde*. During his stay, at least two more corsairs from Algiers put into port at Zeeland. Leaving Vlissingen, JAN attacked several French ships with at least 15 ending up in the possession of the 3 corsairs. In this, they had the assistance of several Dutch captains who actually captured some of the 15 which they sold to the corsairs.¹⁶⁶ Despite claims to the contrary, ships flying the Dutch flag were not always spared by JAN. He would take the cargo but did not make the crew captive, either letting them head for home on their ship or putting them on shore if they were near a place that was safe to do so; on one occasion he actually seized a German ship, readied its crew for their new life in Algiers as slaves, and put the Dutch crew on it to sail home. On the other hand, letters sent him by the States-General asking for release of crews are usually misunderstood and related as saying he was the captain of the ship that made the capture. As the Admiral, he was the official to whom all such communication would be sent, which he then would act on.

If anything, JAN seems to be an opportunist rather than political – he would take whatever ship he could, the nationality being of little concern. Dutch, English and even French captives would each be released from captivity if such a request was made. Just a year after taking several French vessels, he released the French held in captivity in Salé since he and two other corsairs had captured 15 or more French vessels in the winter of 1624. France sent CORNELIS PIJNAKER as Ambassador to Algiers in 1625 with the specific mission to gain the freedom of the French sailors being held. Finding his way stymied in Algiers, he sent the Dutch renegade REGEB REÏS to JAN with a request to release the French captives, which JAN promptly did.¹⁶⁷

In the State Papers in the British archives is an undated petition from 1624 to JAMES I from CAPTAIN THOMAS KING, *Admiral of the Narrow Seas for five years*, requesting permission to take two ships to Salé, at his own expense, to *revenge the seizure there of his factor and goods, and those of other English*. This petition illustrates how nations were held to be the responsible parties for actions of their citizens. The captain's property was seized in compensation for 150

Moors and Andalusians who were sold as slaves by Mr. Madox, of London who enslaved them after seizing a Salétian ship.¹⁶⁸

In March 1623 the *jacht 'de Groene Leeuw'* and the '*le Veneur*' (or '*de Jager*') sailed from Rotterdam; one had CORNELIUS JANSZ as captain and CHRISTIAN VAN GOOL, a painter from Tiel, was passenger on one. Both were brought to Salé as prizes and JAN was called upon to effect release of Dutch crew. COINDREAU maintains that it was Jan who captured the 240-ton Dutch ship *le Lion Vert* on 27 March off of *Cape Roca*. Two days later he captured another Dutch ship off the coast of Lisbon called *Le Veneur*.¹⁶⁹ ISAAC PALLACHE, consul of the Netherlands to Morocco, sent a letter dated 13 April 1623 from Salé to update the States-General: through his and JAN JANSEN'S intervention with the "governor of the castle" CAÏD ABD EL-AZIZ EZ-ZAROURI, all the Dutch sailors brought in on Dutch prizes recently were freed, but not *the Scottish seamen*. ISAAC is also a grandson of the rabbi ISAAC PALLACHE of Fez, through his son SAMUEL (1550 – 1616). SAMUEL was ZAYDAN'S agent to the States-General at The Hague but fell out of favor when it was found he was a spy in the pay of the Spanish government. Both JANSZ and GOOL had already left on one of JAN'S ships. PALLACHE requested that the PRINCE OF ORANGE provide commissions to all captains who are citizens of the United Provinces, probably hoping to get the same cooperation with others as he got from JAN. He ends his letter with the observation that while the governor of the castle is appointed by the Sultan, the real authority is JAN JANSEN.¹⁷⁰

The States-General sent a letter dated 20 July 1623 to the Governor of Salé requesting restoration of the 200-ton, armed merchant ship '*het Goede Avontuur*' (*The Good Adventure*) based in Rotterdam. This is most likely the same as the ship *Bonaventure* that was taken in November 1621 along with the *Nicholas*. The pirate squadron consisted of three ships and two prizes with a host of English prisoners thus establishing this squadron had been active in and around the Straits of Gibraltar in the fall of 1621. It is possible that the same squadron attacked and captured the 120-ton *Jacob* at the end of October. The English crew was shackled below deck on a corsair vessel while four youths were kept aboard the *Jacob* with thirteen corsairs as they made for Algiers. During a storm, the youths managed to overpower the pirates, killing two and losing two more overboard. They sailed for Spain, landing at "Saint Lucas," presumably Sanlúcar in Cádiz, where the nine remaining pirates were sold as galley slaves before taking on a crew and sailing the *Jacob* back to Bristol. The original crew was sold into slavery in Algiers.¹⁷¹

Returning to '*het Goede Avontuur*', the facts as they were known by the States General were presented in their letter: JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, captain of a warship, captured *The Good Adventure* off the coast of Portugal. A prize crew of French sailors, originally intended to be sold as slaves, was put aboard and the ship taken to Salé. Upon further investigation the States-General issued a statement: *no ships carrying contraband to Spain would be reclaimed if taken to Salé*. While not mentioning *The Good Adventure*, the timing of this statement coupled with dropping the reclamation attempts gives us a pretty good idea what had happened. It seems that DAVID PALLACHE (1598 – 1650; son of the SULTAN'S friend JOSEPH and brother to MOÏSE PALLACHE, JAN'S secretary) had pushed through the shipment of arms and munitions that were headed for Spain, enemy of the States-General since the 12-year truce expired in 1621. JAN had taken the correct action by preventing the shipment of contraband from reaching its destination; it's not mentioned if DAVID PALLACHE was fined or penalized for siding with the enemy. Besides Spain, Morocco was a frequent destination of guns and munitions for ZAYDAN and his many enemies. As mentioned previously, the PALLACHE brothers, SAMUEL and JOSEPH, had obtained the right to ship military goods to ZAYDAN from the States General over a decade earlier. The

civil war and Marboutic Crises had everyone building up weapons stores. At one point a Special Ambassador to Morocco named ALBERT RUYL intercepted some weapons destined for ZAYDAN'S enemies but the States-General made RUYL pay for them rather than just seizing the cargo as contraband. ZAYDAN defended RUYL's actions and demanded that the States-General put an end to the gun smuggling aboard their ships or face being penalized.

In 1623 ZAYDAN mounted his first, and only, serious challenge to the independence of the *Republic*. His failure may have been due to his nephew, ABDALLAH II, Sultan of Fez, raising an army of 5,000 in late 1623 and marching on Marrakesh, forcing ZAYDAN to flee to Safi.¹⁷² England may have been a no-show ally, forcing the campaign to be abandoned. It is known that JAN placed a large order for arms and ammunition from the United Provinces in the first half of 1623. The order was shipped despite a protest, dated 30 May, sent to the States-General by ZAYDAN. The Moroccan Ambassador YOUSSEF BISCAÏNO lodged a protest claiming that munitions shipments could only be done at the Sultan's request.¹⁷³ In the final analysis it was determined that Salé was not under ZAYDAN'S government and the restrictions that were in place only applied to those places that were under his control. By 1623 ISAAC PALLACHE, a son of SAMUEL, had moved to Salé where he functioned as a Dutch consul, negotiating for the Dutch government for the release of Dutch captives.¹⁷⁴ This task was undoubtedly made easier with JAN being the admiral as well as being installed as governor in the town.

Having no success on the military front, ZAYDAN opted for a political win. Knowing that JAN was the elected leader of the *Republic*, ZAYDAN may have tried to minimize the importance of that position, and save face after his military defeat, by announcing the official appointment of JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM to the post of CAÏD OF SALÉ in 1624. Sometimes the position is called *qabtān*, probably meaning captain.¹⁷⁵ A letter from JAN'S secretary, MOÏSE PALLACHE, (who was ISAAC'S cousin) to the States-General, dated 18 August 1624, announces *that the CAPTAIN OF THE COURT, MORATO ARAÏS DE SALÉ, also called JAN JANSEZ. VAN HARLEM, has been named GENERAL OF SALÉ FOR NAVIGATION by SULTAN ZAYDAN. Followed by notice that Letters patent arriving and the direction to Submit all matters for consideration to him directly.* The letter continues with a notification that *CAPTAIN MORATO ARRAIS of Salé* had secured a document when he appeared at ZAYDAN'S court that guaranteed the safety of Dutch persons and goods coming into Salé and prevented the enslavement of any Dutch person. A handwritten notation in the margin, *JAN JANSEN VAN HAERLEM is general of Salee*, was probably made in La Hague.¹⁷⁶ The States-General official recognition of the appointment appears in their records of 26 November 1624.

On 14 October 1624 while sailing off of Cape Finisterre on the northwest coast of Spain, the Salétine privateer EL HAJJ ALI, or ALI REÏS, seized two Dutch ships with Dutch cargo under the command of CAPTAIN EUWOUT HENDRICXZ. HENDRICXZ was told by ALI that unless he declared the cargo to be French, a legitimate prize, he would be thrown overboard. He complied until he appeared before the ADMIRAL OF SALÉ, presumably JAN. To the ADMIRAL, HENDRICXZ explained he had told ALI the cargo was Dutch but ALI threatened his life so he changed origin of the cargo to French. He was given freight of equal value and allowed to return home, on other ships. ALI was apprehended on piracy charges by France, and transferred to a prison in Zeeland. Weapons smuggling was a constant problem, a letter, dated 13 November 1624, was sent from Morocco's ambassador YOUSSEF BISCAÏNO to the States-General requesting *a certification of arms shipment of Portugese merchant DIEGO MUNOZ BELMANTE that were shipped to Morocco in violation of CHERIF'S orders pursuant to the form required by JAN JANSZ, ADMIRAL OF SALEE.*¹⁷⁷ AMBASSADOR

BISCAÏNO stated that ships leaving Salé *en course* or as part of a corsair fleet, are given a commission or *lettre-du-marque* from the ADMIRAL. He then tried to defend the actions of EL HAJJ ALI, by stating that, because the United Provinces is the only nation with which Morocco is at peace, getting a *lettre-du-marque* is not necessary. For this reason, it is common to find corsairs from Salé without a Commission on them and foreign governments cannot legally detain their citizens. This is not true at all; a Commission issued by the government is always required to be on any privateering vessel and all sailing on a vessel that does not have one are liable to be prosecuted as pirates, the penalty of which is usually death. His announcement that a state-of-war existed came as a surprise to just about every nation on the planet. In December 1624 the States-General wrote to ZAYDAN requesting the return of the two seized ships that were still being held by the Admiral at Salé. That JAN'S known secretary, MOÏSE PALLACHE, responded on the 13th of December indicates this was an attempt to circumvent JAN'S authority, since the States-General knew exactly who was in charge at Salé.¹⁷⁸

BISCAÏNO'S statement on the issuing of Commissions had immediate consequences. The Ambassador's attaché in The Netherlands was JOHAN DE MORTAIGNE of Brille. MORTAIGNE was an officer of the States-General, a *Commissaris*. On 4 January 1625 he interviewed 3 *renegados* returning to Netherlands regarding whether or not *rovers* setting out on a *corso* are required to have a *special commission* issued by ADMIRAL? All 3 answered the same, a written Commission, signed by ADMIRAL JAN JANSEN is issued for every vessel that is operating legally. He forwarded his findings to the States-General on 21 January 1625.¹⁷⁹ ward alias JOESOEUF REÏS

The famed Dutch privateer from Dordrecht SIMON DE DANSER (c1577 – 1610?), or ZYMEN DANSEKER, was based at Salé during 1605 – 1612 and his son, known as SIMONSON REÏS, was the major fence for seized cargo and vessels for years later. A *danser* was a privateer who, after a raid, returned to the same port he had sailed from, thus making a *round dance*. While SIMON remained a staunch Calvinist all his life, his son converted to Islam.¹⁸⁰ JAN knew both DANSERS and used the services of JUNIOR as did JAN'S corsair *companion* CLAES GERRITZ COMPAEN (1587 – 1660) based at Salé and Safi, who sailed from 1623 to 1627. COMPAEN, though never considered to be a corsair from Salé, was able to issue safe-conduct passes to those ships he wanted to have access to that port. He was able to act as a master of the town due to his relationship with JAN JANSEN who facilitated the sale of his booty.¹⁸¹ JAN got into the fencing business, handling the overflow from JUNIOR initially but later increased his percentage of the business which put him at odds with JUNIOR. COMPAEN was one of JUNIOR'S major suppliers, selling over 300 prizes at Salé. JUNIOR was not satisfied with being the major fence, by far, for COMPAEN'S prizes; he wanted to be the *only* fence. COMPAEN felt that DANSER paid too little for the booty brought to him, 25% of its value, and he reduced his use of DANSER. Once COMPAEN claims he received only 5,000 guilders for goods worth 85,000; he had to sell in order to buy gunpowder, ammunition and fuses. During a particularly busy period for COMPAEN he decided to use JAN to fence some of his prizes, which did not set well with JUNIOR. To show his displeasure, JUNIOR attacked COMPAEN'S fleet lying at anchor in the harbor. Another confrontation occurred when COMPAEN uncovered DANSER'S plan to steal some of the booty on his ships; instead of booty, DANSER got an ultimatum: your ships or battle. The following day, with COMPAEN'S larger fleet, as many as 7 ships, blocking an escape and a couple broadsides that brought the surrender of some of DANSER'S fleet, DANSER barely made a get-away through the blockade.¹⁸² He returned to Salé with his reputation at a low point which was reflected in the downturn in profits realized through fencing goods. JAN was one of the beneficiaries of the conflict between COMPAEN and DANSER as he fenced thousands of guilders of booty for COMPAEN. COMPAEN

decided to leave Salé in 1627 after having secured a pardon from the States-General. The pardon had been transmitted to Salé by ABRAM VALKENBURG and EVERT VAN BARKHOUT, and they were soon joined by COMPAEN's half-brother HEIN AARTSZ, but COMPAEN was on *corso* and didn't return for six months. All three messengers were JAN's guests during the wait. He had been one of JAN's first clients in his fencing business and to show his appreciation for JAN's fencing services, which made him *thousands of guilders*, COMPAEN gave JAN a 12-gun ship, probably a *polacca*, as a parting gift; the vessel may have been the Dutch prize captained by JACOB QUICK that COMPAEN captured on his last *corso*.¹⁸³ Exactly what JAN's position was with respect to the government is uncertain. SULTAN ZAYDAN appointed a Spanish renegade slave he owned named ADJIB his governor for Salé in 1626; ADJIB was killed the following year.¹⁸⁴ A work of 23 volumes includes COMPAEN's biography which has the following to say about, in the section *JAN JANSZ VAN HAERLEMS leven en bedrijf* (*JAN JANSZ VAN HAERLEMS life and company*) or at least this is the translation:

JAN JANSZ, of Haarlem, was with one of the Holland pirates; he behaved strangely, and coarsely disregarded his commission: took all he could catch ; spared none of the vessels of his own country; carried his prizes to Salé to sell his booty: there he became a renegade Mamelucas, derided Christianity, and after changing his religion persuaded many Christian slaves to change theirs too, to the desertion of the salvation which is through Christ; he was worse than any Turk; according to the proverb, a renegade Christian is the bitterest Mohammedan.

*He married at Salé a woman, deserting his own wife and children, whom he had left at Haarlem; went from small things to greater, up to an admiral at sea; was favored by the king of Morocco with the benefit of anchorage, pilotage, and port fees, which yielded a good sum annually. When he first became acquainted with COMPAEN, he invited him to his ship....*¹⁸⁵

The author's bias is prevalent throughout this work and it is rife with errors and opinion, despite claims that COMPAEN had reviewed the work prior to publication. PHILIP GOSSE said of JAN:

*With the prizes he captured at sea plus the income he received as Admiral which included anchor fees, charges for providing pilots in and out of the harbor, and the other revenues and customs earned from the port, added to the commissions he received for moving all of the captured cargo coming into the port, he became immensely rich.*¹⁸⁶

The Dutch ship *Vliegende Hart* sailed from Amsterdam on 5 April 1625 with a letter-of-marque from the PRINCE OF ORANGE. According to JAN, the ship put into the port of Dunkirk where it apparently took on some cargo that was banned in Morocco, probably weapons. When they reached Salé, the cargo was surreptitiously off-loaded and sold and the vessel was abandoned in the harbor. A completely different account comes from the testimony before the States-General by LAURENS RUTGERTSZ, one of the owners. His version has the captain, JAN VERVEREN, making a rendezvous with another ship based in Setabul while on the way to Dunkirk, where the captain only met with the owner, but no cargo was loaded. The implication is that the two made their plans which had them meet up in Salé. Once there, the cargo was secretly unloaded at night and either stored in town or placed on ships that sailed in the morning; all this was done to avoid harbor taxes. VERVEREN, wrote a letter, in Spanish, giving custody of the ship to the *KAID OF*

SALE, containing the express order *to only release the ship to those who make application to do so or their authorized agent*. Now flush with money and hidden cargo, VERVEREN stole away on another departing vessel with plans to recover the hidden cargo at a later date. The States-General relays RUTGERTSZ request that an investigation be made into the location of any stolen cargo and that the ship be made ready to sail and for JAN to do so and have the ship, with any recovered cargo, sailed to the Admiralty in Amsterdam. He then states that any costs to complete his requests are to be submitted to the SULTAN for reimbursement. JAN ordered the ship to be repaired and provisioned for a return to its home port. When he finished JAN sent an itemized statement, signed *MOERETTERES*, a phonetic spelling of MORAT REÏS, for costs incurred to make repairs and clear the harbor totaling 1869 ducats to ZAYDAN. It was forwarded it to the States-General as an attachment to ZAYDAN's own claim of 2 July 1625. ZAYDAN defends his decision to seize the ship and its contents claiming that the cargo was known to be contraband under Moroccan law, specifically illegal weapons for his enemies, and under international prize law, he had the right, as the aggrieved party – the weapons were meant to topple, if not kill, him – to seize the vessel and cargo as allowed under prize law. The States-General was notified that they were being held responsible for payment of the bill from JAN, as they acted as the owner's agent when they transmitted the instruction of the owner that authorized the repairs to ship and became responsible for damages to the harbor by deciding to represent the owner's wishes. The letter and statement are marked *r 12 February 1627*, received. The bill was refused based on conflicting claims of the event.¹⁸⁷ According to VERMEULEN, RUTGERTSZ applied to the Admiralty for a commission-of-reprisal which was refused but his citation provides no such information.

During February 1626 JAN fell victim to one of his own ploys when he led three ships in the North Sea. MATHYS VAN BOSTEL OOSTERLINCK, also found as MATTHIJS VAN BOOTEL, a fellow Dutchman, is named as his Vice-Admiral; he was from Amsterdam and his wife was still living there in 1626. Earlier, one of the corsair captains from Algiers, HAGGY MAMY REÏS, the former PIETER JANSSEN of Akersloot in North Holland, had plundered a French freighter of its cargo of tobacco. JAN spied a fat prize flying the Dutch flag and had the third corsair pull alongside and fifty men boarded it. The Dutch flag was hauled down, a Spanish one hoisted and suddenly the decks were swarming with Spanish soldiers. The “prize” turned out to be a Spanish privateer from Dunkirk. After a tough fight in which several crewmen were killed and many wounded, this ship was captured by the Spanish. JAN managed to beat a hasty retreat with his two remaining vessels which were heavily damaged. The ship of HAGGY MAMY REÏS managed to sail down the Meuse River to Rotterdam where the authorities refused permission to dock. JAN's ship was more heavily damaged, but managed to make it to Amsterdam via the Texel where the port authorities denied his request to disembark his injured crew members. They also denied his request to be allowed to bury their dead; they had to resort to breaking through the ice and sliding their dead under the ice and into the river. Whether or not the Dutch knew that JAN had attacked what he thought was a Dutch ship is uncertain. But the diplomatic row with France that ensued the last time JAN put into a “home port” remained a sore spot, one the Dutch were not anxious to revive. The Dutch could argue that JAN had violated the terms of the treaty when he captured the Dutch vessel *'het Goede Avontuur'* off the coast of Portugal in 1623 and they were within their rights to refuse. Once the seriousness of the crew's injuries was known, the authorities relaxed this restriction and several crew members were admitted to the city hospital under *Resolutiën 20* dated 20 November 1623. JAN's ship in Amsterdam harbor became icebound and, had he not been able to sell it, they would've been forced to wait out the winter before making the necessary repairs in Amsterdam.¹⁸⁸ The States-General ordered the admiralty

at Rotterdam to board HAGGY's ship and take off any of the Dutch renegade crew, free all slaves and escort the corsairs out to open water; whether or not the order was carried out is not known but HAGGY, or rather the Dutch renegade PIETER, was not taken off his ship. The French envoy protested and tried to embargo the tobacco, eliciting a threat from HAGGY to bomb the town if anyone tried to touch his tobacco. The Dutch were not able to enforce their order to leave so instead they turned to paying the French for the cargo of tobacco without letting the French know who was paying for it. JAN and his crew made their way from Amsterdam to Rotterdam, boarded HAGGY's ship and sailed for Salé in April. HAGGY MAMY REÏS never returned to Algiers, making Salé his home port until 1636 when he was captured by a French squadron.¹⁸⁹ JAN headed towards the North Sea again in 1626 and, after capturing a Spanish ship, put into Veere once again, where the cargo and ship were sold. Raids on the English coast were also numerous at this time with Cornwall and Devon being especially hard hit which resulted in a short-lived truce with KING CHARLES I. For their part, the corsairs felt these raids were justified as Britain had routinely agreed to make certain payments to the North African governments only to not actually make the payments. The corsairs were just collecting that which was due their government.

By 1626 he had befriended the English Ambassador to Morocco, JOHN HARRISON. HARRISON referred to JAN as *CAPTAIN JOHN*. HARRISON had been to Morocco in 1614 and 1616 securing the release of English captives. On his way back to England after failing to secure a treaty between SULTAN ZAYDAN and KING CHARLES I, HARRISON barely escaped capture by three Spanish men-of-war, thanks to JAN's interference in their pursuit of the English Ambassador. While on *corso*, JAN had taken two *Hamburgers* homeward bound from Malaga that had five English merchants on board. These he released to HARRISON as a courtesy, a display that had been acted out several times before this 1626 episode, with many more to come.¹⁹⁰ The Salétian corsaires were particularly active on the coast of Wales in 1626. The Minutes of the House of Lords for the 19th of April of this same year could reveal either the impetus for HARRISON's voyage or the result of it. On that date the Lord President, HENRY MONTAGU, 1st Earl of Manchester (c. 1563 – 7 November 1642) reported that the Lords Committee appointed on March 22nd to resolve the issue of the English captives at Salé returned to offer three options: redemption by force, by Treaty with the King of Morocco, or by paying a ransom. The Lords decided upon the second option and the Lord President was appointed to bring the matter before the King.¹⁹¹ In 1626 it was estimated by Trinity House, the guild that supervised shipping and seaman in England, that there were about 1,300 English captives being held at Salé, most of who had been captured in the English Channel.¹⁹² An agreement was reached in 1626 by which English captives would gain their freedom when the English returned with cannons and ammunition for Salé.¹⁹³

JAN was very influential with any matter concerning the Dutch. In February 1627 the States-General requested that ZAYDAN have the GOVERNOR OF SALÉ, JAN JANSZ, make restitution to CAPTAIN GILES JACOBZ of the ship *Macareel* and to Middleberg and deVere, merchants for their cargo. The ship was headed to Salé to sell the cargo and ransom some captives when it was boarded by CAPTAIN ALARACHE or *ABRATCHE* at 37 degrees less 15 minutes latitude on a ship that was half-owned by CAPTAIN JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, *Admiral of your Majesty*. The captains of the pirate ships replied with a pledge to make good on any judgment rendered. They also sent a letter directly to JAN on 16 February to which he responded:

Nobles, Valliants, Very Discreet Lords States-General

The letter of the 16 February 1627 of your Lords has been handed to me August 11 by CAPTAIN GILES JACOBBSZ when he came from a sea trip. It tells me of the violation of the alliance between His Royal Majesty and the Lords Estates committed by CAPTAIN ALARACHE and his men.

The fault was not that of the CAPTAIN, but of his men who were in revolt against him. I have used all my efforts to produce an accord with CAPTAIN GILES JACOBSZ. The result is that the said JACOBSZ has been willing to renounce all action for damage and interest.

I was distressed that anyone would abuse my orders and violate the treaty of alliance which has been concluded between the powerful Lords Estates and His Royal Highness, MOULAY ZAYDAN. I vow to my death to act favorably toward my fatherland, to assist and to honor it. But I can do no more than I have done, because all the people here are in revolt against the King. God knows what will come to pass.

On this, I commend you to the Lord All Powerful.

Your good friend,

Moeraetteres

12 August 1627 at Sale¹⁹⁴

Another description of this incident relates that the States-General requested his assistance in getting a Dutch ship, its cargo, and a cabin boy released. His letter of 12 August is translated differently; in it he promised that they would continue to enjoy his “*favour and assistance and honor*” in maintaining the Dutch-Moroccan treaty and he would “*stand by the fatherland until death. But I cannot do more than I do, because these people here are rebelling against the king. What the outcome will be, God only knows.*” His choice to use fatherland is an interesting one.¹⁹⁵



The Salé Rovers were not above using subterfuge to gain their prizes. At a time when some European countries had peace treaties with the Algerian Regency JAN is known to have ordered his fleet to fly the Algerian flag (right, upper, 1685 flag of Algiers).



COINDREAUX, citing GOSSE, maintains that JAN flew the flag of the Prince of Orange (right, lower)



when his target was a Spanish ship and *the Croissant Rouge* (Red Crescent) of the Turks (pictured later) when his prey was from anywhere else which he qualifies with noting the *Croissant Rouge* undoubtedly refers to the flag flown by the Turkish galleys.¹⁹⁶ The “true” flag that JAN sailed under isn’t known for certain but a



couple of descriptions survive. Both are on a red background; one had three gold crescent moons but this was also the flag of the Ottoman Empire (left, above); the second had one crescent moon and a dancing figure, both in gold. Coming aside a supposed ally, the flag would be struck and that of the Republic hoisted and another prize would be added to the coffers of the Republic. JAN would often hoist the Dutch flag on his ship or any other if that what was needed to change a potential prize into a real one. Of course flying the Dutch flag could mean you were sailing for


the Dutch West India Company who, in 1628, had one of the most successful, and feared, privateering fleet of any government. A flag specific to Salé is found in a British work from 1847 (left) but the extent of its use through time is uncertain.¹⁹⁷

In September 1628 the Dutch privateer fleet, 31 ships, 689 cannon and 3,800 sailors, captured the Spanish silver fleet in the Straits of Florida and returned to Amsterdam with 11.5 million florins in treasure. But pirates and privateers weren't the only ships to hoist false flags - warships flying the flag of a friendly nation would suddenly, when within cannon shot, strike those colors and hoist their true ones – and promptly try to take or sink their opponent.

What is astonishing is the amount of travel and commerce that successfully reached their anticipated, or at least friendly, ports.

The symbiotic relationship between the Sultanate and the Republic is made apparent through the following story. When JAN's son ANTHONY left Salé in the mid-1620s, ZAYDAN presented him with a gift: a handwritten copy of the Koran that was exquisitely illustrated, bound in the finest leather and covered with gilt lettering and semiprecious stones that had been made for his father AL-MANSUR in 1594. ZAYDAN's own identical copy now rests in the Escorial, the monastery/palace of FELIPE III north of Madrid. This gift would be hard to explain if the two were adversaries. Another famine in 1629 is often given as the reason for ANTHONY's move to Amsterdam but this is much too late as ANTHONY had already established himself in that Dutch city well before famine struck. Whether or not JAN's son ABRAHAM was sent there as a result of this famine, let alone the very fact of his existence, is not known at this time.


JAN is credited by some scholars to have increased the size of the Rover fleet by building about seventeen fast sailing ships called *polaccas*. The *polacca* sailed with a crew of up to seventy-five and was armed with twenty-four, probably small-bore, cannons. Other two-masted vessels sailing from Salé were brigantines, chébecs, and frigates. One notable difference with the ships from Salé was that the size of the sails, lanteen and square, compared to the size of the hull, was much greater which accounted for the greater speed of the rovers.¹⁹⁸ Several raïs that used Salé as their base are known; these include three Frenchman MOHAMMED CANDIL, ALI BAUDRY, and RAMDAN ROUSSAY; two from Tetouan: KHADER GHAILAN and ABDELKRIM RAGON; one from Tangier AHMED LINQUILLO; and three locals: AHMED CORTOBI, MOHAMMED SEMMAR, and AHMED OHAM.¹⁹⁹



The engraving of the *polacca* is supposed one to be one that JAN actually sailed. It has a unique sail configuration of lanteen sails in front and a fore-and-aft rig in the rear. In fact it very well may be that JAN brought a *polacca* back from Algiers that had belonged to SULĒYMAN REİS. These numbers compare favorably with the *caravels* from Algiers that had about the same number of cannon but required four times the men to man the oars. JAN made Lundy Island, in the Bristol Channel, his base of operations with increasing frequency, beginning in 1627

and it was from there that he launched two raids that remain notorious to this day.

The 1627 triumph of getting international recognition for the *Republic* from England was considerably dimmed by events that offset and overshadowed it. Earlier in the year the Dutch government referred to him as CAPTAIN JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, *Admiral of your Majesty* in a letter sent to SULTAN ZAYDAN. In September ZAYDAN died and the succession to the throne




went as smooth as one would expect – his youngest son and designated heir ABÛ MARWAN ABD AL-MALIK II was proclaimed Sultan of Morocco while an older, disgruntled son had himself proclaimed Sultan of Fez.

The French ADMIRAL ISAAC DE RAZILLY may have returned to Salé in 1628 to purchase any Frenchmen held captive. When he was told the price would be 100 guns and 1 million French *livres* his reply was a blockade of the harbor on 6 August followed by cannon fire directed at strong points and military installations on both banks of the Bou-Regreg.²⁰⁰ RAZILLY definitely sailed for Morocco at the head of a fleet on 20 July 1629. He commanded the fleet from his ship, *La Licorne*, a 500 ton, 3rd rate ship-of-the-line with 30 guns and 200 men. The rest of the fleet was made up of similar *vaisseaux*, or ships-of-the-line: the *Saint-Louis*, *Griffon*, *Catherine*, *Hambourg*, *Sainte-Anne* and *Sainte-Jean*. He bombarded Salé and sank three corsair vessels. The

Griffon, sailing under command of BAPTISTE DE TREILLEBOI, was sent to fulfill RAZILLY's plan from 1626 and capture the fortress of Castelo Real at Mogador and to settle some of the 100 or so colonists onboard. After spending a few days on Mogador Island, about a mile out to sea, for reasons that are unclear, TREILLEBOI abandoned the venture and rejoined the fleet at Salé. In 1630 he was back, this time negotiating to purchase French captives. On the way he met "*the Admiral of Sale, MORAT RAIS*" in a caravel at dawn near al-Ma'mura which he forced to ground and took many Moors captive. His ship was a 150-ton derivation of the Spanish caravel and had a length of 22 to 25 meters and a width of about 8 meters. I had three masts and a bowsprit with *civadiere*; they carried two sets of sails: one square for tailwinds and the other lanteen for sailing close to the wind. Armament varied but usually consisted of 8 to 10 cannon and 20 to 25 *pierriers* or stone-throwers. It had a crew of about 150.²⁰¹ On 3 September 1630 the French, represented by RAZILLY and MONSIEUR DE CHALARD, vice-admiral of the fleet, the appointed commissioners of CARDINAL RICHELIEU for the King of France, signed a treaty with *le Capitaine et Gouverneaux du chasteau et ville de Sallé* and the other villages under their jurisdiction within the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco at the *chasteau et Radde de Sallé*. Representing were

ACHMED BEN ALI *BEXELIF* and ABDALA BEN ALI *CASCESY*. It is noted that the signatures of the representatives of Salé were actually Arabic initials and that they were signing the treaty, well, not exactly on *behalf* of SULTAN ABDELMALEK but with the understanding that the terms involved the Sultan as well as the city. In 1631, RAZILLY returned on 12 July and opened negotiations between the two powers at Salé which resulted in the *Capitulations and Articles of Treaty between Salé and France*. An attempt was made to subsume the 12 Articles of the 1630 treaty into another dated 24 September 1631 which contained 17 articles and was called the *Articles of Peace between the Kings of France and Morocco with the acceptance of the Governor and inhabitants of Salé*. This seems to have been an attempt to get one treaty between France, Morocco, and Salé but as it remained unsigned, that attempt failed. A third treaty, supposedly written on the same date in Salé, was signed 29 September 1631 at Safi with the Sultan being named as *ELQUALID*. This treaty contained 26 Articles and made no mention of Salé.

Capitulations were but one part of the legal code concerning formal relations between two nations; two others were the *fermans* and the *berats*. *Berats* were a record of investiture that confirmed an appointment of an ambassador or consul. *Fermans* were a tool by which the



Capitulations could be modified without going through the tediousness and expense of having a new set of *Capitulations* issued. Each of the three had to be reissued when a new ruler took office and the fees were paid. Once the expense of reissuing several *fermans* became excessive, negotiations for a new set of *Capitulations* commenced.²⁰² RAZILLY purchased the freedom of several French sailors being held in captivity. On 2 August 1631 “*MORAT RAYS, Admiral of their vessels*”

requested a passport from RAZILLY to allow one of his ships out of the port, unmolested by the French. RAZILLY granted the passport as long as JAN agreed to include an article in the Concessions that stated the Salétians would not attack any French vessel, nor the vessels of their allies that were within ten leagues of the coast of France. Additionally, the Salétians will protect the French and their allies from all *Turc pirates and others, without discrimination or exception*. JAN agreed to the article and the passport was granted. He also agreed to supply a *caravel* for the use of *His Christian Majesty* when he sends aid to the *Andalusian Moors*. JAN hosted a 3-day negotiating conference that lasted from the 17th to the 20th and a draft was submitted to the governing bodies for consideration. To the French, this was taken to mean the terms had been accepted and there could be no more French vessels taken under Commission. The Salétians rejected the terms and understood that there was no prohibition against taking French vessels as their Commissions were still valid. One clause in the treaty states that the French agree to give safe haven to the Andalucians and Moors that are due to arrive on their shores aboard a *patache* of CAPTAIN BENCARTE and in the *caravel* of MORAT REÏS that was probably the one mentioned on 2 August. Most likely this was a *square-rigged caravel* that closely resembled the newer *polacca* design JAN favored, both having high fore and aft-castles. On September 3rd a 6-year truce was attested to by *the Governors and Captains of Salé and all jurisdictions under its authority and on behalf of the Sultan and by Admiral of the French Navy, COMMANDER RAZILLY for CARDINAL RICHLIEU and the King of France*. During the celebrations that immediately followed, JAN is noted as vouching for the good character of the Republic by two attendees to the negotiations, JEAN ARMAND MUSTAPHA and a CAPTAIN PALLOT who sailed under RAZILLY. The celebratory mood was only marred by the disagreement over the date that the Commissions


issued by JAN against French vessels become null and void, August 24th or September 3rd?²⁰³ This disagreement was apparently worked out as the treaty went into effect. This treaty was supplemented by another the following year between France and Morocco, indicating, again, the independence of the Republic from the Sultanate. A short treaty was ratified at Sainte Germaine on 2 April 1632; it contained just 7 articles but it was followed by an *Acceptation* of these 7 articles by the *ville de Sallé* as represented by *MONSIEURS ELHAC 'ABDALA BEN ALI EL-QUARERY and MAHOMET BENAMAR, gouverneaux de la ville et Chasteau de Sallé et plus Senzayet* signed on 1 September 1635 – all of which goes to show that Sale was a sepaarte jurisdiction from that of Morocco for this entire period.²⁰⁴

JAN's leniency toward the Dutch was noted again in April 1630 when ANTONIO KEYSER wrote in his Journal that *through the actions of the ADMIRAL MORAT RAIS, JAN JANSEN VAN HAERLEM, the Dutch prisoners being held at Salee were released.*²⁰⁵ Dutch envoy JAN WENDELSZ asked the *diwan* for release of any *poor Dutch captives* on 23 April 1630. The *diwan* responded that there weren't any as it was the established policy of MORAT REÏS AL-SAGHIR to question every new captive what their nationality was. If *Dutch* was the reply, the prisoner was immediately released.²⁰⁶

Between 1620 and 1630 it is estimated that the average annual value of the prizes were 1.6 million pounds, roughly equal to \$416 million U.S. dollars today!²⁰⁷ 1630 was a difficult year for JAN. He managed to head off an impending civil war between the Andalusians and Hornacho quite by accident. The *SAINT OF SHELLY* and several other learned Moors were returning from a pilgrimage to Mecca when they met up with JAN in Tunis who gave them a lift to Salé. Through their mediation a military confrontation was avoided and some sort of peace treaty was agreed to, though it would not hold for long. Late in the year the English AMBASSADOR JOHN HARRISON presented JAN with an incredible proposal. He posited that KING CHARLES I should take the Republic of Bou-Regreg into the English government! Believing that the local population already thought of CHARLES as their chief protector, his proposal got more support from JAN who claimed that the Moriscos were *longing to be under a Christian government again*. JAN asked to be kept informed of all developments and if the proposal began to look like reality he would immediately take on oath of loyalty to CHARLES I and lock down the port for English occupation. Then he added, if the proposal was not going to be acted on, he asked HARRISON to procure English citizenship for him and as soon as it was done, he would attack Spanish and Portuguese vessels with the King's commission. HARRISON states that he *professeth himself still a Christian in heart, howsoever in his younger years of infirmitie forced to turne at Argier, taken at Lanserot, being a prisoner there with the Spaniards, and of a prisoner made a slave by the Turkes when they tooke that iland, and after worse, a Turke.*²⁰⁸ This may be the origin of the false 1618 kidnapping and conversion stories that have proliferated in recent years.

Before leaving this section, a rather incredible story was posted online in April 2012. A Moroccan resident named TAHIR SHAH uploaded a description of a journey he made with his daughter to locate the home of JAN JANSEN in Salé to his website; I have extracted the parts wherein he describes landmarks in the town which may point future travelers to the same place. While I find it highly suspect that the mere mention of JAN's name still brings recognition, let alone directions to the ruins of his abode, stranger things have happened. MR. SHAH *approached Salé from the coast* and found himself in an *immense and ancient burial ground*. At the edge of the cemetery was a *low, honey-yellow stone fortress built into the seawall and called the Sqala*. Within the fortress were *rusted iron cannons* and others of *bronze, lizard-green with verdigris*,

still trained on the horizon. Each one had a different crest which he interpreted as being *captured*




by pirates otherwise they would all bear the same crest. A policeman escorted MR. SHAH and his daughter to the dungeon of the *Sqala* [Borj ad Dumû] where they saw *a truly miserable cell which looked as though it had been quite recently used.*

Their escort told his guests *that the last prisoner had been forgotten, and had starved to death.* To find JAN'S home they were told to go to *the old city* and the policeman wrote down an address for them to find (one which MR. SHAH neglected to share). Passing *through the Bab Ma'alka Gate* into the walled medina, they were soon directed *to the great mosque, built in the glorious twelfth century Almohad style* with a different door for each day of the week. They wound their way through several *whitewashed lanes to a spacious square, the Souq el*

Gazelle, the Wool Market. Here was where *slaves had once been sold, having been dragged ashore from captured ships.* They wandered *through the Mellah, the old Jewish quarter,* and were directed *to the crumbling façade of a building. Once plastered, the dressed stone was exposed, ravaged by the elements. A fig tree had taken hold and was growing out from the side, and the studded wooden door was falling to bits.* The wool market occupies the largest square in the city and is where raw and dyed wool in piles is auctioned; *souk al-Ghazel* is an alternate spelling. A distinct market for the sale of woollens and other fabrics is the *Kissaria As-sawari* (souk of the columns). The location of the slave market is disputed with the *souk El-Kbir* (Great market) also claimed as the location of the Christian slave market.²⁰⁹ According to the address given by the policeman at the *Sqala* to MR. SHAH, this was once the home of JAN JANSEN. In the 19th century the *old Jewish Quarter* was the name of the street to the Jewish Quarter or Mellah. That street, *al-mallāh al-qadīm*, is located off the main street that cuts across the business district of town from the Bab Sibta, or Ceuta Gate, to the Bab Jadid. Once past the *souk El-Kbir* or Great market, you look for the entrance to the silk thread market of the *harratines* and *al-mallāh al-qadīm* is on the right heading towards the residential district. In that work, residences are described as having entrances of small cul-de-sacs that branch off the main street and having similar layouts no matter how grand. The small front door opens into a small room from which there is a small corridor to reach the open-air courtyard which will have trees and a fountain. The courtyard has a succession of long, narrow rooms with high ceilings and large doors that run around 3 or 4 sides that open onto the courtyard only; they did not connect directly to each other. Columns in the courtyard support a roof that extends slightly beyond the room to provide shade in the courtyard at all times of the day. The interior walls have the patterns created by inlaid tiles that the country is known for and the ceilings are of sculptured wood. In the 19th century Salé was a town of families and two, the FANNĪSH and the MA'NĪNŪ, trace their lineage back to the corsairs of the 17th century. Perhaps we have more cousins than we think!²¹⁰ Even odder is the online game developer from Sweden that used or planned to use Salé as one of the backdrops for a game. Set in the early 17th century, the "Admiral's Palace" is described in some detail and its location is given as on the same street as the Great Mosque, just north of it. He even has drawings of it. Easily dismissed as a fictional location is less easily dismissed when the descriptions and locations of the places that can be verified are spot-on! Armed with this description, this author attempted to locate this building in 2019 but could not due to the vagueness of the directions.²¹¹ Studying satellite images of the area provides a couple

possibilities as well, assuming that the property remains intact after 4 centuries: Rue Moul Goumri runs NW to SE and in the block directly north of the Great Mosque is a property that looks like it could be the right size as does another at the intersection of Akbat Lafkih Benkhadra and Rue Saniat Hassar.



1629 – 1631: ALGIERS?? SAFI?? AND 1627 – 1632: LUNDY ISLAND IN THE BRISTOL CHANNEL

Money is a very good reason to move and it seems that plenty was available to the Algerian corsairs during this time. The captains were the virtual sovereigns in Algiers by 1628.²¹² Cargoes valued at five million French livres and twenty-three hundred Frenchmen were escorted to Algiers and sold in this three-year period alone. Jan, basically living in the Bristol Channel for two years already, and fearful of the ongoing civil unrest in Morocco, probably moved his wife



to Algiers; whether his sons PHILIP and CORNELIS were still in Salé is not known.

JAN's exploits have him operating from Lundy Island in the Bristol Channel from 1627 (not 1645 as reported by some) to about 1632. JAN launched his



most notorious raids from this enclave. It was said the *Islamic flag* flew over Lundy; unfortunately no description of that flag was given. It was probably the red, *Crescent and Star flag* or the red *SAÂDIAN flag* of Morocco (respectively, left and right, used until 1659). Locally, several villages along the Devon and Cornwall coast were raided further up the Channel prompting watches being kept from church towers and entire coastal villages moved inland. The English mounted a campaign directed by GILES PENN, a Bristol merchant and ship's captain, in the early 1630s which closed JAN's access to Lundy Island. PENN was appointed by CHARLES I the first English Resident Consul to Barbary (Salé) on 30 December 1627.

During his first year on Lundy JAN promised freedom to a Danish slave named PÁLL if he would guide his corsair fleet of a dozen galleys and 3 smaller vessels to the Danish outpost of Iceland. PÁLL ended up staying with the fleet, converted to Islam and was shot in a skirmish with some ships encountered on the way home. JAN's own galley carried 150 men, over twice as large as any of his other crews for which documentation exists, but just 10 cannon, fewer than a standard *polacca*. A surprising amount of detail on this venture is preserved.²¹³ It was such an astounding event the Icelanders actually created a word for it: **THE TYRKJARÁNIÐ** (Turkish Abductions). The raid, according to KLAUS EYJÓLFSSON, member of the *Lögretta* (Icelandic Commonwealth Legislature), supposedly started with a bet made between two *Lords of the Turkish Empire* – MURAT REÏS of Salé and KURE MORAT of Algiers. One said that it was impossible to get even a stone out of Iceland, let alone a man, to which the other proposed a bet: the fleet that brought back the largest number of healthy captives would be the winner; just what he won was not mentioned. EYJÓLFSSON's chronicle was pieced together from eye witness accounts of those who had managed to evade capture and presented to the legislature in 1627 or 1628. The expedition consisted of two fleets with a dozen ships but the English gave battle off the coast of England and 5 of the warships were defeated as they sailed for Iceland. ADMIRAL JAN led his reduced fleet of 3 warships, with the captains AREIF REÏS and BEIRAM REÏS, to Iceland's southwest coast where one of his warships anchored in the harbor at *Grindavík* on 20 June 1627. They raided a Dutch merchant ship that was at anchor and captured two sailors that were sent to investigate what was happening. Thirty crew headed into town, raiding the merchant's store but, as most had been hidden, got very little. They moved to the farm at *Járngerðarstadir* where they captured GUDRÚN JÓNSDÓTTIR, the wife of the owner, and a little girl named GUDRÚN RAFNSDÓTTIR. They also captured three sons of the farmer: JÓN, HELGA and HÉDINN. They encountered four of

GUÐRÚN's brothers, injuring two, and capturing two, HALDÓRR and JÓN JÓNSSON. HALDÓRR became the personal slave of BEIRAM REÍS. They held JÓN GUDLAUGSSON and his son but released the father as he was ill. The crew onboard wasn't idle; they captured two merchant ships, one belonging to HANS ÓLAFSON that was under sail to *Vestfjörður*, and placed their captives below deck, held in neck irons, 4 to a group while the raid continued. The haul of this first stop was some salted fish and animal hides and just 15 captives: 12 locals and 3 Danes; this was put on one of the prizes and sent to Algiers. The warships and the remaining prize headed to *Hafnarfjörður* with plans to capture a ship docked there, but that was not done. Then JAN tried to land at the royal grounds at *Bessastaðir*, where the Danish governor of Iceland HOLGEIR ROSENKRANZ was staying, but was unable to. The governor had alerted merchants to the threat and offered his harbor at *Seilan* as a safe-harbor. The fleet continued to the next harbor at *Álftarnes* (absorbed by *Garðabær* as of January 2013), exchanged some shots with the Danes and continued sailing to *Gardur* before turning back. Two warships and the ÓLAFSON prize entered the harbor at *Álftarnes* but the prize got stuck on a rock piling; they transferred their captives to the grounded ship to prevent the Icelanders from trying to scuttle it during the night. Transferring cargo and captives off the grounded merchant ship to the warships, they were able to refloat it. They sailed west for *Vestfjörður* but were told that four English warships were anchored there. Some sources state they sailed for four days, releasing some of their captives, before heading south and home. Others say that JAN made for the capital of *Reykjavík*, only a short distance from *Bessastaðir*, where he had greater success. GUÐRÍÐUR SÍMONARDÓTTIR, the wife of a farmer on the Vestmann Islands, was one of his captives but stories vary with some saying she was taken in *Reykjavík* while others say the Vestmann Islands.

The second fleet of 4 ships landed at *Hvalsnes* on Iceland's southeast coast on 4 July 1627. The raiders sailed further up the *Austfirðir* (East Fjords), raiding at *Berufjörður* and *Breiðdalur* for the next week and came away with 110 captives, including GUTTOMUR HALLSSON taken on 6 July. Sailing along the south coast they captured, then scuttled, a Danish merchant ship. Joining forces with JAN's fleet they headed to the *Vestmannaeyjar* (Vestmann or Westman Islands) south of Iceland after capturing an English fishing vessel. The combined fleet of 7 warships was reduced in number as some were sent back to Algiers loaded with captives and booty. The smaller combined fleet landed at the harbor of *Kaupstad* on *Heimaey*, the only inhabited island of the group, on 16 July. The Dutch merchant ship *Krabbe* was seized and a total of 242 additional captives were taken from the Islands over the next three days; most of the captives were on the *Krabbe*. Among the captives was a Lutheran minister in his 60s named ÓLAFUR EGILSSON, his wife, ASTA ÞORSTEINSDÓTTIR, and two sons. By the time they sailed away, forty Icelanders had been killed. The corsairs were not pillars of virtue by any definition. Aggression, beatings, humiliation and even rape occurred – in itself not unexpected. What was shocking was that the atrocities were committed by the European renegades, not the Arabs or Amazighs. So shocking did they conduct themselves that the Janissaries were appalled by the conduct of the Europeans.²¹⁴ The voyage to Algiers was noteworthy for the care with which the captives were treated aboard ship, there being no molestation of women; the crew sharing food from their own rations with children; beer, mead and brandy was given despite the Islamic prohibition of alcohol, which none of the Muslim crew drank; and how, when a woman went into labor, a completely private section was cordoned off and she was treated to the best care that could be offered on board. They encountered a severe storm and the fleet was scattered; the *Krabbe* was separated for several days and the captives were put in irons below deck after a plan to mutiny was discovered. On the return voyage, which took about six weeks, JAN managed to capture

another Dutch merchant vessel and imprisoned more people. Of the returning fleet and prizes, the Dutch merchant prize *Krabbe* was the first to make Algiers; according to a letter written in 1631 by HALLSSON, his ship anchored first in Algiers on 12 August, shooting twelve cannon and blowing bagpipes and a trumpet. Another ship, with REVEREND EGILSSON onboard, anchored on the 13th and all of the warships had arrived by the 15th. The captives spent their first week “on display” in prison. First, two captives were taken by JAN JANSEN as he was the Admiral; next PASHA HÜSEYIN claimed his share of one of every eight captives and the remaining captives were split into two groups – one for the crew and the other for the ship’s owners (among this group were the two bettors that started the whole affair). The public auctions started about 20 August and proceeded in groups of 30 with the crew sharing in the profits which, with a child slave fetching upwards of \$300, approached a quarter of a million dollars. Those from *Hvalsnes*, *Berufjörður* and *Breiðdalur* on Iceland’s east coast were first; their auctions lasted until 28 August. Then those taken from the *Vestmannaeyjan* were next on the block, followed by the captives from *Grindavik* and *Reykjavek* on Iceland’s west coast being auctioned last. REVEREND EGILSSON was released in 1628 on condition he head to Denmark to plead with CHRISTIAN IV, KING OF DENMARK, for money to ransom the captives. Several captives managed to ransom themselves over the next few years. GUÐRÚN JÓNSDÓTTIR returned to Iceland in 1628; money was raised in Iceland and used to free several captives in 1632. CHRISTIAN IV ransomed 36 captives in 1636 and more in 1637, including some from *Grindavik*. GUÖRÍÐUR and REVEREND EGILSSON’S wife were in the 1637 group, but the Reverend’s sons were never heard from again. This last group was found to be wanting in matters of Christian religion as they passed through Copenhagen so a 23 year old Icelandic theology student named HALLGRÍMUR PÉTURSSON was given the task. PÉTURSSON soon found himself in a new position – that of soon-to-be father. He left the seminary and returned to Iceland with the group; upon arrival, the 39 year old GUÐRÍÐUR SÍMONARDÓTTIR, said to have been a concubine while in Algiers, learned that her husband had conveniently died a short time before, allowing her to marry the much younger father of her child. She was known as *TYRKJA-GUDDA* and scorned by most. For his part PÉTURSSON worked as a laborer for several years before becoming a minister in 1644 and one of Iceland’s greatest poets! Of the approximately 400 taken captive, 90 adults and children converted to Islam. Two stayed in Algiers and made a new life for themselves: JON ASBJARNARSON held a high post in government and JON JONSSON VESTMANN became a corsair.²¹⁵ EGILSSON writes about his adventure in *Reisubók séra ÓLAF EGILSSONAR* which was published in Iceland and Denmark. In 2008 this book was finally translated into English and, along with many letters from the captives and other contemporary writings, was published in Iceland as *The Travels of REVEREND ÓLAFUR EGILSSON*.²¹⁶ One lasting result of this raid is an Icelandic prayer beseeching God for protection against *the terror of the Turk*.

It was also from Lundy that, in 1631, our ancestor launched an even more infamous raid than THE TYRKJARÁNID. Across the Irish Sea from Lundy was the south coast of Ireland which was festooned with many pirate enclaves, a fact that JAN was undoubtedly aware of. He took with ease two French ships, taking their cargo and 29 crew before staving in the hulls of the useless vessels, followed by an English ship on 17 June. From this crew, the Devon sailor EDWARD FAWLETT’S knowledge of the Irish coast proved invaluable. JAN headed for Kinsale, intercepting the Dungarvan fishing boat of JAMES HACKETT who cautioned him against attacking that town as it was too strongly fortified against JAN’S two ships – one *about 300 tons* with 24 cannon and 200 men and another *about 150 tons* with 12 guns and 80 men. HACKETT was a Roman Catholic and had been dispossessed of his land by the Protestant English; there was no love lost between

him and the English interlopers. JAN dropped anchor at 10 pm in a little inlet called Eastern Hole just outside the harbor at Baltimore. JAN headed up a reconnaissance party using HACKETT's fishing boat, with FAWLETT as guide, returning to his ships a couple hours later where he declared "*We are in a good place. We shall make a bon voyago.*"²¹⁷ *The Sack of Baltimore* is a celebrated Irish poem that memorializes the event – though it is relayed as an Irish lament, the native inhabitants were none-too-sad to see the English removed. Some say the local installed English governor was tried and hanged for failing to mount even a token resistance against the raiders; just who this refers to has not been made clear and no supporting documents have come to light. The raiders numbered 230 and their action yielded some booty and a large number of captives taken from the lower part of town that fronted the harbor. Using HACKETT as a guide, JAN's men made their way to the upper part of town, leaving a line of retreat to the harbor guarded by 60 men armed with muskets. The majority in the upper town had been warned and had already fled; only 10 persons were found. Used as propaganda, some reports state that four hundred captives were taken. STANLEY POOLE, just after misidentifying the leader of the Icelandic raid as the German MURĀD Reīs, states (incorrectly on several points) '*not to be outdone, his namesake MURĀD REĪS, a Fleming, in 1631, ravaged the English coasts, and passing over to Ireland, descended upon Baltimore, sacked the town, and bore away two-hundred and thirty-seven prisoners, men, women, and children, even from the cradle. "It was a piteous sight to see them exposed for sale at Algiers," cries good FATHER DAN; "for then they parted the wife from the husband, and the father from the child; then, say I, they sell the husband here, and the wife there, tearing from her arms the daughter whom she cannot hope to see ever again.*'"²¹⁸ *Many bystanders burst into tears as they saw the grief and despair of these poor Irish.*'²¹⁹ The most specific number of captives, a figure obtained from the town of Baltimore itself, is 109 – 20 men and 89 women and children. All was not civility and politeness with reports of residents being punched and dragged into the streets. Their homes were set ablaze. The corsairs brooked no insolence or defense and at least two men, JOHN DAVYS and TIMOTHY CURLEW, were killed trying to defend their wives. Many families lost a significant number: WILLIAM GUNTHER, being away from home at the time of the raid, lost his wife and 7 children; RICHARD LORRYE, his wife and 4 children were taken along wife RICHARD's sister; JOHN HARRIS, his mother, his wife, their 3 children and their maid were gone. Of the number taken was a very pregnant woman named JOAN BROADBROOK who soon went in to labor aboard ship. Her husband has fled inland during the aid, leaving her and their two children to their fate. She was accorded every possible modicum of privacy, being shielded from all by large sheets and attended to by her kinswomen as well as receiving the best of care possible from JAN's physician. It does cause some wonder why a woman in such a late stage of pregnancy would be taken but that is the story as has been related. She remained captive in Algiers until being ransomed in 1637.²²⁰ JOSEPH CARTER, the mayor of Baltimore, alerted SIR WILLIAM HULL, the deputy vice-admiral at Leamcon the next morning as the raiders were thought to be heading his way and farther west to Crookhaven. Ten miles east at Castlehaven, a merchant ship lay at anchor; despite the pleas of the Baltimore businessmen, the owner would not weigh anchor and pursue the corsairs. The Lord President of Munster, SIR WILLIAM SAINT LEGER, was notified at Mallow as was CAPTAIN WILLIAM HOOKE who was in charge of the *Fifth Whelp*, a fast, well-armed pinnace at Kinsale.

HACKETT and FAWLETT, being set free in exchange for their help, were soon picked up by English authorities. The Englishman FAWLETT was believed when he said he acted under duress and was released. HACKETT, an Irishman, was not so fortunate. The Cork assizes Court were ordered to find him guilty of treason, which they obediently did. HACKETT was hanged. The effect of this raid was much greater, to the point that CHARLES I became personally involved. The recriminations went back and forth between those that should have been patrolling the coast, but were not; the parties responsible for making sure such patrols were supplied; the officials tasked with ensuring the patrols went out; and so on. By the following year a series of beacons had been installed along the south coast of Ireland to warn of an attack and the sea defenses were beefed up with the addition of a couple of galleys.



SIR THOMAS BUTTON was the captain of the 5th *Whelp*, a pinnace ordered by the King to protect the Irish Coast. From the 23rd of May to the 27th of June, he kept his ship in the harbor at Kinsale. BUTTON was known to benefit from his dealings with pirates and may have been paid to stay in harbor as the raid on Baltimore is believed to have been done at the request of the English lord that owned Baltimore. This dereliction of duty was one of several charges lodged against him in the High Court of the Admiralty on 22 February 1634. He entered a plea of *not guilty*, and then died which effectively brought the case to an end.²²¹

On 28 July JAN sailed into the harbor at Algiers with 109 captives as reported by the English consul at that place; some give the actual number as 107 because two elderly captives, ALICE HEARD and OLD OSBOURNE, were set ashore before leaving Ireland, but the consul would not have been aware of that fact. The consul asked the English government for money to redeem the captives in early August; they never acted on that request. The Irish poetic lament bemoans the fact that only two of the captives were ever heard from again. Of course, when we look at the reality of the situation, the captives' lives in Baltimore must have been quite miserable. The fact they were taken from the lower part of town, where the poorer classes lived, pretty much guarantees that their lives were hard. In Algiers their lot was probably somewhat improved and there is no comparison between the cold and damp climate of the Irish coast with that of the warm and balmy southern Mediterranean coast. Add to this the fact that most, if not all, of their family and friends were taken at the same time and shared in their captivity and that they were English transplants to Ireland where they were despised and we may have arrived at the very real reason why only two ever ventured back to Baltimore! More may have left but they undoubtedly headed back to England, not Ireland.

Lundy remained a base of operations for Jan and other corsairs from Salé until 1633 when they were ousted by Spanish privateers who took it for their base of operations. England experienced escalating raids by Salétin corsairs since 1631 when treaty negotiations stalled. In the mid-1630s the town of Plymouth recorded 200 of their citizens being captured in a single day; more than

3,000 Englishmen were enslaved and 47 English vessels captured by Algerian and Salétin raids in England's home waters in just a few years.²²²

1631 – 1634: SAFI

Four years would pass before the proclamation of another Sultan ended the rivalry during which time the competing factions of the *Republic* severely strained its very existence.

JAN was engaged by ABÛ MEROUAN ABDELMALEK, 2nd Sultan of Morocco, early in 1631 to negotiate a treaty on behalf of Morocco with France, once again emphasizing the independence of the Republic that had signed their treaty with France on 2 September 1630. ADMIRAL ISAAC DE RAZILLY was sent by LOUIS XIII, KING OF FRANCE (1601 – 1643) entered into negotiations in 1631 and the resulting *Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1631* allowed a French Consulate to be opened, reduced tariffs on French goods, and granted freedom of religion for French subjects. LOUIS XIII ratified the *Treaty* in 1632. During the negotiations JAN was still living in Salé. The *Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1631* was the most significant good thing to mark the 4 year reign of ABDELMALEK. He was known for his cruelty and debauchery, finally culminating in his murder on 10 March 1631. It is said that he was drunk and unconscious when he was murdered in the El Badi Palace. His brother EL-WALID BEN ZAYDAN succeeded to the throne and, in an unusual thing for a SAÂDIAN, no brother, nephew or marabout was named Sultan of Fez! For the first time in 28 years the lands of Morocco were almost completely united and ruled by one Sultan! It wasn't a completely untroubled reign though. EL-WALID was said to be a pious, honorable man not quick to temper and one who treated his subjects fairly, gaining their support and praise. But it has been reported that a brother named SEMEN, in conjunction with one of the leaders EL-WALID released from prison upon his ascension to the throne, tried to overthrow him. Unsuccessful, and caught, SEMEN was beheaded.²²³ The independence of the *Republic of Bou-Regreg* continued until 1640 at least and Sous and the Anti-Atlas remained outside of the Sultan's area of rule. Sous remained under the rule of the grandson of his short-lived step-grandfather MAHALLI. EL-WALID was a very religious and generous man and became popular among the population. In the first half of his reign, he devoted himself to eliminating his rivals in his family. He imprisoned his cousins and his brother MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH ES SEGHIR for fear that they rebelled against him. He loved poetry, music, and wine.²²⁴

JAN and his family moved to the port of Safi towards the end of 1631 where he served the new SULTAN EL-WALID. Safi is the oldest and largest of Morocco's port cities and its proximity, 86 miles, to the then capital of Marrakesh made it the favored entry point for ambassadors. Two undated descriptions, contrary on some points, are found in the record kept by the French: *Safi is not strong; the walls are mostly in ruins, it has no ditches, ramparts, or fortifications. The population may be five or six hundred thousand, but they are not warlike and will not defend their walls or the town like the Mores called al-arabes who live in tents in the country and are accustomed to fight.* Then, immediately following this one is another: *Safi is the Sultan's 2nd*



port, situated on the coast with good walls and 2 fortresses (chateau) one on the hill and the other at the sea being guarded by 16 eunuchs with the city between the two. At the lower castle are 200 hundred women belonging to the sultan who never come out of the castle unless called to serve the sultan. They are not allowed to interact with men or women unless they are renegade eunuchs. There are about eight hundred men in the

*Jewish quarter and two hundred of the Sultan's soldiers; the rest being poor people.*²²⁵

JAN was appointed to some position at Safi; some say he was the Governor, or *Ca'id*, while others believe he was the Captain, or Admiral, of the Port. The latter seems more probable considering that the French envoy CAPTAIN ANTOINE GABIRON referred to the *alcaïde* as MORAT and named the governor as ABILCHERIN.²²⁶ EL-WALID provided whatever staff he needed to administer the office he held. The previously mentioned DAVID PALLACHE, while serving as an unofficial Dutch envoy to Morocco, lived in Safi. The town was under Portuguese control between 1488 and 1541 during which they built the two fortresses mentioned in the descriptions; both are still standing. The *Dar el-Bahar* (above), or Castle by the Sea, was built to protect the port. The *Kechla* fortress sits on a hill to the rear of the city and housing the military garrison. The Portuguese lost their hold when the Saâdians drove them out just before taking the throne. The *Admiral's palace* would be close to the *Dar el-Bahar* and possibly adjacent. When I examines the fortress and the walls of the town, it was obvious that at one time there was a wall located just where you can see the red flag in the photograph above; that wall projected straight across the street to meet up with a half-tower that still stands. While it is possible that the building where JAN lived with his family still stands somewhere, it is my opinion which is shared by some locals, that the admiral's place was where the road now is.

Once in Safi, JAN took a good look at Aïer, some 20 miles north of town, which had been under consideration as the site for a new port since the first decade of the century. In fact, it was JAN'S secretary MOÏSE PALLACHE who, with his father JOSEPH, tried to persuade ZAYDAN to build a port there in 1612. Seeing its advantages, he persuaded EL WALID that to build the necessary high ground for the location of the Kasbah was not too difficult or too costly. EL WALID was swayed and built the cliff face that we see now, some 60 feet or higher all around the eastern edge of the lagoon, followed by the Kasbah on top.²²⁷

For JAN, the second quarter of the 17th century saw a worsening of the prospects for the Barbary corsairs and the Salé Rovers. Peace was breaking out all over; stronger rulers demanded a greater share of the booty; more merchant ships were lightly, though effectively, armed; impressively-armed Spanish galleons protected the gold-laden ships making their way back to Seville and Madrid – all conspired to make privateering a much more dangerous profession that brought steadily decreasing monetary rewards. This was definitely a good time for a career change!

1635 – 1640: PRISONER OF THE KNIGHTS OF SAINT JOHN ON MALTA

One day I saw in the street more than a hundred women assembled pêle-mêle; they were on their way to console this renégat and corsair. This they did with great lamentations of moaning and all were wailing, not without the shedding of tears, whether they were true or feigned, as is their custom in similar unexpected and catastrophic accidents.

PIERRE DAN wrote the above, according to COINDREAU, after JAN was imprisoned on Malta. The recipient of this female attention was *MORAT FLAMAN*; the circumstances that would explain just how COINDREAU arrived at the conclusion that MORAT FLAMAN and MORAT REÏS were one-and-the-same are not known.²²⁸

The story that JAN was captured by the KNIGHTS OF SAINT JOHN in 1635 and imprisoned in the fortress on Malta until 1640 continues to intrigue, but primary sources to confirm this are lacking. The GRAND MASTER in 1635 was ANTHONY DE PAULLE. *As the story has been told, JAN, who was believed to be living in Tripoli, was captured when his ship was taken by the KNIGHTS off the coast of Tunisia. He was taken to Malta where he was imprisoned in the order's dungeons in Vallarta.* There is no record of JAN ever living in Tripoli and this writer alleges that he was severely mistreated and occasionally tortured for no reason as he held no information the KNIGHTS wanted or needed. USTA MURAD, the DEY OF TUNIS, carefully planned an assault against the KNIGHTS of Malta to liberate their fellow sailors and corsairs. A huge corsair fleet descended upon the island in 1640, now under the GRAND MASTER PAUL LASCARIS CASTELARD, and *successfully mounted a massive attack on the fortress; gaining entry the corsairs set the prisoners free, including the 70 year old JAN. Returning to Tunis, JAN was greatly honored and praised and as each step brought him closer to Morocco, the honors grew in size.* Whether or not this actually happened is debatable. HAMMUDA PASHA BEY with USTA MURAD as DEY controlled Tunis from 1637 until USTA died in July 1640. There is no logic behind the *Dey* of Tunis mounting a costly and dangerous expedition to free someone with almost cursory ties to Tunis. USTA MURAD, also known as *OSTA MORATO GENOVESE*, is a far more likely candidate to (1) be captured off the Tunisian coast and (2) be the Knights' prisoner that causes an expedition to be mounted for a rescue.²²⁹ Perhaps the capture was the cause of the death of USTA MURAD. There is no mention of such an attack on Malta from Tunis, or anywhere else, in the sources consulted.

There are some problems with the time frame as JAN was appointed the first governor for a new port city on the Atlantic in 1634 and, by this time, was quite old and had greatly reduced, if not eliminated, the escapades of the *corso* from his life. There is evidence that he was, in fact, in Walidia in 1638. There was a Dutch renegade that lived in Tunis for 27 years with a similar name, MURAT PICININO REÏS, formerly ULBE JANSZON from Workum. VERMEULEN offers MURATO FLAMENCO from Antwerp as a possibility.²³⁰ Both of these men are on a list of corsairs in Algiers in 1625 – 1626. It is difficult to distinguish which person is meant when the name MURAT REÏS is found in records. A third corsair from either *Génoa* or *Génevois* (a province in

the Duchy of Savoy) named AGOSTINO BIANCO allegedly adopted the same or similar name, confounding a correct identification more and he may be the same person as USTA MURAD, the *Dey* of Tunis. Another person to add to the mix was MORAT FRANÇOIS who was the commander of a military unit sent by the new Sultan, MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH ES SEGHIR, to *reinforce* the *Kasbah of Salé* in 1637.²³¹ A review of the records indicates that most of these used the form MORAT *GÉNOA*, MURAT *PICININO*, or MURATO *FLAMENCO* and it was only later that some *helpful* writer decided to add a *RAÏS* or *REÏS* which only served to cloud the picture.

Some have made the assertion that JAN *sailed the Ionian Sea and fought the Venetians near the coasts of Crete and Cyprus with a vibrant Corsair crew consisting of Dutch, Arab, Moriscos, Turkish and Elite Janissaries. He made large profits by raiding the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Corsica, and the southern coast of Sicily in the Mediterranean and often sold most of his merchandise in Tunis where he became a good friend of the Dey.*²³² While these remain unsupported speculations until such time as documentary evidence is provided, it does provide a framework wherein being captured by the Knights became a possibility.

1634 – 1641 (AND BEYOND): Al-Walidiyya

SULTAN EL-WALID built a new port city, after JAN persuaded him of the feasibility of the project, and gave it the name Al-Walīdiyya (Walidia). The spelling as *Oualidia* is a French creation as the French ‘ou’ is pronounced ‘w’ – both spellings remain in use; it is puzzling that this remnant of the French Protectorate has not been discarded. The new harbor was said to be capable of holding 1,000 vessels and it provided easy access for loading and unloading – unlike independent Salé where they had to drop anchor outside of the harbor because of the once-useful sand bar in front of the harbor and pay high fees to hire smaller boats to shuttle goods in both directions. The need for a new Atlantic port that was really under the control of the Sultanate had been studied since the first decade of the century. About 20 miles north of Safi was a tiny fishing village named Aïer, found on a 1607 Mercator map as Emendera. Foreign entrepreneurs would provide the capital and workers to actually build the port, and the officials needed to run it. In exchange they received the exclusive and lucrative trading rights and control of the harbor. It had been proposed by the Dutch to analyze the possibilities around 1609; their findings dissuaded them of the feasibility of the project. Then the French became interested around 1611 but the interest waned in large part to the ongoing civil strife but also to ZAYDAN’S decision to imprison several French sailors in response to the Frenchman, who was the head of the port project, sailing off with ZAYDAN’S amazing library he was entrusted to safeguard; he was boarded by pirates and the priceless library now sits in the Escorial, north of Madrid. Their interest returned and in 1618 the French financier JEAN HABERT, lord of Montmort formed the “Compagnie du port d’Aïer” to spearhead the project. In May 1612 ZAYDAN abandoned the capital for Safi and it may have been at this time the idea of building a new port city north of Safi in the Doukkela Province. ZAYDAN asked the States-General for help to build the port in the summer of 1621 and, after more than a year of deliberations, ALBERT CORNELIUS RUYL, a minor trader of the Dutch East India Company and a secretary at The Hague, was named Special Ambassador to Morocco in 1622. RUYL had written in his journal during his 1619 visit that JOSEPH PALLACHE, the father of MOÏSE, had told him the sultan would grant a three-year concession for the new port at a cost of 50,000 Dutch guilders per annum.²³³ Commanding two ships with an engineer, stone dressers and gunners onboard, RUYL arrived and proceeded to investigate the possibility despite the local population being in open revolt. RUYL’S report was not favorable to the location suggested, the lack of an elevation on which to build a Kasbah to protect the harbor was one problem; another was the presence of a reef out the outlet of the lagoon which needed to be removed. Whether it was this or ZAYDAN’S growing dislike of the prospect of yet another foreign country in control of one of his ports, nothing came of the venture.²³⁴ The Spanish were quite alarmed at the prospect on another port they sent a fleet of thirty-two warships which dropped anchor just outside of Aïer on 12 June 1623. The arrival of a fleet of fourteen Dutch warships at Safi the following day ended Spanish plans of taking the soon-to-be port city.²³⁵ By the 1620s Safi in the southern Abda Province was the only Atlantic port remaining under ZAYDAN’S control. The northern ports were controlled by *marabouts*, notably AL-‘AYÂCHI; Larache and al-Ma’mura were in Spanish hands; Mazagan was held by the Portugese and Salé was virtually independent. He needed another port. Due to the ongoing civil strife, nothing came of these plans under ZAYDAN. The biggest hurdle to

overcome was the lack of an adequate elevation from which the harbor could be seen and cannons placed for its protection. EL-WALID'S solution was simple and massive – the high cliff on which the Kasbah was perched was built specifically for this purpose.²³⁶ JAN JANSEN was the first appointed Governor of Walidia which may have been a reward for his success in negotiating a favorable treaty with France.

The new port city officially opened for business in 1634 – with JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM as the town's first governor. Coindreau maintains that a commercial port never opened while other sources say otherwise.²³⁷ It was definitely still in use by the corsairs in 1680.²³⁸ A brand new Kasbah had been built to conduct the port's business and protect the port; a deep channel into the lagoon had been dredged making it much easier to enter than at Salé. A garrison of soldiers lived in the Kasbah and JAN was their commander and he, instead of a corsair fleet, the Sultan's Atlantic Fleet of Morocco's Navy was stationed here with JAN as the Admiral. EL-WALID also built a residence for JAN that has been referred to as a *castle* high up on the slope of the gently rising hills inland from the town where the breezes were more cooling. EL-WALID provided a cast of Amazighs to help him govern these several positions – Governor, Admiral and General.

Gate of the Walidia Kasbah



Inside the walls of the Kasbah at Walidia



As governor, he would have supervised the policing of the town and any “high roads” in the vicinity. He also regulated the markets and the pricing of goods, and presided as judge and jury over matters of public safety and minor infractions such as quarrels, thefts, and assaults. He could sentence the guilty to pay a fine (to him) or spend time in prison which could be remitted by a payment (to him as well). The *Kasbah* served as the official government building (which it remains to this day), housing a military regiment, being a weapons depot, and armed with cannons to keep the lagoon clear of enemies.

AL-WALID IBN ZAYDAN IBN AHMAD AL-MANSOUR AL-DHAHABI (the Sultan's full name; in Arabic: الوليد بن زيدان بن أحمد المنصور الذهبي) was assassinated by 4 French renegades in his employ as soldiers on 21 February 1636 over amounts owed for services. There may have been more to the story though as his brother, and successor, employed one *BACHA MAHMOUD*. He was said to

be the instigator of the plot which had placed the brother on the throne. In February 1636, ROBERT BLAKE arrived in Oualidia from England on his own account and MAHMOUD became an indispensable assistant to BLAKE; in two years he was the agent for the English joint-stock *Barbary Company*, incorporated 28 May 1638; CHARLES I's appointed commissioner to the Sultan; and the Sultan's envoy to England. On behalf of the company BLAKE obtained certain rights such as the exclusive right to trade with the regions located between Cap Blanc and Tlemcen for three years and a monopoly on the mining of salt-peter. Responding to the anger of other merchants, this charter was suspended on 5 May 1639.²³⁹ Some say he obtained *the rights to farm the customs duties of the ports of Safi and 'Aer' (the lagoon of the present day Oualidia)* from EL-WALID'S successor, Sultan MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH ES SEGHIR.²⁴⁰ This is an exaggeration though he did get the port custom fees for all English merchants who put in at Safi. An additional caveat he wrangled was that no English merchant could stop at any port in Morocco without first dropping anchor in Safi and making a sincere effort to sell any cargo there before obtaining leave from BLAKE to head to other ports – which was very lucrative. With BLAKE'S activities involving the ports of Safi and Oualidia, it is disappointing to not find mention of JAN JANSEN though the two undoubtedly knew each other. An unnamed *Englishman* recorded in his travel account that he met MORAT ARIEZ, the *alcaid* of Walidia in 1638 and it was thought that this may have been ROBERT BLAKE but MORAT ARIEZ is not found in BLAKE'S journal or letters. A possibility is EDMOND BRADSHAW who was appointed English ambassador to the Sultan arrived in Safi in October 1636.²⁴¹ The biographical information provided by the *Englishman* is that JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM had been a merchant in Lanzarote, his Christian name is JOHN BARBER, he repeats the same captivity and conversion story except that in this version, JAN converted to gain his freedom after which he moved to Salé where he became Admiral; then he moved to Safi in 1631, and convinced EL-WALID to transform Aïer into the new port city of Walidia. In 1638 SIR GEORGE CARTERET wrote that Sultan had *A little Creeke he hath at a place called Gowladie, w^{ch} of late hath beene fortified wth purpose to have made a Porte, but it doth not Answer their expectation.*²⁴²



The States-General appointed the sea captain ANTONIUS CHARLES DE LIEDEKERKE (1587 – 1661) to the post of AMBASSADOR; he sailed from the Texel aboard the 40-gun *Gelderland* on 1 September 1640. The six-year-old East Indiaman measured 128 Amsterdam feet or about 119 feet in length and looked much like the model pictured. The Embassy's purpose was twofold: to renew the alliance with Morocco and to ransom Dutch captives – specifically, the 49 men of the *Erasmus van Rotterdam* and 28 more from *de Maecht van Dordrecht* – who were being held by *SANTON SIDALI* from *Jliego* (probably Ilich, southeast of Agadir). Both ships had been stranded off the coast near Agadir, the *Erasmus* in May 1638 and *de Maecht* sometime later.

A member of the Embassy was the engraver ADRIEN JACOBSZ. MATHAM (1599 – 1660); it is thanks to his presence that we know many of the specifics of the voyage as he recorded the experiences in a journal that was later purchased by PRINCE EUGENE OF SAVOY and deposited in the Library of the Imperial Court at Vienna (now the Austrian National Library).²⁴³ MATHAM mentions the presence of a married couple on board; they were off to visit the wife's father; it was none other than LYSBETH JANSEN VAN HAARLEM and her husband; unfortunately his name is never given. Another passenger was LYSBETH'S brother-in-law JACOB ARISEN; we cannot say if he was the brother of her husband or the husband of a sister. The former seems more likely since

that would mean the party of three consisted of the ARISSEN brothers with one wife, rather than a husband and wife plus the husband of the wife's sister, but not the sister herself. The *Gelderlandt* reached La Rochelle, France on the 19th and remained for about two weeks. They then dropped anchor at Belle-Île off the coast of Brittany on 11 November and finally passed Portugal on the 27th. Lookouts sighted the *land of the Turks* on 2 December and, keeping to the coast, but far enough offshore to avoid musket fire, they entered the harbor at Salé in the evening of December 10th. There are discrepancies in the various published



versions of MATHAM's journal. One says that crew members went into Salé on the 11th where they received a letter from JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM asking permission to board the ship. Another one says that they left for Safi on the 11th, arriving there on the 24th.²⁴⁴ On the 28th two letters from JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM are received from Walidia (clearly indicating that JAN and the Governor of Safi are two different persons). On that same day JACOB ARRISON departs for Walidia with 7 or 8 Moors sent by JAN as an escort. JACOB returned with JAN, plus 18 servants, on the 30th after meeting him on the road to Walidia. One version has JAN sitting *comfortably in the barque on a rug and satin pillows*. Another has MATHAM describe JAN as an *old and feeble man who was carried by servants on a lounge. His carpeted lounge had many silk cushions*. JAN either talked with LYSBETH and then with the AMBASSADOR or JAN was led into the cabin with the AMBASSADOR and LYSBETH where they ate a splendid meal and spent time relaxing and conversing with his daughter. JAN and LYSBETH left the ship, stayed in Safi the next day and headed to Walidia on 1 January. On February 11th, the Ambassador was *magnificently received at Safi, in the manner of that country, with trumpets and drums and a large number of soldiers with muskets, accompanied by the very noble Governor of the town, and the aforementioned JAN JANSS. D'HAERLEM, having before all a richly caparisoned horse for the Lord Ambassador*.²⁴⁵ Later that month MATHAM made a *three or four day trip to the castle of Maladia, the governor of which is JAN JANSS, VAN HAERLEM. By him I was entertained and welcomed very cordially. And for him I have drawn the castle with the entrance of the harbor, and the river, where the ships can lie at anchor*. (Wouldn't these be a find!) LYSBETH, her husband and JACOB stayed with her father through August. As for the Embassy, they visited SULTAN MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH *ES SEGHIR* at the El Badi Palace in Marrakesh in March 1641. Fez fell to the Dala'iyya in that year and Rabat recognized the rule of the Dilâ Prince Sîdî MOHAMMED EL-HADJ; Marrakesh was the last safe inland place for the SAÂDI family. They were later forced from Marrakesh and took refuge in the port city of Safi.

The picture at right is from MATHAM's engraving "*Arrival of ANTONIUS DE LIEDEKERKE in Marrakesh*" (1641). AMBASSADOR DE LIEDEKERKE bought the freedom of 45 Dutchmen from the *Erasmus* for 2,000 ducats on 8 June 1641, at *St. Crux* (*Santa Cruz do Cabo de Aguer*, now Agadir); a French slave held captive for over 40 years was also released. The demand for 3,000 ducats for the remaining 32 was beyond the amount allotted by the States-General. They planned to sail to Safi and left *Santa Cruz* on 6 July, but due to contrary winds they ended up on the island of *Madera* (the Portuguese island of Madeira, 300 miles west of Morocco and 275 miles north of Tenerife, Canary Islands). While there it was learned that Portugal, of which Madeira belonged, had seceded from Spain and that the country had joined with the United Provinces in

declaring war on Spain. They sailed from Madeira on the 27th of July and on that date, MATHAM's journal contains the cryptic entry *CORNELIS VAN HAERLEM sitting in prison in Fonciael* (Funchal, capital of Madeira). With no additional information, it's tempting to say that this was a son of JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM, but the *VAN HAARLEM* would not be the correct toponymic; perhaps MATHAM appended the one used by the father to the son. The *Gelderlandt* reached Safi on August 12th.

JACOB ARRISON returned from Walidia to the ship on 22 August and LYSBETH soon thereafter. The *Gelderlandt* left Safi on the 12th of September and encountered some very rough weather during which both their galleon and their large sloop were wrecked into pieces, the main sail and the mizzen sail were shredded, they sailed up the wrong coast of England, and they reaching Texel on 12 November 1641 but were unable to land because of the rough seas.

There is no record of what became of JAN after LYSBETH returned to the United Provinces. PHILIP GOSSE wrote that an unnamed schoolmaster in Oostzaan, a small town in the province of North Holland in Zaanstreek, Netherlands, wrote about JAN. As this was where CLAES COMPAEN was born in 1587 and where he died a pauper on 25 February 1660, perhaps the work was about COMPAEN with JAN mentioned as an associate; he ended the section on JAN with an ominous phrase: *His end was very painful*.²⁴⁶ A 1659 biography on COMPAEN contains a section on Jan but it is not certain if this is the one GOSSE was referring to.²⁴⁷ The National Archives of Algeria has information about JAN which indicates that at one point he had hopes of gaining control of the island of Corsica as his base of operations. In an exhibition mounted in conjunction with the Swedish Embassy the Archives has ventured their opinion that JAN died in 1641 at Salé from an illness resulting from his treatment in the dungeons of the Knights of Malta.²⁴⁸ This should be not considered as fact though since both the capture by the Knights and his presence in Salé in 1641 is unsubstantiated. As mentioned earlier, the

JAN may have received an award of sorts, a *Crescent Medal*, from a SULTAN, ZAYDAN or EL-WALID, or a different source all together. After his death this *Medal* made its way to his son ANTHONY in New York and was passed down through several generations of descendants. The last descendant to have possession of the *Medal*, or perhaps their executor, supposedly gave the *Medal* to The Holland Society in New York; queries to the Society from this writer about the *Crescent Medal* have gone unanswered.

The Dutch honored JAN JANSEN in 2006 as he is considered to be somewhat of a patriot or freedom-fighter when they nominated an opera performed by the singing group *Camerata Trajectina* that glorifies JAN's life as the lead production for the 2006 Dutch National Opera season.²⁴⁹ Even more recently the stage act "*JAN JANSZON, de blonde Arabier*" toured The Netherlands in 2009. It was written by KARIM EL GUENNOUNI, and based on JAN's life as a pirate.

THE LAST *GUERRE-DE-COURSE* OF THE SALÉ ROVERS

On 1 August 1828, little did *raïs* Brittel of Salé and *raïs* Bargach of Rabat, each at the helm of a ship, realize they were writing the final chapter in the biography of the Salé Rovers.

The Second Barbary War ended in June 1815 with the triumph of the U.S. Navy over Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. In August of the following year the British Royal Navy destroyed the fortifications and ships of Algiers in a 9-hour bombardment. It was these two acts that stirred the Sultan of Morocco, Mulay Suleiman, to order a stop to all corsair activities in 1818. A decade later this order was reversed by his successor Mulay Abd er-Rahman and in July 1828 Brittel and Bargach embarked on what would be the final exhibition of the daring that had struck fear in the heart of every sailor for over two centuries.

Sailing the Atlantic during the first week of August, the Rovers found themselves between Porto, Portugal and Cape Finisterre, Spain where Brittel and Bargach encountered three merchant ships – a British brig, a British schooner, and an Austrian brig – and seized them. Why? The British because they were not flying any identifying flags; the Austrian because of unpaid debts owed by the former Republic of Venice which, since 1815, was Austrian territory. The prizes were sailed back to the Bou-Regreg whereupon the Sultan ordered them to Tangiers where they arrived on the 20th of August.

Both countries immediately acted but, as Austria had no consul in Morocco, the English Consul to Morocco made the first move. The Consul not only rejected the claims of the captains but charged them with flying a false flag – the white flag of the King of France – supported by declarations made under oath by the captain of the brig and the principal members of his crew. Brittel formally denies this accusation and proceedings opened on the 29th in the kasbah of Tangiers. The following day both English ships but the Consul is not satisfied. England demands the Sultan issue a formal proclamation that forbids the use of the ‘stop and visit’ under any pretext whatsoever for all English vessels. The ‘stop and visit’ is allowed under international law to any nation when two ships meet on the open seas. On the 1st of October, two British warships drop anchor in Tangier harbor to demonstrate the English will and an ultimatum is given to the Sultan: English demands will be met within forty days or diplomatic relations will be severed and the port of Tangiers would be shut down by the Royal Navy which is what came to pass on November 12th. In response, the English delegation is held against their will when they try to leave the city without the Sultan’s approval on the 17th. Negotiations follow with sacrifices made on both sides – all the English can leave except the Consul; England will not receive any compensation because there was no physical damage to the ships or cargo; and the ‘stop and visit’ is suspended for English ships – but neither side is satisfied with then agreement signed on 29 January 1829.

Habsburg Austria reacted quite differently and the consequences were much greater. *Le Véloce* was a brig owned by Sieur Monerde whose homeport was Trieste, then a part of Austria too. *Le Véloce* was sailing to Rio de Janeiro with a cargo of oil, wine, and 674 cases of general merchandise, including Venetian glassware, candles, pharmaceuticals, and batteries, when they were intercepted. The crew was immediately removed from their ship and they are sent to Fez, all the time being treated with respect. The consular corps at Tangiers immediately acts and, through the Danish consul, acting on behalf of Austria, asks for the sailors to be released into their custody. The Sultan acquiesces and the prisoners arrive in Tangier on the 8th of October where their expenses are

shared by all the consuls which earn the corps public acknowledgment of this act of humanity from the Austrian *chargé d'affaires* at Madrid.

The tortuous negotiations are to be, hopefully, nudged forward when 4 Austrian warships make their appearance off the coast on the 14th of March in 1829. The Austrian legate demanded a salute to their flag, the immediate release of the crew and *Le Véloce* with the entire cargo intact or paid for in full. The Sultan has 48 hours to respond. Not surprisingly, he does not respond and the legate leaves only to return on the 21st with two more ships.

The consular corps steps in and receives the legate at the marina and, with their marines surrounding them, proceeds to the Danish consulate. That same day a conference is held with the Austrian legate being assisted by the Danish Consul, the governor of Tangier, the sultan's delegate, and the customs official. Headway is made and the captain and the sailors of *Le Véloce* are immediately released, bringing to an end their 7 month adventure in Morocco. Taking no chances, they are immediately embarked on the Austrian ships. On the 22nd the legate and captain pay an official visit to each of the consuls of the city. This is when the demands of the Austrian government are heard: release of *Le Véloce* plus any costs to return her to the same condition she was in when captured, the full cargo returned, and cost of sending the Austrian Navy and the legate to be paid by the Sultan in full.

The demands were impossible to meet, literally. Two Jewish traders from Tétouan arrived in Rabat just days earlier with the Sultan's order to throw any wine on the ship overboard; it also ordered half of the cargo was to be transferred to the Sultan while the other half was remanded to the custody of the customs officials. It is doubtful the Sultan would have submitted to the demands even had it been possible to meet them.

On the 18th of April, with the Moroccans stubbornly refusing to release the ship or its cargo, the Austrian Imperial Navy returned to Tangier. Negotiations are broken off on April 22 and Austria announces that not only will all Moroccan ports be blockaded, but hostilities will commence. Larache is bombarded on June 4th; Asilah on July 21st; and Tétouan on August 31st and again on September 25th. But all does not go well for Austria – a landing is made in Larache but it ends with a hundred Austrian heads being sent to Fez where they are mounted on the gates of the city.

An agreement is finally concluded at the end of February 1830. *Le Véloce* is released as-is without any cargo; Vienna gives up all other demands; and Morocco abandons any claims they held against the Republic of Venice. On the 7th of March 7 in 1830, a small Austrian warship with just 21 sailors arrives at the estuary of Bou Regreg. The sailors immediately commence the repairs needed to make *Le Véloce* seaworthy after 10 months of being abandoned. In Gibraltar, on March 19th, a treaty is concluded between the two countries. Finally, at 4 pm on the 27th of April, 1830, *Le Véloce* sailed from Rabat bound for Gibraltar.

In the midst of these negotiations, the Sultan decided to strengthen his navy by ordering 5 new ships to be built. But this not the 17th century and the Republic of Bou-Regreg was but a dim memory. Just six weeks after *Le Véloce* sailed away, French forces landed in Algiers; six weeks later, that city began 130+ years of occupation. The last of the Sultan's ships was launched at Rabat in 1832; three years later would find all 5 rotting at Larache. The Franco-Moroccan War of 1844 saw a loss of territory and prestige to French-Algeria and Salé was bombarded in 1851 after citizens had stolen cargo that had been rescued from a capsized French merchant vessel. Morocco itself would fall to France and Spain in less than 80 years.

Jacques Caillé, "Le derniers exploit des corsairs du Bou-Regreg," *Hespéris - Archives Berbères et Bulletin de l'Institut des hautes Études Marocaines*, Tome XXXVII, 4^e Trimestres, 1950, pp. 429 – 437.

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- 1) **MARIKEN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM:** born 1598; married JACOB ARRISSEN.
- 2) **LYSBETH JANSEN VAN HAARLEM:** born about 1600. All that is known for certain is that she was married and had traveled to Morocco to visit her father, arriving in December 1640 with the new Dutch Ambassador and leaving in August 1641.
- 3) **ABRAHAM JANSEN VAN SALÉ:** believed to have been born around 1602 in Cartagena. Possibly emigrated to New Amsterdam sometime before 1650 but this may be an unrelated person, in which case JAN'S brother ABRAHAM is a mystery. In the Minutes of the Orphan Masters of New Amsterdam is found the following entry dated 9 April 1659:

CATALYNTJE, the wife of JORSEY, coming in says that a man called ABRAHAM JANSEN VAN SALÉ, alias the TURK, who had lived at her house, was dead, having made a testament whereby he has devised his property to the negro-woman and the child he has by her, JORSEY having been named executor. She says the Deacons of the City have attached and seized the property, and she had been to the Director-General, who has referred her to the Orphanmasters. As the domicile is not within this jurisdiction the case was not taken up by this Board, but again referred to the Director-General and Council.²⁵⁰

That there is no mention of JAN in his *Testament*, and the existence of sources identifying him as a Negro complicates the identification as being a brother.

- 4) **PHILIP JANSEN VAN SALÉ:** died 1674.
- 5) **ANTHONY JANSEN VAN SALÉ:** moved to Amsterdam circa 1625 where he captained some sailing ships and possibly owned one. Lived near the *Haringpakkenstoren* where he met **GRIETJE REYNIERS**, a bar maid at a tavern owned by PIETRE DEWYNTER. He obtained a license to marry **GRIETJE** in December 1629 and they sailed for New Amsterdam before the end of the month. They were married on board ship in January 1630. Their story continues in their own file.
- 6) **CORNELIS JANSEN VAN SALÉ:** may be the same person found in the journal of ADRIEN JACOBSZ. MATHAM under the entry date of 27 July 1641: *CORNELIS VAN HAERLEM sitting in prison in Fonciael* (Funchal, capital of Madeira). This is the only mention of this person in MATHAM'S work but JAN JANSEN VAN HAARLEM is mentioned many times. It may be that MATHAM was identifying him by giving the surname *JANSEN VAN HAARLEM* which could be linked to only one person. Died 1657.
- 7) **(UNNAMED DAUGHTER):** Died young.

HOUSE OF SAADI – leaders and officials

ABU ABDALLAH EL-QÂ'IM (d1517): had two sons, both of whom were acclaimed/declared Sultan:

1. ABOUL-ABBÂS AHMED AL-A'RAJ (1486 – 1557): heir-apparent; entered Marrakech 1523/4; by treaty with MERINID sultan in Fez, became ruler of Marrakech in 1533/4, but not *emir*?; overthrown & imprisoned by brother in 1539/40. He and family members still in prison, were executed 3 days after MOHAMMED AL-SHEIKH was assassinated in 1557 by the governor of Marrakech to prevent a revolt against MOHAMMED's heir.

Chamberlains: MOHAMMED BEN ALI ELANKARTHÎ & MOHAMMED BEN ABOU ZÉÏD ELMETRÂZI
Secretary: SAÏD BEN ALI ELHÂMIDÎ.

1. ZIDAN (d1553): was in Sidjilmassa when father executed; disputed whether he was declared sovereign of Morocco. City pledged their loyalty but 'he did not reign'.
2. MOHAMMED AL-SHEIKH AL-SHARIF AL-HASSANI AL-DRAWI AL-TAGMADERTI
aka MOHAMMED AL-SHEIKH (1488 – 1557)
Was a consul for his brother ABÛ' L-ABBÂS AL-A'RAJ before deposing him.
1ST Emir of Marrakech 1544 – 1557 (assassinated by Turkish agents from Algiers)
1st Emir of Morocco ~1554 – 1557; *Sultan* in many sources.
Chamberlains: ALI BEN ABÛ BEKR AZÎKÎ ELHÂHÎ and MOUSSA BEN DJOMÂDA ELGHOMRÎ.
Fez Cadi (judge): ABÛ HASSOÛN ALI BEN AHMED ELAKHSÂSÎ.
Marrakech Cadi: ABÛ ALI ELHASSEN BEN ABÛ BEKR ESSDJTÂNI.
 1. MOHAMMED ELHARRÂN
 2. ABÛ MOHAMMED ABDELQÂDER; vizier to father, d. 1552.
 3. ABÛ MEROUAN ABDELMALEK ELGHÂZÎ-FI-SEBÎL-ALLA
 4. ABDALLAH AL-GHALIB BILLAH **2ND Emir of Morocco** 1557 – 1574
Vizir: his nephew, the son of ABÛ MOHAMMED ABDELQÂDER
Fez cadi: ABÛ MALEK ABDELOUÂHED BEN AHMED ELHAMÎDI
 5. ABÛ ABDALLAH MOHAMMED II; aka AL-MUTAWAKKIL or ABDALLAH MOHAMMED **3rd Emir of Morocco** 1574 – 1576; d. 1578
 6. MULAY EN-NASER (imprisoned by AL-MUTAWAKKIL 1574)
 7. *Unnamed son* (assassinated by AL-MUTAWAKKIL 1574)
 8. ABÛ MARWAN ABD AL-MALIK I; aka ABD AL-MALIK or MULAY ABDELMALEK **4th Emir of Morocco** 1576 – 1578
 9. AHMAD IBN AL-HÛSSÎN ruled the Drâa Valley as AL-MANSUR's agent
 10. ABÛ SAÏD OTSMÂN
 11. ABOUSSAÂDA ABDELMOUMEN
 12. ABÛ HAFS OMAR
 13. ABOULABBAS AHMED AL-MANSUR (also AL- MANÇÛR)
5TH Emir of Morocco 1578 – 1603
Vizirs: his servant MOULOUD (MAWLÛD); ABDELAZÎZ BEN SAÏD ELMEZOUÂR (ABD AL-AZÎZ AL-MAZWÂR), known as the *OULD MAULÂT-ENNAS*; ABÛ SÂLIM IBRÂHIM AS-

SUFYÂNÎ; ALÎ BEN MANÇÛR ACH-CHAYDAMÎ; and ENNÂSIR BEN ALI BEN CHAQRA (AN-NÂCIR BEN ALI BEN CHAGRA).

Secretary: ABÛ FÂRÈS ABDELAZÎZ BEN IBRAHIM ELFICHTÂL “*ABDELAZIZ ELFICHTÂLÎ*”

Caid (captains): IBRAHIM ESSOFIANI; MOUMEN BEN MOLOUK, *le renégat*;

Marrakech cadi: ABOULQÂSEM BEN ALI ECCHÂTHIBI; ABÛ ABDALLAH MOHAMMED BEN ABDALLAH ERREGRAGUI, nicknamed *BOU ABDELLI*.

Fez cadi: ABÛ MALEK ABDELOUÂHED BEN AHMED ELHAMÎDI

Timbuctoo cadi: ABÛ DJAAFAR OMAR BEN ELÂQEB ESSENHÂDJI

Provosts: ABOULHASSEN ALI BEN SELIMAN ETTAMELI.

Chief of police: MOHAMMED BIN MOHAMMED BEN ELHASSEN, nicknamed *ELMISMAR*

- a. MOHAMMED ES-SHEIKH *EL-MAMOUN*; aka ABDUL ABDALLAH MOHAMMED III

1st Emir of Fez (1603 – 1613); Vice-regent of Fez for ZAYDAN (1608 – 1613)

Pretended Sultan of Marrakech (1608 – 1613?)

1. ABDALLAH II; aka ABDALLAH BEN ECCHAIKH BEN ABOULABBAS ELMANSOUR

2nd Emir of Fez (1613 – 1623)

2. ABD AL-MALIK IBN ABDALLAH; aka ABDELMALEK BEN ECCHAIKH BEN ABOULABBAS ELMANSOUR

3rd Emir of Fez (1623 – 1626); followed by 1st Sultan of Fez

MOHAMMED BEN ECCHAIKH BEN ABOULABBAS ELMANSOUR, nicknamed *ZEGHOUDA*; challenged ABDALLAH II; held Drâa and Sidjilmassa against ZAYDAN; occupied Fez July & August 1619; occupied kasbah at Fez immediately after death of ZAYDAN; killed by the 1st Sultan of Fez, his cousin ABOUL ABBAS AHMED, on 16 June 1628.

- b. ABÛ AL-HASAN ‘ALI

- c. ZAYDAN EN-NASIR; aka ZAYDAN AN-NASSER BEN AHMED; d. 20 September 1627

1st Sultan of Marrakech (1608 – 1626) first to formally adopt title Sultan

1st Sultan of Morocco (1626 – 1627) first ruler of Morocco to use that title

Viziers: Pasha MAHMOUD and YAHIA ADJÂNA ELOURÎKI

Secretaries: ABDELAZIZ ELFICHTÂLI and

ABDELAZIZ BEN MOHAMMED ETTSAÂLEBI

Cadi: ABÛ ABDALLAH ERREGRÂGUI

Caid: MOHAMMED ESSENOUS

1. ABOUL ABBAS AHMED; known as *AHMED*

1st Sultan of Fez (5 November 1627); killed cousin *ZEGHOUDA* 16 June 1628.

Imprisoned in palace at Fez-la-Neuve on 12 August 1628.²⁵¹

2. EL-WALID IBN ZAYDAN; aka AL-WALID IBN AHMED AL-MANSOUR AL-DHAHABI

3rd Sultan of Morocco (1631 – 1636)

Viziers:

Cadis: ABÛ ABDALLAH ĖLNIEZOUÂR ELMERRAKOCHI;

AÏSSA BEN ABDERRAHMAN ESSEDJETÂNI.

3. MOHAMMED ESH SHEIKH ES SEGHIR, aka MOHAMMED ECCHAIKH, MOHAMMED IV;

Revolted against ABDELMALEK (1628) and EL-WALID (1631); imprisoned both times.

4th Sultan of Morocco (1636 – 1655)

Viziers: YAHIA ADJÂNA ELOURÎKI and his son

MOHAMMED BEN YAHIA ADJÂNA (also CAÏD).

Cadis: AÏSSA BEN ABDERRAHMAN ESSDJETÂNI;

ABÛ ABDALLAH ĒLNIEZOUÂR ELMERRAKOCHI, *aka*

MOHAMMED ELMEZOUÂR.

Secretary: MOHAMMED BEN ABDERRAHMAN??

4. AHMAD AL-ABBAS

5th Sultan of Morocco (1655 – 1659)

Murdered 1659 by maternal uncles of the Chebâna tribe who

placed their kinsman ABDELKERÎM BEN ABOU BEKR ECCHEBÂNI

ELHARZI on the throne.

5. “SEMEN” brother who revolted against EL-WALID and was beheaded

6. ABÛ MEROUAN ABDELMALEK; *aka* ABÛ MARWAN ABD AL-MALIK II
‘youngest son’

2nd Sultan of Morocco (1627 - 1631)

Viziers: MABMOUD BACHA, *le renégat*; DJOUDER ADJÂNA

ELOURÎKI; and YAHIA ADJÂNA ELOURÎKI.

Marrakech cadî: AÏSSA BEN ABDERRAHMAN ESSDJETÂNI.

Marrakech mufti: the jurisconsult AHMED ESSALEM.

d. ABDALLAH BEN MANSOUR: known as *EZZOBDA*; sent by ZAYDAN in 1613 to
confront army of ABÛ MAHALLÎ.*

e. ABÛ FARIS ABDALLAH

6th Emir of Marrakech (1603 – 1608) ‘youngest son’

His grandson MOULAY ABDALLAH led a revolt in the Dra against ZAYDAN
circa 1624

*AHMAD ABÛ MAHALLÎ *aka* AHMED IBN ABÛ MAHALLÎ married ZAYDAN’s mother in 1613 and
had himself declared *Sultan of Marrakech* in that year; killed 1614.

[Sources: *Le mahkzen sa’adian* (Harakat, 1973, pp. 49-50.)]

PASHA

This can be *honorific title*, one granted to those held in some level of regard and similar to *Sayeed*. Comparable English versions include *Sir*, *Lord*, and *Esquire*. Even *Mister* and *Missus* are honorifics as was *Master* which I was taught to use when signing my name until the age of twelve: *Master BRIAN SMITH*. (As an aside, *Missus* is an abbreviated form of *Mistress* and what married woman wouldn’t want to be called a *mistress*; at least it’s better than being a *madame*. And *Ms* was used in the 17th century – so much for the progressive 1970s!)

Pasha in addition to being an honorific could also designate a high-ranking official in the Ottoman military or government. It was appended to a person’s name: *ABDIL PASHA*

Pasha or *Paşa* may have originated from the earlier *basha* which would be ironic as a *pasha* selected to be the viceroy of Algiers was called the *bashaw*. Many believe this to be an Anglicized form of the word *pasha* while others claim the Italian *bassa* predated its use by the Ottomans and was the source for the Arabic *bashaw*. However this last derivation runs into trouble when trying to explain the spelling versus pronunciation in Ottoman society. The statement that *pasha* is pronounced *basha* because there is no ‘p’ sound in the language is non-

sensical. Why change the ‘*b*’ of *basha* to the ‘*p*’ in *pasha* if (1) there is no change in pronunciation and (2) there is no equivalent sound or need for ‘*p*’ in the language?

It could only be bestowed by the Sultan and was not restricted to co-religionists. The most common use was in the military in which several different grades were accorded the title: *Vizier-i-Azam* (Grand Vizier), *Mushir* (Field marshal), *Ferik* (army Lieutenant-general or navy Vice-admiral), *Liva* (major general or Rear-admiral), and the *Kapudan Pasha* (Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet). Lower ranks were *Beys* and *Aghas* while higher grades were Persian *Khedive* and the Arab *Vizier*.

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- ¹⁶¹ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 3, pp. 269 and SIHM, First Series, v.1 France, tome 3, pp.313-314 for Moises St. Jago and SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 3, pp 270-272 for Journal of Albert Ruyl.
- ¹⁶² *supra.* van Gelder, "The Republic's Renegades," *JMH*, pp. 194 – 196.
- ¹⁶³ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 634.
- ¹⁶⁴ *op. cit.* Coindreau. "Antoine de Sallettes" *Hespéris* (1947) 34 (3-4): 340 – 373. Smith, D.C., English translation (2020)
- ¹⁶⁵ *supra.* van Gelder, "The Republic's Renegades," *JMH*, citing: J. Roelevink, ed., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal. Nieuwe Reeks VI (1623-1624)* (The Hague, 1989), 20, 28 November 1623; Simon de Vries, *Handelingen en geschiedenissen tusschen den staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, en die van de zee-roovers in Barbaryen [...]* (Amsterdam, 1684), 57-58.
- ¹⁶⁶ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" pp. 632 – 633.
- ¹⁶⁷ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 635.
- ¹⁶⁸ 'James 1 - volume 180: Undated 1624', in *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1623-25*, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London, 1859), pp. 425-435. British History Online <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/jas1/1623-5/pp425-435> [accessed 8 June 2020].
- ¹⁶⁹ *op. cit.* Coindreau, Les corsairs de Salé, p. 76.
- ¹⁷⁰ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 3, pages 244 – 246.
- ¹⁷¹ Adrian Tinniswood. Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquest, and Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean. (New York, NY, Riverhead Books; 2011) Chapter 6.
- ¹⁷² *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 3, pp. 270-272; Journal of Albert Ruyl, letter dated 17 Feb 1623.
- ¹⁷³ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 633.
- ¹⁷⁴ *op. cit.* García-Arenal and Wiegers. A Man of Three Worlds. p. 105.
- ¹⁷⁵ *supra.* van Gelder, "The Republic's Renegades," *JMH*.
- ¹⁷⁶ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, (1913) page 10f.
- ¹⁷⁷ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, pp. 41-43.
- ¹⁷⁸ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, page 74.
- ¹⁷⁹ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, p.99.
- ¹⁸⁰ Dordrecht Regional Archives, "Simon Simonsz de Danser," December 2012.
- ¹⁸¹ *op. cit.* Coindreau, Les corsairs de Salé, p. 63, footnote 1.
- ¹⁸² Stephen Snelders, The Devil's Anarchy: The Sea Robberies of the Most Famous Pirate Claes G. Compaen, and The Very Remarkable Travels of Jan Erasmus Reyning, Buccaneer (Autonometia, 2005) pp. 25-26.
- ¹⁸³ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 3, p.513 (and) Snelders, The Devil's Anarchy.
- ¹⁸⁴ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM, First Series, Vol.1 France, tome 3, p. 25.
- ¹⁸⁵ 'Begin, Midden en Eynde der zee-rooveren Vanden Alderfamieufften Eerft-Zee-Rover Claes G. Compaen. (1659) p. 9; and Nicholaes van Wassenaer, 'tDerde-deel of t'Vervolgh van het Historisch Verhael aller ghedenck-waerdigher gheschiedenissen, die in Europa, als Duytslant, Vranck-rijck, Enghelant, Spaenjen Hungarijen, Polen, Sevenberghen, Sweeden, Walachien, Moldavien, Turckijen, Switserlant, Barbarijen en Nederlant, van de maent April des jaers 1622, tot in Octobri deselven jaers voorgevallen sijn., Amsterdam: Jan Evertsz. Kloppenburgh, 1623. *Pr.* Hoorn: Isaac Willemsz., 1626.
- ¹⁸⁶ *op. cit.* Coindreau, Les corsairs de Salé, p. 77. Citing Philip Gosse. Histoire de la piraterie. (Broché, 1933)
- ¹⁸⁷ *op. cit.* de Castries, SIHM. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, pages 31 – 33, 130 – 131, 132 – 136.
- ¹⁸⁸ *op. cit.* van Gelder cites: Nicolaas van Wassenaar, Het elfde deel of t'vervolgh van het Historisch Verhael aller gedencwaerdiger geschiedenissen XI (Amsterdam, 1626), c.77r-77v. (see note above)

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- ¹⁸⁹ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco," pp. 635 – 636.
- ¹⁹⁰ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 639.
- ¹⁹¹ 'House of Lords Journal Volume 3: 19 April 1626', in *Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 3, 1620-1628* (London, 1767-1830), pp. 562-565. *British History Online* <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lordsjrn/vol3/pp562-565> [accessed 21 March 2018]
- ¹⁹² *supra*. Tinniswood. *Pirates of Barbary*. Chapter 9.
- ¹⁹³ *op. cit.* Lebel, "Le Maroc dans les relations des voyageurs Anglais ...," *Hespéris* (1929) 9 (4): 278.
- ¹⁹⁴ *op. cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, pages 148 – 151, 168 – 170, 192. *op. cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 89.
- ¹⁹⁵ *supra*. van Gelder, "The Republic's Renegades," *JMH*; that footnote states: "[ik zal] het vaderlant noch voor staen tot der doot toe. Maer ick en can niet meerder gedoen als ick en doen, want dit volck van hier die rebellieren tegen den Coninck. Wat het eynde wesen sal is Godt bekent", NADH, SG, Lias Barbarien, 12 August 1627.
- ¹⁹⁶ *op. cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 75, footnote 2. Citing Philip Gosse. *Histoire de la piraterie*. (Broché, 1933); a translation of *The History of Piracy*. (London: Longmans; 1932).
- ¹⁹⁷ Three hundred and six illustrations of the maritime flags of all nations; together with regulations and instructions relating to British flags. Newly arranged by J.S. Hobbs (1847).
- ¹⁹⁸ Maziane, Leïla. "Salé." *Dictionnaire des Corsaires et des Pirates*. (CNRS Editions, Paris; 2008) pp. 729 – 733.
- ¹⁹⁹ *List des corsairs*, <http://dictionnaire.sensagent.leparisien.fr/Liste%20de%20corsaires/fr-fr/#Hollandais>.
- ²⁰⁰ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 639.
- ²⁰¹ *op. cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 103.
- ²⁰² *supra*. Heinsen-Roach, "Consuls, Corsairs, and Captives...", pp. 191 – 192 (pp. 205 – 206 of pdf file).
- ²⁰³ *op. cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 1 France, Tome 3, pages 282 – 366.
- ²⁰⁴ *Recueil de traites et de relations de voyages relatifs à la Turquie, au Maroc et aux États Barbaresques (1522-1635): Voyages de Reimond Merigon, du P. Pacifique de Provins, Jean Chesneau. 1601-1700* (Collection of treaties and journal of the voyages to Turkey, to Morocco and to the Barbary States (1522-1635): Voyages of Reimond Merigon, of P. Pacifique de Provins, Jean Chesneau .. 1601-1700); Folios 117 – 146 verso and reverse and 147 verso. Available from the *Département des manuscrits* at the Bibliothèque nationale de France online at: www.gallica.bnf.fr.
- ²⁰⁵ *op. cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, p. 250.
- ²⁰⁶ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" pp. 639 – 640.
- ²⁰⁷ Maziane, Leïla. "Salé." *Dictionnaire des Corsaires et des Pirates*. (CNRS Editions, Paris; 2008) pp. 729 – 733. And Eric W. Nye, Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, accessed Sunday, June 28, 2020, <https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm>.
- ²⁰⁸ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" pp. 640 – 641. He, in turn, cites de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 3 England, tome 3, pp. 127 – 128. Vermeulen comments: "The version given by Jan Jansz. of his earlier adventures might be slightly romanticised and embellished to please western ears, since renegades whom had renounced God and their native country were not exactly welcome in Europe."
- ²⁰⁹ French Wikipedia, "Souks de Salé," updated 27 October 2017, accessed 18 August 2020; URL: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Souks_de_Salé
- ²¹⁰ Kenneth L. Brown. *People of Salé Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City 1830 – 1930*. (Manchester, England, Manchester University Press; 2006)
- ²¹¹ Tahir Shah, "Home of Jan Jansen in Salé," 2 February 2012, www.tahirshah.com
- ²¹² *op. cit.* Grammont. *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination Turque*. p. 127.

- ²¹³ Björn Jónsson, *The Turkish Raid Saga*, written in 1643 [Reykjavik: The Icelandic Press; 1866]. Vermeulen disagrees with the accepted version of events, mischaracterizing firsthand accounts as *minor Dutch* works; whether he knew of the existence of the Icelandic and Danish accounts by participants or not, it is obvious he chose to not include the most accurate works. Instead he relies on the secondhand accounts of Père Dan who is known to be wrong on many details in most of his stories. He tries to convince readers by stating as fact that the raid on Reykjavik *never occurred*. He does not provide a source of this information and, as we have the name of at least one captive from that town and it was the source of the greatest amount of Jan Jansen's booty, Vermeulen's error is easily dismissed. He maintains that it was conducted by only Algerine corsairs because none of the captives are known to have been in Salé, conveniently failing to mention the presence of two Icelandic captives who appear as Jan's property in Salé immediately following the raid. He also ignores the fact that Jan is known to have sold captive crews in Algiers while unloading the cargo at Salé. Chapter 8 of Adrian Tinniswood's 2010 book *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests, and Captivity in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean* contains a section on the Iceland and Baltimore raids.
- ²¹⁴ Adrian Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests, and Captivity in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean*, (NY: Riverhead Books; 2010) pp. 128 – 144 (pp. 88 – 92 of pdf file).
- ²¹⁵ *op.cit.* Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea*, pp. 76 – 78.
- ²¹⁶ According to the translators, because of Iceland's dire economic conditions the book is not currently available for purchase. <http://reisubok.portal.acrosonic.com>
- ²¹⁷ *op. cit.* Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary*, pp. 128 – 144.
- ²¹⁸ Pierre F. Dan, *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses Corsaires*, 2nd edition, Paris, 1649; p. 277; <https://archive.org/details/histoiredebarbar00danp>
- ²¹⁹ Stanley Poole, *History of the Barbary Corsairs*, p. 233. Vermeulen doubts Jan's participation based on flimsy evidence – he cites a 1627 list of Irish captives at Salé having no Baltimore residents – which it shouldn't have as the raid happened in 1631! He also missed that Jan had been based on Lundy Island since 1627 and still based his operations from there when this raid occurred. He would take booty and prisoners to whatever port offered the highest return and, due to the troubles at Salé, Algiers was the best option; where he lived does not factor into the disposal of prizes.
- ²²⁰ *op. cit.* Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary*, p. 201.
- ²²¹ *op. cit.* Mallet, "Early Seventeenth Century Piracy and Bristol," pp. 21 – 24, 46.
- ²²² Leïla Maziane and Germán Santana Pérez, "Privateers and ports in the mid-Atlantic: Salé and the Canary Islands, c. 1600 – 1850," *International Journal of Maritime History*, 2020, 32 (1) 163. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0843871419886804>
- ²²³ *supra*. Guidi. *Recherches Historiques sur le Maures et Histoire de L'Empire de Maroc*. Volume 3; pp. 333 – 334.
- ²²⁴ *al-Walid ibn Zaydan*, Book Wiki encyclopédie libre; <http://boowiki.info/art/deces-en-1636/al-walid-ibn-zaydan.html>; accessed 19 October 2019.
- ²²⁵ *supra*. *Recueil de traits et ... Voyages de Reimond Merigon*. Folio 373 verso and reverso.
- ²²⁶ *op .cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*.First Series, Vol. 1 France, tome 3, p. 468.
- ²²⁷ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p.643. Vermeulen, in turn, cites de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 3 England, tome 3, pp. 485 – 486.
- ²²⁸ *op. cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 77. Citing Pierre F. Dan. *Histoire de Barbarie et de ses Corsaires*, 1649, p. 254.
- ²²⁹ *op. cit.* Guellouz, et al. *Histoire Générales de la Tunis*, Tome 3.
- ²³⁰ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 642.
- ²³¹ *op. cit.* Tinniswood, *Pirates of Barbary*, p. 188. *op.cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 75, footnote 1.
- ²³² "Jan Janszoon," https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jan_Janszoon&oldid=861296667 (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). "Jan Janszoon," *World Heritage Encyclopedia*, Article ID: WHEBN0010530908 (World Library Foundation, Project Gutenberg; 2019) http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Jan_Janszoon.
- ²³³ *op. cit.* Coindreau. "Antoine de Sallettes" *Hespéris* (1947) 34 (3-4): 358 - 362. Smith, D.C., English translation (2020)

- ²³⁴ *op. cit.* Vermeulen, "From Lanzarote to Morocco" p. 631.
- ²³⁵ *op. cit.* Coindreau. "Antoine de Sallettes" *Hespéris* (1947) 34 (3-4): 358 - 370. Smith, D.C., English translation (2020)
- ²³⁶ *op. cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 1 France, tome 3, p.xliv–xlvii.
- ²³⁷ *op. cit.* Coindreau. "Antoine de Sallettes" *Hespéris* (1947) 34 (3-4): 370 – 373. Smith, D.C., English translation (2020)
- ²³⁸ Philippe de Cossé-Brissac, "Quelques documents inédits sur le Maroc 1670 – 1680," *Hespéris, Archives Berbères et Bulletin de l'Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines*. (Librairie LaRose Paris, 1950) 37 (1 – 2): 110.
- ²³⁹ Brian A. Smith, English translation of Philippe de Cossé-Brissac, "Robert Blake et la Barbary Company, 1636 – 1641" *Hespéris, Archives Berbères et Bulletin de l'Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines*, (Librairie LaRose Paris, 1946) 33 (1 – 2): 103 – 122. (2020) URL: <https://archive.org/details/2020-tr-of-robert-blake-cosse-brissac-hesperes-1946>
- ²⁴⁰ *op. cit.* Lette, "Confronting Barbary," pp. 155 – 156.
- ²⁴¹ British State Papers For Barbary States, Morocco, Vol. 13. "A General Observation of ye Barbary Trade." Cal. S.P. Dam. 1636-7, page 440; 1637-8, page 204. From: 'Venice: November 1637', in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 24, 1636-1639*, ed. Allen B Hinds (London, 1923), pp. 312-328. *British History Online* <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/venice/vol24/pp312-328> [accessed 21 March 2018].
- ²⁴² *op. cit.* Carteret. *Barbary Voyage of 1638*. p. 27.
- ²⁴³ "de oude Heer Smits" (pseudonym of a female writer) "Een oud-hollandsche reis naar de Barbarijsche staten" (roughly "An old Dutch voyage to the Barbary States"), *De Nederlandsche Spectator*, 29 December 1866, No. 52, pages 414-415. ADRIEN MATHAM'S journal was printed at the request of the Imperial Court for the first time as "*Voyage d'Adriaen Matham au Maroc, 1640 - 1641*," (in French) with bibliographical data of the author, introduction and notes by Ferdinand de Hellwald, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1866. See also: Gaston Deverdun, "Communications: A propos de l'estampe de Adriaen Matham: Palatium magni Regis Maroci en Barbaria (Vue de la Casbah de Marrakech in 1641)," *Hespéris, Archives Berbères et Bulletin de l'Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines*. (Librairie LaRose Paris, 1952) 39 (1 – 2): 213 - 218.
- ²⁴⁴ Journal of Adriaen Matham 1640-1642; translated by Cor Snabel and Elizabeth A. Johnson from: Hellwald, Ferdinand de. *Voyage d'Adrien Matham au Maroc (1640-1641)*. 1866. Marinus Nijhoff: The Hague. 11 May 2014 revision. <http://17thcenturyhollanders.pbworks.com/w/page/50086901/Journal%20of%20Adriaen%20Matham%2C%201640-1642>
- ²⁴⁵ *op. cit.* de Castries, *SIHM*. First Series, Vol. 2 Pays-Bas, Tome 4, page 629; quote from the imprint of frontispiece of the book *Une Vue de Merrakesh* (La Hague, 1646).
- ²⁴⁶ *op. cit.* Coindreau, *Les corsairs de Salé*, p. 78. Citing Philip Gosse. *Histoire de la piraterie*. (Broché, 1933).
- ²⁴⁷ 't Begin, midden en eynde der zee-roovereyen van den alderfamieusten zee-roover Claes G. Compaen van Oostzanen in Kennemer-landt. (Amsterdam, printer: een liefhebber van alle nieuwicheden; 1659) p. 19. https://archive.org/details/gri_33125011258296
- ²⁴⁸ Mahnaz Pater-Rov, *Jansen van Salle Genealogy FaceBook group*, post dated 13 April 2019; <https://www.facebook.com/groups/772787496091315/>.
- ²⁴⁹ Listen to excerpts at: <http://www.camerata-trajectina.nl/display.php?l=en&i=notes#janjansen>
- ²⁵⁰ New Amsterdam Records, VI, 84.
- ²⁵¹ *supra*. ibn Muḥammad Ifrānī. *Nozhet-elḥādī*. pp. 404 – 405.